Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
Mar 11, 2019, 9:03 am
#1711
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: YAM, CIU, CGN
Programs: AC FOTSG, DL WM
Posts: 190
So personally, what I'm interested in now is whether the MAX is statistically safer than other aircraft. Two crashes in ~22 months of operation seems like a lot.
I can't seem to find a good source for how many total flights the 737 MAX fleet has operated -- does anyone have a figure for this? In lieu of which, if I use some very, very handwavy assumptions and some cocktail napkin math...
350 aircraft * 22 months * 30 days/month * 4.5 flts/day * 0.50 delivery curve = 519,750 flights ever operated by a 737 MAX in total.
2 fatal hull loss accidents / .519750 million flights so far = 3.85 fatal hull loss accidents per million takeoffs.
Looking at this statistical report assembled by Boeing for 1959-2017, this puts the 737 MAX roughly on par with the DC-8, better than the 707 & 720, but notably worse than the DC-9 and BAC 1-11, with many of the common aircraft still in service being well down the list.
http://www.boeing.com/resources/boei...df/statsum.pdf
Take this with somewhere between a bucket and a barrel of salt in lieu of the assumptions made and the (thankfully) small sample sizes involved when it comes to airliner crashes.
I can't seem to find a good source for how many total flights the 737 MAX fleet has operated -- does anyone have a figure for this? In lieu of which, if I use some very, very handwavy assumptions and some cocktail napkin math...
- Boeing has delivered 350 of these aircraft so far.
- First delivery was 16 May 2017, giving about 22 months in service so far.
- Possibly the biggest unknown: how many flights per day for these aircraft? I think the industry average for narrowbodies is about 4, with operators like Southwest being a bit above 5. Say 4.5?
- And then if we assume deliveries were perfectly linear (ha ha), we get...
350 aircraft * 22 months * 30 days/month * 4.5 flts/day * 0.50 delivery curve = 519,750 flights ever operated by a 737 MAX in total.
2 fatal hull loss accidents / .519750 million flights so far = 3.85 fatal hull loss accidents per million takeoffs.
Looking at this statistical report assembled by Boeing for 1959-2017, this puts the 737 MAX roughly on par with the DC-8, better than the 707 & 720, but notably worse than the DC-9 and BAC 1-11, with many of the common aircraft still in service being well down the list.
http://www.boeing.com/resources/boei...df/statsum.pdf
Take this with somewhere between a bucket and a barrel of salt in lieu of the assumptions made and the (thankfully) small sample sizes involved when it comes to airliner crashes.
Mar 11, 2019, 9:07 am
#1713
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: YEG
Posts: 3,925
You can’t just ground 24 aircraft without a contingency (unless there is an imminent danger). Despite the panic, there is no imminent danger. However, I believe more groundings are inevitable, even if the airlines choose to do so simply to demonstrate their concern publicly, and pressure Boeing.
In AC’s case, if they decide to ground the 737s, they need to reposition A32X aircraft, cancel some flights, add some wide body capacity to cover some of those flights (such as Vancouver - Hawaii Max flights ). 24 aircraft out of the fleet will have a significant impact on operations.
I am certain Air Canada has just about finalized their plans. I believe WestJet has done the same. I suspect both AC and WJ will announce the groundings within hours of each other (if they choose to do so).
In AC’s case, if they decide to ground the 737s, they need to reposition A32X aircraft, cancel some flights, add some wide body capacity to cover some of those flights (such as Vancouver - Hawaii Max flights ). 24 aircraft out of the fleet will have a significant impact on operations.
I am certain Air Canada has just about finalized their plans. I believe WestJet has done the same. I suspect both AC and WJ will announce the groundings within hours of each other (if they choose to do so).
Mar 11, 2019, 9:20 am
#1714
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YXU
Programs: AC SE100K, National E/E, HH Diamond, IHG Diamond, MB, Avis PC
Posts: 970
The myth about the A320's automation causing the crash of AF296 at LFGB has been debunked many times.
Mar 11, 2019, 9:22 am
#1715
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Ottawa, ON
Programs: AC*SE100K, AC*MM, Marriott Platinum Elite
Posts: 286
Another possibility is that the potentially-offending MCAS system gets disabled, instead of a full grounding... But a key issue (from the first crash at least) seems to be pilot training. Lion Air’s pilots didn’t know how to deal with the MCAS fault, but perhaps AC’s pilots have received the appropriate training... Will be interesting to hear if the Ethiopian crash involves MCAS, and if so, if the pilots had been trained on that issue.
(I’m currently in SXM, having arrived on a Max, with my return flight to YYZ coming up on a Max...)
(I’m currently in SXM, having arrived on a Max, with my return flight to YYZ coming up on a Max...)
Mar 11, 2019, 9:24 am
#1716
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: YSB & YAM, Northern Ontario, Canada
Programs: Aeroplan, IHG Gold Elite, Marriott Rewards
Posts: 1,100
Can the MCAS on AC's Boeing 737MAX8 be locked "off" by pilots?
While many of us on here are very understandably preoccupied and concerned about two major accidents with this Boeing model and are worried simply because, depending on what route we must fly, there is no alternative.
We do not know if any AC pilots experienced problems with the MCAS system attempting to override their control inputs but it is a potential situation which is worrying.
It would be nice for peace of mind to know that AC crew are able to (and permitted by management operating rules!) to disconnect and completely lock-out MCAS during regular operations.
This problem with automatic controls overriding pilots is nothing new, although we might have hoped Boeing could have benefitted by known examples!
In June 1988 the then relatively new Airbus A320-211 during a low fly-past at an air show could not be pulled up to climb away and flew into a forest at the field perimeter.
Let's just hope that this problem can be rectified and that yet another design deficiency does not end up being blamed upon unfortunate aircrew!
We do not know if any AC pilots experienced problems with the MCAS system attempting to override their control inputs but it is a potential situation which is worrying.
It would be nice for peace of mind to know that AC crew are able to (and permitted by management operating rules!) to disconnect and completely lock-out MCAS during regular operations.
This problem with automatic controls overriding pilots is nothing new, although we might have hoped Boeing could have benefitted by known examples!
In June 1988 the then relatively new Airbus A320-211 during a low fly-past at an air show could not be pulled up to climb away and flew into a forest at the field perimeter.
Let's just hope that this problem can be rectified and that yet another design deficiency does not end up being blamed upon unfortunate aircrew!
Mar 11, 2019, 9:32 am
#1717
Original Member
Join Date: May 1998
Location: Vancouver, Canada
Posts: 6,222
But I have seen lots of claims and reports about how Airbus was more agressive in pursuing fly-by-wire and flight automation than Boeing.
I am not able to state whether or not that is a good thing.
Mar 11, 2019, 9:37 am
#1718
A FlyerTalk Posting Legend
Join Date: Sep 2012
Location: SFO
Programs: AC SE MM, BA Gold, SQ Silver, Bonvoy Tit LTG, Hyatt Glob, HH Diamond
Posts: 44,346
Could not be pulled up due to lack of airspeed, sure. But my understanding was this was entirely pilot-error.
Mar 11, 2019, 9:38 am
#1719
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,804
That basically constitutes the entire AC fleet. Every FBW commercial aircraft today is designed to override pilots if it determines un-safe commands. AF447 is a prime example. We also don't know if the pilots attempted to over-ride the FMS, that is speculation. In most cases the information provided to pilots is what typically leads to errors and crashs whereby either the information is erroneous, or the pilots mis-interpret the data, or the pilots are too slow to respond.
That statement is quite misleading. And in the case of AF447, completely wrong. The computer had returned controls to the pilots who did the very opposite of what was required to get out of the stall. That was decidedly not the computer.In the MCAS issue, pilots find themselves fighting the computer. And disabling it first would entail a proper diagnosis and may not be obvious. Not the same as having the computer in the loop as in the AB case, and in most modern Boeing, which arguably does not include the max...
Mar 11, 2019, 9:45 am
#1720
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,804
Another possibility is that the potentially-offending MCAS system gets disabled, instead of a full grounding... But a key issue (from the first crash at least) seems to be pilot training. Lion Air’s pilots didn’t know how to deal with the MCAS fault, but perhaps AC’s pilots have received the appropriate training... Will be interesting to hear if the Ethiopian crash involves MCAS, and if so, if the pilots had been trained on that issue.
The MCAS was put in place for a reason. I don't believe they are allowed to fly with it disabled.
It would be nice for peace of mind to know that AC crew are able to (and permitted by management operating rules!) to disconnect and completely lock-out MCAS during regular operations.
This problem with automatic controls overriding pilots is nothing new, although we might have hoped Boeing could have benefitted by known examples!
In June 1988 the then relatively new Airbus A320-211 during a low fly-past at an air show could not be pulled up to climb away and flew into a forest at the field perimeter.
About the MCAS, it's there to avoid the engines pushing the nose up in certain configurations where the plane is unstable because the smallish vertical stabilizer is too weak to counterbalance the torque (with horizontal axis about the mass center) due to engine thrust. So disabling the MCAS wqould make the plane more unsafe, not less.As cow said, the issue of the 320 in 1988 was that they let the engines idle, and engines take a while to spool up until they develop much thrust. More a case of overreliance on the protection afforded by the computers than anything else. Perhaps too much AB spin, but that's a different story, the "concierge" thing...
It would be nice for peace of mind to know that AC crew are able to (and permitted by management operating rules!) to disconnect and completely lock-out MCAS during regular operations.
This problem with automatic controls overriding pilots is nothing new, although we might have hoped Boeing could have benefitted by known examples!
In June 1988 the then relatively new Airbus A320-211 during a low fly-past at an air show could not be pulled up to climb away and flew into a forest at the field perimeter.
Mar 11, 2019, 9:49 am
#1721
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: YYC
Programs: BA bronze, Aeroplan peon
Posts: 4,746
If we look at this Airbus document on aircraft safety and accident rates, a 4th generation plane (roughly those designed after 1988) have hull loss rates of 0.18 per million flight cycles. Your math looks pretty good, but it is still over 20 times higher rate than should be expected for this type of aircraft. It's much higher than third generation aircraft at 0.54 hull loss per million flight cycles. Third generation are things like A300, 737 classic, 757.
Even the second generation ( 737-100, DC-9, L-1011, 747-100) reached a minimum in the late 80's of 1.0 loss per million flights before increasing as the aircraft aged and moved to lower tier operators.
If your math is reasonable, the 7M8 is back to a loss rate that hasn't been seen since the early 1960's. For a design that is an evolution of a proven design, this is an unacceptably regressive step. I would expect a new aircraft to be better than a 707, Comet, Trident or VC-10.
Mar 11, 2019, 9:53 am
#1722
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: YEG
Posts: 3,925
We do not know if any AC pilots experienced problems with the MCAS system attempting to override their control inputs but it is a potential situation which is worrying.
It would be nice for peace of mind to know that AC crew are able to (and permitted by management operating rules!) to disconnect and completely lock-out MCAS during regular operations.
It would be nice for peace of mind to know that AC crew are able to (and permitted by management operating rules!) to disconnect and completely lock-out MCAS during regular operations.
My (limited) understanding is that Boeing sold this "new" aircraft as being basically the same as the "old" aircraft, and that limited training was required to be able to fly the Max (for existing 737 pilots). Just because the aircraft was new to AC, it doesn't mean that the training AC pilots received was any different than what is provided to previous 737 operators; it is entirely possible that AC pilots are/were as completely unaware of MCAS, etc. as other 737 pilots.
If pilot training with regards to MCAS is found to be a root cause of this crash, I wouldn't be surprised if FAA/EU/TC/etc. change the categorization of this aircraft to be a new "type" (or whatever the technical term is) that is to be treated completely differently than the other 737's in existence (which AFAIK is one of the reasons MCAS exists - but definitely not the only reason - to provide commonality with other 737's).