Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
May 5, 2019, 6:20 pm
#2776
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: Mississauga Ontario
Posts: 4,105
Just more LOL each and every moment.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...d=hp_lead_pos3
Boeing Knew About Safety-Alert Problem for a Year Before Telling FAA, Airlines
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...d=hp_lead_pos3
May 5, 2019, 6:40 pm
#2777
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC SEMM / HH Diamond
Posts: 3,167
Just more LOL each and every moment.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...d=hp_lead_pos3
Boeing Knew About Safety-Alert Problem for a Year Before Telling FAA, Airlines
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...d=hp_lead_pos3
May 5, 2019, 9:28 pm
#2778
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I'm actually not that convinced that the pilots did "let the plane get as completely out of control" as some of the articles imply.
There's no dispute that the plane was out of control (it did crash, after all) ... but how much of that was the pilots responsibility, is where we diverge. For example, the speed did indeed get high ... but articles that claim the speed was exceedingly high (I read one that claimed it was over 500 knots) are either wrong or confused - the speed only became excessively high during the final dive. Prior to that, the speed was maintained at or near Vmo.
Keep in mind that this is occurring in a plane with (a) an active airspeed disagree situation, and (b) an active stick shaker, typically indicating a pending stall (aka you want to increase speed), and (c) a failure to climb in a high-altitude airport with rising terrain. All of those signals would be entirely consistent with a slow speed scenario, hidden by the airspeed disagree, and resulting in a real stall.
Everyone would be super harsh on these pilots if the actual problem had been the latter scenario, and the plane had crashed because it had really stalled, and the pilots had reduced thrust despite the active stick shaker.
I've said several times that I'm not claiming the pilots behaved as supermen, and it does seem likely to me that some other pilots may have been able to salvage the situation.
Where I think we disagree, is that I don't think the above situation (where some pilots may have been able to salvage the situation) is anywhere close to acceptable. Unless we believe that the pilots were behaving profoundly unreasonably, exhibiting behaviours that only a tiny fraction of other pilots would do, and were an active causal factor in the crash (for example, the AF 447 pilots) -- then I am very hesitant to ascribe significant blame to the pilots.
Yes the pilots are meant to be trained to handle challenging situations ... but there's a limit. When the plane is behaving significantly outside the box of "normal plane behaviours", and the pilots respond in a way that is understandable, reasonable and explainable - even if their actions are suboptimal, and some other pilots may have responded better - then I think the vast majority of blame needs to land on the plane.
As we've discussed before, a plane cannot be designed to stay in the sky only when flown by superhuman pilots, or even when flown by pilots who have above the median skill. We need to pick a minimum skill and experience level that is acceptable, and the plane must be able to be flown safely by those pilots.
To me, the evidence is not there that the Ethiopian pilots response was below what I'd consider a minimum skill level. I suspect we disagree on this point.
Hopefully my response above makes it clear that really don't view the situation as entirely black or white, and I'm not discounting the fact that some other pilot may have been able to save the plane.
Let's pretend that there was a lightning strike or an explosion or the error of a mechanic. Of course I would hope that the training and skill of the pilots might save the situation. However, if they were unable to do so, and their responses were still in the range of reasonable (even if not optimal), then the primary cause of the subsequent crash would have been the lightning strike or the explosion or the error of the mechanic. Unless a reasonable pilot could have been reasonably expected to save the plane, then the pilot response would not have been considered the primary cause.
The article you quoted a couple of posts above stated that
and I just don't see it.
BTW, that same article, in it's list of "Contributing Factors", didn't even mention the MCAS design flaw. That is breathtaking to me. They do list "Boeing’s omission in terms of disseminating critical MCAS characteristics" ... as though describing the existence and behaviour of MCAS would have been sufficient ... but they don't list the fact that there was a design flaw as even a contributing factor. Wow.
We agree
There's no dispute that the plane was out of control (it did crash, after all) ... but how much of that was the pilots responsibility, is where we diverge. For example, the speed did indeed get high ... but articles that claim the speed was exceedingly high (I read one that claimed it was over 500 knots) are either wrong or confused - the speed only became excessively high during the final dive. Prior to that, the speed was maintained at or near Vmo.
Keep in mind that this is occurring in a plane with (a) an active airspeed disagree situation, and (b) an active stick shaker, typically indicating a pending stall (aka you want to increase speed), and (c) a failure to climb in a high-altitude airport with rising terrain. All of those signals would be entirely consistent with a slow speed scenario, hidden by the airspeed disagree, and resulting in a real stall.
Everyone would be super harsh on these pilots if the actual problem had been the latter scenario, and the plane had crashed because it had really stalled, and the pilots had reduced thrust despite the active stick shaker.
I've said several times that I'm not claiming the pilots behaved as supermen, and it does seem likely to me that some other pilots may have been able to salvage the situation.
Where I think we disagree, is that I don't think the above situation (where some pilots may have been able to salvage the situation) is anywhere close to acceptable. Unless we believe that the pilots were behaving profoundly unreasonably, exhibiting behaviours that only a tiny fraction of other pilots would do, and were an active causal factor in the crash (for example, the AF 447 pilots) -- then I am very hesitant to ascribe significant blame to the pilots.
Yes the pilots are meant to be trained to handle challenging situations ... but there's a limit. When the plane is behaving significantly outside the box of "normal plane behaviours", and the pilots respond in a way that is understandable, reasonable and explainable - even if their actions are suboptimal, and some other pilots may have responded better - then I think the vast majority of blame needs to land on the plane.
As we've discussed before, a plane cannot be designed to stay in the sky only when flown by superhuman pilots, or even when flown by pilots who have above the median skill. We need to pick a minimum skill and experience level that is acceptable, and the plane must be able to be flown safely by those pilots.
To me, the evidence is not there that the Ethiopian pilots response was below what I'd consider a minimum skill level. I suspect we disagree on this point.
Hopefully my response above makes it clear that really don't view the situation as entirely black or white, and I'm not discounting the fact that some other pilot may have been able to save the plane.
Let's pretend that there was a lightning strike or an explosion or the error of a mechanic. Of course I would hope that the training and skill of the pilots might save the situation. However, if they were unable to do so, and their responses were still in the range of reasonable (even if not optimal), then the primary cause of the subsequent crash would have been the lightning strike or the explosion or the error of the mechanic. Unless a reasonable pilot could have been reasonably expected to save the plane, then the pilot response would not have been considered the primary cause.
The article you quoted a couple of posts above stated that
and I just don't see it.
BTW, that same article, in it's list of "Contributing Factors", didn't even mention the MCAS design flaw. That is breathtaking to me. They do list "Boeing’s omission in terms of disseminating critical MCAS characteristics" ... as though describing the existence and behaviour of MCAS would have been sufficient ... but they don't list the fact that there was a design flaw as even a contributing factor. Wow.
We agree
Last edited by bimmerdriver; May 5, 2019 at 11:41 pm
May 6, 2019, 4:55 am
#2780
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: Mississauga Ontario
Posts: 4,105
yup, 357 dead - plenty to laugh at - I’m sure you’re being sarcastic
And some posts up thread asked whether criminal act involved - as more and more comes out, possibly an investigation is warranted by Cdn govt to whether Boeing knowingly/deceptively sold lethal product to AC & WJ? Competition Act does have Criminal Code section for such proactive behavior. And as Cdn citizens have died with ET, then legal standing exists to trace deceptive sale of MAX to Cdn jurisdiction, possibly?
I'm referring to all the Boeing apologists who were so quick to say there was nothing wrong etc etc.
May 6, 2019, 7:20 am
#2783
Join Date: Sep 2005
Programs: AC MM E50 , Former SPG, now Marriott LT Plat
Posts: 6,263
Two non-paywall alternatives:
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-re...ts?item=130431
May 6, 2019, 9:22 am
#2784
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,804
as they say, hindsight is 20/20 - and if Boeing 37 program managers purposefully hid information, not just from senior mgmt but regulators too, then I can see how folks here can logically reach conclusion nothing wrong. And in the face of new information, presumably positive views about Boeing should change too - my views have and will change in future based on evolving disclosures.
So question AC needs to ask itself before saying anything in public about future MAX ops - what else has not been disclosed, and can AC continue to believe this is the only latent defect?
And here is rub, AC needs MAX back in service to continue strong financial performance so will these questions get proper attention- and how will traveling public know that proper due diligence has been done when AC (& WJ) begin full court press with Minister of Transport to rescind flight ban.
some tough questions that need a public explanation!
Interesting, in the piece about first trimester performance in the Globe, Rovinescu said AC would do their own safety assessment of the Max before returning it in service. But alas, I am not 100% convinced they really have the capability...https://www.theglobeandmail.com/busi...climbs-higher/
May 6, 2019, 9:24 am
#2785
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YYC
Programs: AC 50k 1MM, Marriott LT Titanium Elite
Posts: 3,402
Interesting, in the piece about first trimester performance in the Globe, Rovinescu said AC would do their own safety assessment of the Max before returning it in service. But alas, I am not 100% convinced they really have the capability...https://www.theglobeandmail.com/busi...climbs-higher/
And I would be amazed if Boeing would make their source code available.
May 6, 2019, 10:19 am
#2786
Join Date: Feb 2004
Location: USA
Programs: AC SE100K, F9 100k, NK Gold, UA *S, Hyatt Glob, Bonvoy Titanium
Posts: 5,195
Or straight from the horse's mouth, in full double-speak:
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-re...ts?item=130431
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-re...ts?item=130431
7 long paragraphs, so painful to get through reading. They ramble on and on about: how some systems are not even needed, how programming seems hard, etc.
Their goal is clear: confuse readers and make them think that disclosing this to their internal programmers was a BETTER or legal alternative to disclosing it to their customers, pilots, and the FAA.
This stuff makes Boeing look worse and worse. They needed to own up to the issues, wait till the regulatory authorities worldwide come to their own conclusions and redesign requirements.
Makes me sick to see their strategy of wining and dining pilots of airlines worldwide. Inviting them for executive test flights is pretty damn underhanded. They clearly are using pilots to pressure the regulatory authorities to accept the "fix" and get planes in the air.
AKA "wow, my buddies at Boeing gave me an all expense paid trip to Seattle, had a wicked party with pilots worldwide and test flight. Of course I'll go on record saying they convinced me they are safe to fly." Conveniently leaving out the part that they are just operators rather than design/safety engineers or accident investigators.
Last edited by expert7700; May 6, 2019 at 10:45 am
May 6, 2019, 12:32 pm
#2787
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: YXE
Posts: 3,050
Anyone who tells you that these airplanes can be fixed just by walking up to them with a laptop.... Doesn't know what they're talking about, IMHO. And spectacularly that seems to include the manufacturer as well.
May 6, 2019, 12:36 pm
#2788
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YXU
Programs: AC SE100K, National E/E, HH Diamond, IHG Diamond, MB, Avis PC
Posts: 969
Its not even a matter of 'source code'. All that needs to be done to determine whether Boeing has even begun to take the issue seriously is look at the airplane and try to find the 3rd AoA sensor that is the absolute minimum that must be done to produce an implementation that could possibly meet requirements. Since Boeing still hasn't even begun to put a proper non-software fix on the table, it logically follows that there's no chance of the plane being considered airworthy and consistently survivable of even a birdstrike to one of the sensors, let alone any of the many of other events that could occur.
Anyone who tells you that these airplanes can be fixed just by walking up to them with a laptop.... Doesn't know what they're talking about, IMHO. And spectacularly that seems to include the manufacturer as well.
Anyone who tells you that these airplanes can be fixed just by walking up to them with a laptop.... Doesn't know what they're talking about, IMHO. And spectacularly that seems to include the manufacturer as well.
May 6, 2019, 1:09 pm
#2789
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YYC
Programs: AC 50k 1MM, Marriott LT Titanium Elite
Posts: 3,402
Its not even a matter of 'source code'. All that needs to be done to determine whether Boeing has even begun to take the issue seriously is look at the airplane and try to find the 3rd AoA sensor that is the absolute minimum that must be done to produce an implementation that could possibly meet requirements. Since Boeing still hasn't even begun to put a proper non-software fix on the table, it logically follows that there's no chance of the plane being considered airworthy and consistently survivable of even a birdstrike to one of the sensors, let alone any of the many of other events that could occur.
Anyone who tells you that these airplanes can be fixed just by walking up to them with a laptop.... Doesn't know what they're talking about, IMHO. And spectacularly that seems to include the manufacturer as well.
Anyone who tells you that these airplanes can be fixed just by walking up to them with a laptop.... Doesn't know what they're talking about, IMHO. And spectacularly that seems to include the manufacturer as well.
I just wanted to point out that a thorough evaluation of an aircraft would require examining software source code. Does anybody here really think that AC has the necessary expertise to evaluate software? (Cue AC IT jokes. Rightly so.)
May 6, 2019, 3:10 pm
#2790
Join Date: Jan 2017
Location: Halifax
Programs: AC SE100K, Marriott Lifetime Platinum Elite. NEXUS
Posts: 4,569
But here is the critical difference, On Airbus aircraft, typically flown by computers, if the computers get confused, it releases control, and turns over control to the human pilots.
In the MAX, typically flown by humans, when the computer gets confused, it takes control and flies the aircraft into the ground. It can cross check 38 sensors, but if the failure mode continues to be to fight with the pilot, then nothing else before that matters.
Pilots aircraft my ....