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Old Jan 4, 2021, 1:37 am
FlyerTalk Forums Expert How-Tos and Guides
Last edit by: WineCountryUA
This is an archive thread, the archive thread is https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/1960195-b737max-cleared-faa-resume-passenger-flights-when-will-ua-max-flights-resume.html

Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

Originally Posted by WineCountryUA
READ BEFORE POSTING

Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.

Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...

As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.

The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.

Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
Originally Posted by WineCountryUA
This thread has engendered some strongly felt opinions and a great tendency to wander into many peripherally related topics. By all normal FT moderation standards, this thread would have been permanently closed long ago ( and numerous members receiving disciplinary actions).

However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.

The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.

Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.

The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).

Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator



United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.

How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:

View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.

The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.

For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.

All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.




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Old Sep 21, 2019, 2:53 pm
  #2236  
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Originally Posted by fly18725
While it is undeniable that Boeing needs to change MCAS (something that was recognized almost immediately after the Lion Air accident), I have to dismiss any and all attempts to dumb down the situation to place the blame in a single place. We are not that stupid.
I disagree. Boeing needs to go back to the FAA and get the aircraft certified without MCAS and train pilots on how to fly the plane based on how it actually flies as opposed to trying to augment it with a computerized system and make it feel like an aircraft the generation before. The cheAAp AAirlines that wanted to cut costs on their pilot certification can just deal with it.
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Old Sep 21, 2019, 6:30 pm
  #2237  
 
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Originally Posted by cmd320
I disagree. Boeing needs to go back to the FAA and get the aircraft certified without MCAS and train pilots on how to fly the plane based on how it actually flies as opposed to trying to augment it with a computerized system and make it feel like an aircraft the generation before. The cheAAp AAirlines that wanted to cut costs on their pilot certification can just deal with it.
Did you read my last post?

Every modern aircraft uses augmentation and none could be reasonably flown without it.

I would agree that more training is always beneficial. One advantage to the US is that we have a robust general aviation community and pilots get “real” flying experience. There needs to be more of that for jet pilots in addition to SIM time.
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Old Sep 21, 2019, 7:41 pm
  #2238  
 
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An interesting different prospective from NY Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/m...x-crashes.html
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Old Sep 21, 2019, 7:46 pm
  #2239  
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Originally Posted by chipmaster
An interesting different prospective from NY Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/m...x-crashes.html
Beleive this is the same article that has been discussed here for the past few days starting with
Originally Posted by fly18725
For a comprehensive (and engaging) overview of the situation, there’s an excellent article in this week’s NY Times Magazine:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/m...sultPosition=1

While it implicates Boeing and the FAA for sloppy decisions, it also touches on the mistakes made in the cockpit and on the ground (for JT610) that could have prevented the incidents.
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Old Sep 22, 2019, 11:44 am
  #2240  
 
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Originally Posted by fly18725
There are two problems with MCAS: first, it gave an unlimited number of nose down commands. It appears this was permitted as both Boeing and the FAA believed pilots would recognize erroneous deployment as runaway trim and respond accordingly. In hindsight, this assumption was wrong. It’s difficult (with info currently available) to attribute any negligence to this decision as a different deployment wouldn’t increase cost.

The other problem is the decision to depend on one AOA. There has not been a good explanation publicly, probably because this will be harder for Boeing to explain. The change is with software, so it may be difficult to attribute to cost.
There is a fairly reasonable explanation for both these design issues. To avoid the training issue, Boeing needed to keep the MCAS low key. Something the pilots did not need to be aware of.

If they have 2 sensors for reliability, then in a disagree the pilot needs to understand that the functionality is off and what this means. Similarly with the repeated activations. If the pilot is not aware of the system, he can not know that he disengaged it.

Similarly with the AOA disagree indicator. Look at Boeing's tapdance on that issue. First it was an option because it was only a diagnostic assist for maintenance and not an assist for the pilots. When they felt the heat on this they blamed it on a software mistake.

Boeing has quality engineers. Neither of there were mistakes, nor were they cost saving on the hardware/software. I see no alternative but that they were marking driven off the single type issue.
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Old Sep 22, 2019, 12:14 pm
  #2241  
 
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Originally Posted by exwannabe
There is a fairly reasonable explanation for both these design issues. To avoid the training issue, Boeing needed to keep the MCAS low key. Something the pilots did not need to be aware of.

If they have 2 sensors for reliability, then in a disagree the pilot needs to understand that the functionality is off and what this means. Similarly with the repeated activations. If the pilot is not aware of the system, he can not know that he disengaged it.

Similarly with the AOA disagree indicator. Look at Boeing's tapdance on that issue. First it was an option because it was only a diagnostic assist for maintenance and not an assist for the pilots. When they felt the heat on this they blamed it on a software mistake.

Boeing has quality engineers. Neither of there were mistakes, nor were they cost saving on the hardware/software. I see no alternative but that they were marking driven off the single type issue.
The entire premise of your post is that MCAS is treated differ than other trim systems. I don’t think it is, e.g. it can’t be disengaged separately and is not responded to differently than other runaway trim issues.
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Old Sep 22, 2019, 1:46 pm
  #2242  
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Originally Posted by fly18725
The entire premise of your post is that MCAS is treated differ than other trim systems. I don’t think it is, e.g. it can’t be disengaged separately and is not responded to differently than other runaway trim issues.
This. MCAS is treated the same a STS, which has been with us for decades.
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Old Sep 22, 2019, 3:59 pm
  #2243  
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This author captures my own thinking pretty well (bolding mine):

https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/exp.../#.XYe6ZG5Fw2w

The pilots probably should have been able to overcome the baffling mechanical malfunction they faced, true. But Langewiesche fails to address the fact that in simulator reenactments many pilots here in the United States have been hard pressed or unable to overcome a sensor malfunction that drove the repeated automatic deployment of rapid and repeated nose down trim of MCAS, even though those same pilots entered the sim knowing in essence what they would be encountering.

...

Ultimately, the author’s attitude about airmanship and the pilot’s role in safety is sadly outmoded. The view of the pilot as the hero, the one who stands as the last line of defense against disaster is the stuff of John Wayne movies. The truth, which Langewiesche admits, is that a very small percentage of pilots who think they would be up to the task when faced with a difficult challenge in a flight simulator actually succeed at the task.

...

As poorly as the pilots of Lion Air 610 performed, they had the deck stacked against them, and if studying accidents shows us anything, it is that when things start going south in a complicated cockpit, even good pilots can have a very bad day. We need to expend our energy on keeping those bad days from happening instead of hoping in vain to have a pair of heroes in every cockpit.
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Old Sep 22, 2019, 4:08 pm
  #2244  
 
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Originally Posted by DenverBrian
This author captures my own thinking pretty well (bolding mine):
I've only read what you quoted, but from reading that, it almost appears that the author would be in favor of completely pilot-less planes.
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Old Sep 22, 2019, 4:40 pm
  #2245  
 
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Originally Posted by DenverBrian
This author captures my own thinking pretty well (bolding mine):

https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/exp.../#.XYe6ZG5Fw2w
I would absolutely agree that the pilots of both flights had the deck stacked against them, because of problems with the airplanes and the result of their decisions.

However, the quote the pilots in the US have been unable to overcome the situation in SIMS is false. The regulators and all MAX operators have flown in a SIM and there are no reports of failure. An FAA pilot did have trouble with another scenario, which led to the requirement for additional software changes.
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Old Sep 22, 2019, 5:18 pm
  #2246  
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Originally Posted by narvik
I've only read what you quoted, but from reading that, it almost appears that the author would be in favor of completely pilot-less planes.
That wouldn't be me; I'd rather we focus on mistake-proofing so that, when the true emergencies come up, pilots can do their thing.

I just want a relentless focus on mitigating, eliminating, minimizing, etc. true emergencies. It's a business where you can never afford to just sit back and say "we're safe enough."
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Old Sep 23, 2019, 4:10 pm
  #2247  
 
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Originally Posted by mduell
This. MCAS is treated the same a STS, which has been with us for decades.
Yeah.

. Does the Speed Trim have the same authority? My understanding is that it only operates is short small bursts.
. The STS has a fail indicator.
. The STS was made known to pilots and the FAA
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Old Sep 30, 2019, 7:12 am
  #2248  
 
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Originally Posted by narvik
I've only read what you quoted, but from reading that, it almost appears that the author would be in favor of completely pilot-less planes.
In an industry faced with pilot shortage and growing dominance of pilot error in incident statistics, this is coming no matter what. However, it will still take a decade or two for generational resistance to expire enough to make this commercially viable. OTOH, things can always progress quickly when accidents happen.
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Old Sep 30, 2019, 7:36 am
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Originally Posted by mozilla
In an industry faced with pilot shortage and growing dominance of pilot error in incident statistics, this is coming no matter what. However, it will still take a decade or two for generational resistance to expire enough to make this commercially viable. OTOH, things can always progress quickly when accidents happen.

(bolding mine)

Like driver-less cars?
It'll take MUCH longer than that, IMO.
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Old Sep 30, 2019, 7:44 am
  #2250  
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Originally Posted by mozilla
In an industry faced with pilot shortage and growing dominance of pilot error in incident statistics, this is coming no matter what. However, it will still take a decade or two for generational resistance to expire enough to make this commercially viable. OTOH, things can always progress quickly when accidents happen.
Well, based on the current automation deciding to crash the aircraft I would say we're a fair bit away from that being viable.
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