SJC ORD LDR

I've heard a lot of talk about AF 447. There was an hour on a local talk show with a substitute host with a PhD in physics talking to an amateur 727 pilot about that crash and both went into why Airbus was less safe. It's been almost 8 years, but they actually got pretty detailed in the differences in Airbus and Boeing. They didn't totally trust Airbus's over-reliance on automation.

I've also talked to a deadheading pilot about the crash and he doesn't think a US airline pilot would have made the same mistake because those pilots made. He thought a lot was training.

ATOBTTR

So to play devil's advocate, what's your explanation for how the 777's auto-throttle and such played a role in the Asiana 777 crash at SFO? (Asiana 214)

readywhenyouare

The captain of flight 214 selected the wrong autopilot mode which disabled the autothrust from controlling airspeed. It does sound like the system could use some simplification to reduce the likelihood of the error being repeated. But the captain was the pilot who was supposed to be monitoring information such as airspeed while the FO flew the plane. Both made unfortunate mistakes. Asiana's training was to blame for that accident. They weren't training their pilots to fly visual approaches in normal line operations.

jrl767

as a 21-year Boeing alum who put in three years as a flight test engineer (mostly 767) and one in Customer Engineering (777, right after program launch), I can think of two things that were relevant at that time: internal capital to underwrite the key technical constituencies (aero, propulsion, structures, loads, systems, avionics, interiors, manufacturing, subcontracts, certification, flight test, and a few others I e probably forgotten) to collaborate on developing and refining a design, and customer interest (which also requires pre-launch investment in the Sales/Marketing workforce, as well as Customer Engineering once discussions with an airline go beyond the preliminary stages)

it is in no way a trivial process

bretthexum

Ever done the 737-900 jaunt from LAX to HNL? Now that's torture. Heheh

readywhenyouare

I think for April fools one year Delta should pull a CRJ-900 up the gate for LAX-NRT and announce an aircraft change. It would be hilarious to watch the medallions explode.

jrl767

​Boeing made economic decisions on fuselage commonality circa 1960 (727), 1965 (737), and 1978 (757); I'd suggest that their relatively robust financials have long spoken to the wisdom of those choices

moreover, I'd suggest that it's completely disingenuous to imply that Boeing could or should have anticipated the massive changes in market conditions and the worldwide airline industry in the ensuing years -- much less the evolution of the average passenger physique, and still less the existence of FT where this sort of discussion can happen

jdrtravel

I personally think that this is not the factor that so many think it is. Sure, some have gotten larger, but plenty of people have not. I am not tall nor overweight and I find main cabin seats to be very tight and uncomfortable.

Kevin AA

The massive increase in load factor and and massive decrease in legroom are 1000x more important than a one inch difference in width of the seat. I would think that anyone would prefer a 17" wide seat with 34" pitch and a good chance of the middle seat being empty (737/727/757 through the 1980's) over an 18" wide seat with 30" pitch and a virtually guaranteed occupied middle seat (which is either you or some stranger).

jdrtravel

I want 34" of pitch and 18" of width.

readywhenyouare

We are in the minority. AA tried the MRTC project but passengers weren't willing to pay for the extra room.

I've always felt it would be in the interest of safety if everyone was weighed at check-in. This would give dispatchers much better control over weight and balance. And anyone who is excessively heavy should be charged for two seats.

Kevin AA

Pick one, which do you prefer?

They sort of have it now with Main Cabin Extra but the way of paying for it is different (free if you don't want it and will put up with Torture Class).

For a large plane, that won't make enough of a difference to waste the time to weigh everyone. The "large of large numbers" means the variance of the weight and balance of the passengers drops as the number of passengers increases. It makes a difference on a 9 seater but after ~20 seats, it doesn't matter unless the load is low (and that only involves moving people around, not weighing them).

ATOBTTR

Just as AF's pilot wasn't properly trained (or in the heat of the moment failed to remember) proper stall recovery. My point being that in instances involving both an Airbus and a Boeing you could point to a drawback within the design being a partial contributing factor but the ultimate contributing factors in both were pilot error.

readywhenyouare

From my understanding the autopilot controls for the Boeing will be made more user friendly in hopes to prevent the mistake from happening in the future.

The Airbus pilots were unaware that the computers had degraded to direct law. This is why the FO was pulling back on the side stick. Under normal law the computer would limit the pitch and increase power to keep the plane from stalling. In direct law the pilot must make sure he/she has enough power and adjust the angle of attack to prevent a stall. Boeing pilots must practice this on a daily basis during take off and landing (assuming not performing an autoland). Airbus pilots are used to having protections and can therefore be a little more clumsy with their flying skills and not have to worry about it. This is why the Airbus is so popular with many startups in emerging economies such as India. They can take inexperienced pilots and quickly train them. The Boeing is not as forgiving and will require a more experienced pilot. There are soft limits on FBW Boeings such as the 777 or 787, but the pilot can override them.

muishkin

This post is so full of fiction and/or claims that could not be proven either way I don't know where to begin.