I have personal knowledge of the fact that, when other agencies intercept a terrorist, it is front page news, e.g. as with the recent case of the subway bomb plotters in New York, the Millenium Bomber, and even the underwear bomber. TSA routinely posts their "successes" on their website -- though the list includes people caught with drugs, "invalid" ID and other trivia, conspicuously lacking is anyone detected for suspected terrorism.

Has TSA captured any suspected terrorists and, for some reason, is keeping the fact secret? Perhaps. However, absent any evidence to the contrary, and in light of the strong circumstantial evidence that it has not, I simply do not believe that TSA has accomplished anything in this regard. And, if it has, as I said, stop enough people and you'll get lucky eventually. Even a stopped clock is right twice a day.

More resources and taxpayer dollars down the tube for nothing. :rolleyes:

1,000 hours = 125 work days = 25 work weeks.

"thousands of hours" would imply more than a year of full time "training"

You wouldn't be exaggerating a little bit now, would you?

Given TSA's habit of talking loudly about their "Big Catches" I think the proof that BDO's are ineffective is clear.

You ask me to prove a negative which is impossible. All I asked you to do is show one case of BDO's catching anyone.

Your none response further proves my point.

I have enough contempt to go around. :D

Seriously, I believe that the leaders of the TSA, who have implemented these horrendous policies, are criminals, plain and simple. They have violated their oath as Federal employees, "to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States..."

But the "little folks" on the front lines are not saints, either. They may not have better options, but feeding your family by doing contemptible things is no badge of honor. Soldiers who commit war crimes cease to be heroes. Same thing.

Bruce

That did come out wrong. Thousands of hours of implementing hundreds of hours of additional training beyond the "3 day course". Other federal agencies have training programs for behavioral detection also. What makes you pax think that the TSA has provided the only training?

And without records of successes and failures, there is no way to know if the implementation is effective. What are the objective, quantifiable metrics used to assess the effectiveness of the training and the implementation?

If we are arresting and convicting terrorists found by the TSA and the public/media is unaware of it, then there are even bigger problems. AFAIK, we don't have a Star Chamber for this.

1. I'm a "person", not a "pax".

2. What makes me think that? The fact that TSA won't tell me anything about their training program.

So you want to apply math this to behavioural genetics?

Thousands really, about 25 weeks! That's still years if not decades short of true experts that laugh at TSA "program". There personnel have degrees(masters & PhD Levels) in psychology and behavioral science as well as years of experience before they ever "hit the field".

Then how many terrorists have your caught? and then how many people have you sent for secondary because of a hunch that turned up a terrorist. Then while were at it how many people did you harass in the process.

So other agencies have to allocate time and resources to the TSA? I really wish yinz would quit Staring At Goats and just focus on WEI instead.

Care to repeat that in English this time?

I want to apply quantitative metrics to a program you and the TSA says is "effective".

How do you suggest the effectiveness of the program, the training, and the it's personnel be evaluated? chicken bones and tarot cards?

How does the TSA determine if the program is a waste of time? How does it determine if BDO's are just goofing off instead of "working"? How does the TSA determine if the money spent could be better utilized? These are all basic, valid questions.

:td:

I would suggest that TSA will use the same model as they did with puffers.

Get a sharp sales presentation, buy what is being sold, hook, line and sinker without proper evaluation.

Place extremely expensive tools in airports and play like they are doing a wonderful job.

After senior leadership is replaced announce that the items do not function as well as hoped.

Throw millions of dollars of gear in the dust bin.