Last edit by: WineCountryUA
This is an archive thread, the archive thread is https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/1960195-b737max-cleared-faa-resume-passenger-flights-when-will-ua-max-flights-resume.html
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
READ BEFORE POSTING
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
This thread has engendered some strongly felt opinions and a great tendency to wander into many peripherally related topics. By all normal FT moderation standards, this thread would have been permanently closed long ago ( and numerous members receiving disciplinary actions).
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
B737MAX Recertification - Archive
#451
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: Boston MA
Programs: UA 1K/1.5 million miler, SU Gold, JL Sapphire
Posts: 529
@bocastephen
My company works in software testing in Avionics. So, I have a nuanced view here.
I know that from a programming perspective, the folks at Honeywell, Rockwell and others (because, yeah, a lot of these systems are not actually created by Boeing, just like a lot of the software going in a car is not actually made by the OEMs) need to meet the toughest quality standard known to man. It is stringent yet well thought. And the reason why so much software goes inside vehicles now, whether they are plane or cars, is because it is advantageous - saves on gas, provides more safety, etc...
Until it doesn't. Because this is the flip side of software: it is relatively complex. A FMS can be 500K lines of code. Sure, it is often Ada (very well-defined, constrained language), it is arch-verified, but the system remains very complex. That's why any level A system has triple redundancy. The thought is, for the most critical systems, if one computer has a flaw, at least the two others will have it right, and the third one can be rebooted.
But in a case like this, could it be either that a faulty hardware provided the wrong information to the computer, which assumed command based on that faulty data? Or perhaps there is a use case when hitting just the right numbers the software came to the wrong conclusion and again took command? In both cases, and I am not an expert here, why wasn't the pilot, who is supposed to be the ultimate fail safe for all these computers, not be able to override the computer's decisions if it is obviously wrong? Shouldn't it be easy for a pilot to take command?
We don't know what happened, and there is plenty of bright experts working on this right now. So it is best to keep judgment for later. But if it turns out to be such a problem, then somewhere in the design there has been perhaps a wrong philosophy at work. Instead of seeing the pilot as a faulty decision maker that must be prevented from making mistakes (which may happen...), perhaps this should have been designed with the opposite philosophy: ultimately the pilot knows best. From a standard perspective I can see lively debates happening to ensure such problems are engineered out of the systems in the future.
My company works in software testing in Avionics. So, I have a nuanced view here.
I know that from a programming perspective, the folks at Honeywell, Rockwell and others (because, yeah, a lot of these systems are not actually created by Boeing, just like a lot of the software going in a car is not actually made by the OEMs) need to meet the toughest quality standard known to man. It is stringent yet well thought. And the reason why so much software goes inside vehicles now, whether they are plane or cars, is because it is advantageous - saves on gas, provides more safety, etc...
Until it doesn't. Because this is the flip side of software: it is relatively complex. A FMS can be 500K lines of code. Sure, it is often Ada (very well-defined, constrained language), it is arch-verified, but the system remains very complex. That's why any level A system has triple redundancy. The thought is, for the most critical systems, if one computer has a flaw, at least the two others will have it right, and the third one can be rebooted.
But in a case like this, could it be either that a faulty hardware provided the wrong information to the computer, which assumed command based on that faulty data? Or perhaps there is a use case when hitting just the right numbers the software came to the wrong conclusion and again took command? In both cases, and I am not an expert here, why wasn't the pilot, who is supposed to be the ultimate fail safe for all these computers, not be able to override the computer's decisions if it is obviously wrong? Shouldn't it be easy for a pilot to take command?
We don't know what happened, and there is plenty of bright experts working on this right now. So it is best to keep judgment for later. But if it turns out to be such a problem, then somewhere in the design there has been perhaps a wrong philosophy at work. Instead of seeing the pilot as a faulty decision maker that must be prevented from making mistakes (which may happen...), perhaps this should have been designed with the opposite philosophy: ultimately the pilot knows best. From a standard perspective I can see lively debates happening to ensure such problems are engineered out of the systems in the future.
Last edited by skidooman; Mar 15, 2019 at 9:13 am Reason: FMS, not SMS -> Flight Management System
#452
Join Date: Jun 2014
Programs: UA MM
Posts: 4,125
....
The "MCAS deactivation/override" is the runaway stabilizer checklist, which every 737 (and any other type with an auto stab trim) pilot has been trained on for decades.
In addition, it can be deactivated by deploying flaps or engaging the autopilot. Nothing novel here. The manual revisions reinforce this and also provide information about the MCAS architecture, but at the end of the day, the MCAS failure presents no differently than a runaway stab trim scenario and pilots are trained to respond correctly. If they don't, bad things happen.
The media, probably out of ignorance, has portrayed this as some sort of all-new procedure developed in light of the Lion Air crash. It's not.
The "MCAS deactivation/override" is the runaway stabilizer checklist, which every 737 (and any other type with an auto stab trim) pilot has been trained on for decades.
In addition, it can be deactivated by deploying flaps or engaging the autopilot. Nothing novel here. The manual revisions reinforce this and also provide information about the MCAS architecture, but at the end of the day, the MCAS failure presents no differently than a runaway stab trim scenario and pilots are trained to respond correctly. If they don't, bad things happen.
The media, probably out of ignorance, has portrayed this as some sort of all-new procedure developed in light of the Lion Air crash. It's not.
https://phys.org/news/2019-03-ethiop...oeing-max.html
#453
Join Date: Feb 2011
Posts: 1,353
I'd think of it as if the power steering freeze in my car and I had to switch it off (if there were such a switch) while driving on a fast curvy narrow mountain road. Yes, I recognized the steering problem and turned off the system, and I've driven *different* cars without power steering in the past, but this car handles very differently and Honda said there was no need to train on those differences even though the power steering seems to freeze more than in other cars. I may or may not get the "feel" right on those first curves -- who wants to be in the passenger seat?
#454
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: New York, NY
Programs: UA, AA, DL, Hertz, Avis, National, Hyatt, Hilton, SPG, Marriott
Posts: 9,452
This article implies something that, on the surface at least, is much different:
https://phys.org/news/2019-03-ethiop...oeing-max.html
https://phys.org/news/2019-03-ethiop...oeing-max.html
It said procedures already exist to "safely handle the unlikely event of erroneous data coming from an angle of attack (AOA) sensor," the suspected cause of the Lion Air crash.
"The pilot will always be able to override the flight control law (MCAS) using electric trim or manual trim," the aircraft manufacturer said.
"The pilot will always be able to override the flight control law (MCAS) using electric trim or manual trim," the aircraft manufacturer said.
That's what Boeing is suggesting should happen, in the event of an unwanted MCAS activation. The truth is, considering human factors, it might be asking too much of pilots, especially if combined with a high workload, potential fatigue and possibly limited experience and/or inadequate training, to timely diagnose the issue and execute the proper corrective actions.
#455
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: BNA
Programs: HH Gold. (Former) UA PP, DL PM, PC Plat
Posts: 8,184
The biggest difference for me to adjust to is that the audio panel (controls what we're listening to and on which radio we're transmitting) has been moved from the outboard panels to the center console. The MAX has significantly better weather radar and an expanded vertical situation display which aids in situational awareness regarding the planned vertical profile. Both important safety advances, IMO.
#456
Original Poster
Join Date: Oct 2015
Location: SAN
Programs: 1K (since 2008), *G (since 1990), 1MM
Posts: 3,219
I enjoy learning from the comments of people with the expertise in aviation and software. I also trust the pilot flying the plane and his/her primary concern is the safety of their passangers. I also believe the pilot is as concerned with getting safely to the destination as I am and does not have a death wish.(I cannot imagine the horror for the pilot and FO in either of the accidents with the 737MAX)
I understand there can be pilot error for a number of reasons.
The 737MAX was presented as a pig with lipstick whereas I actually think it was a hog (using an analogy that keeps coming to mind when reading about the 737MAX). You can call it a 737 with enhancements but those enhancements make it sound like it was actually a 740..
I hope the investigations also carefully consider the certification and training for the 737MAX and not blame the pilots if it truly were a new aircraft for which they were inadequately trained (through no fault of the pilots).
I understand there can be pilot error for a number of reasons.
The 737MAX was presented as a pig with lipstick whereas I actually think it was a hog (using an analogy that keeps coming to mind when reading about the 737MAX). You can call it a 737 with enhancements but those enhancements make it sound like it was actually a 740..
I hope the investigations also carefully consider the certification and training for the 737MAX and not blame the pilots if it truly were a new aircraft for which they were inadequately trained (through no fault of the pilots).
Last edited by Aussienarelle; Mar 14, 2019 at 11:35 am
#457
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: New York, NY
Programs: UA, AA, DL, Hertz, Avis, National, Hyatt, Hilton, SPG, Marriott
Posts: 9,452
#458
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Houston
Programs: UA Plat, Marriott Gold
Posts: 12,693
The problem is that the ET pilots got that training.... See https://www.washingtonpost.com/world...=.e0716dcb9434
Until then your post/link has little to do with my post.
#459
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: New York, NY
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Exactly... the JT610, ET302 and every other type-rated 737 pilot since the 60s has as least been introduced to the runaway stab procedure. The widely-held misconception is that this is some all-new training program hastily developed by Boeing in response to Lion Air, when in reality, the Lion Air crew who brought PQ-LQP to CGK the night before (safely) got it right. The travesty is everything that happened in the following 12 hours...
#460
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: May 2012
Location: MCO
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Posts: 12,809
See, I would argue the PCU servo issue was even more serious than the MAX problems... there wasn't a well-established procedure in place to recover from such a scenario, and the Eastwind flight only safely landed because the servo failure spontaneously resolved. The Lion Air crash, though not in final yet, most proximately involves a flight crew failing to recognize a scenario for which they had been trained (runaway stabilizer) and continuing to fight a losing battle. It's a pretty textbook case of being 'behind the airplane'. If the ADS-B data profile shows great similarity to Lion Air 610, it's probably another tragic case of the same response. Did a poorly-designed system contribute? More than likely. But it's always the result of a panoply of factors.
As you note, the commercial interests won the day in the 90s, and the 737 was not grounded. You'll also recall that Boeing went to great lengths to characterize the incident as an improper response to wake turbulence.
All this is exactly why I'm not in favor of letting social pressure and political influence dictate safety decisions made by the FAA and other regulators. Would it have been more appropriate not to ground the MAX if this series of accidents took place five years from now, with upwards of a thousand in service?
As you note, the commercial interests won the day in the 90s, and the 737 was not grounded. You'll also recall that Boeing went to great lengths to characterize the incident as an improper response to wake turbulence.
All this is exactly why I'm not in favor of letting social pressure and political influence dictate safety decisions made by the FAA and other regulators. Would it have been more appropriate not to ground the MAX if this series of accidents took place five years from now, with upwards of a thousand in service?
And I agree, I don't think social pressure or political influence should be a reason to ignore safety, however this case is the opposite and one could argue that the FAA was protecting Boeing's interests for too long and should have grounded the aircraft days earlier when the rest of the world did.
#461
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: New York, NY
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FYI, The Atlantic has some of the most responsible reporting I've seen on the 737MAX issues. A very recent piece is below, but the work in this instance (a few other articles by several writers, too) is sober, thoughtful journalism and deserves a plug, IMO.
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/20...pilots/584941/
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/20...pilots/584941/
#462
Join Date: Mar 2016
Location: Houston/DC
Programs: UA 1K, 1MM
Posts: 564
FYI, The Atlantic has some of the most responsible reporting I've seen on the 737MAX issues. A very recent piece is below, but the work in this instance (a few other articles by several writers, too) is sober, thoughtful journalism and deserves a plug, IMO.
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/20...pilots/584941/
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/20...pilots/584941/
#463
Join Date: Feb 2011
Posts: 1,353
FYI, The Atlantic has some of the most responsible reporting I've seen on the 737MAX issues. A very recent piece is below, but the work in this instance (a few other articles by several writers, too) is sober, thoughtful journalism and deserves a plug, IMO.
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/20...pilots/584941/
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/20...pilots/584941/
1) Train pilots on the MCAS system -- how to detect that it is malfunctioning and what steps to take to disable it, and quickly enough to prevent not just crashing but violating altitude restrictions, causing passenger injuries/discomfort, etc
2) Train pilots how to *safely* fly the plane with MCAS disabled. Do all of the airlines involved have access to the right simulators to do this, how much time is needed to become aware/proficient in the differences between the raw aerodynamics of the MAX and previous 737s to avoid stalls in all weather conditions, altitudes, airspaces etc?
I'm not saying that's not the right answer, but I think it's more than just turning off MCAS and flying what is now might be a different plane than you're certified to fly.
#464
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: Boston MA
Programs: UA 1K/1.5 million miler, SU Gold, JL Sapphire
Posts: 529
I'd think of it as if the power steering freeze in my car and I had to switch it off (if there were such a switch) while driving on a fast curvy narrow mountain road. Yes, I recognized the steering problem and turned off the system, and I've driven *different* cars without power steering in the past, but this car handles very differently and Honda said there was no need to train on those differences even though the power steering seems to freeze more than in other cars. I may or may not get the "feel" right on those first curves -- who wants to be in the passenger seat?
One day, I am driving in a snowstorm. Suddenly, with people left and right on the freeway, the system activates... and suddenly it starts acting like I will lose control.
This may be something similar. Usually, the system helps. But then under certain conditions, it starts working against you.
I learned from my mistake on time. I keep the system on unless it is snowing heavily. Never had a problem.
What is happening here may be something similar. There is a lot of talk about NA airlines providing training for the MAX to their pilots. Maybe they are OK because they know exactly when and how to override that MCAS. Still, if it requires a "training patch", one may still wonder if the system is well designed. Usability bug? Design flaw?
Above engineering, there is also institutions and people. Was enough done after Lion Air? Could that other tragedy have been avoided?
#465
Join Date: Jun 2014
Programs: UA MM
Posts: 4,125
Exactly... the JT610, ET302 and every other type-rated 737 pilot since the 60s has as least been introduced to the runaway stab procedure. The widely-held misconception is that this is some all-new training program hastily developed by Boeing in response to Lion Air, when in reality, the Lion Air crew who brought PQ-LQP to CGK the night before (safely) got it right. The travesty is everything that happened in the following 12 hours...