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Originally Posted by txrus
(Post 11768192)
Once again Ron-please describe the one policy or procedure, for which the TSA is 100% responsible, that would have prevented '9/11' (TM) had it been in place on 9/10.
Either back up your statements or stop making these insipid claims. |
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11768303)
Once again spiff, I’m going to prove you wrong. It should be getting pretty old for you by now, the newest TSO of the forum showing you your errors on an ongoing basis.
And of course, this last one is the kicker: “In order to use Kinepak, the liquid component is simply poured into the solid component. Within about five to fifteen minutes, the liquid (which is usually colored red) will soak down to the bottom of the container, as evidenced by the pink color. At this point, it has the consistency of moist powder and is a cap sensitive, high explosive. It can be used in most situations where it would be suitable to use cartridged explosives such as dynamite, water gels and small diameter emulsions.” “only other known commercial product is marketed under the name Binex. Binex uses a two component system of an aqueous solution of sodium perchlorate and aluminum powder. When these two components are combined, a liquid explosive is formed that is cap sensitive.” “Pure nitromethane is actually a very powerful explosive. However, without the addition of some additives or modifiers, it is so insensitive that it is classified as a "Flammable Liquid" for transportation purposes.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...ves-liquid.htm Now, care to retract your statement calling me a liar sir? There are several liquid explosives that can be mixed without the controls you say are required. Mixed on an aircraft, in a car, on a boat, with green eggs and ham if you like. I await your apology. Calling you a liar? No, probably uneducated though. |
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11768382)
No box cutters. Next?
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Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11768382)
No box cutters. Next?
Again, as others have pointed out to you, repeatedly, there are a number of perfectly legal items that could be used just as easily as the box cutters were. Please try again. |
Originally Posted by AngryMiller
(Post 11768411)
They also threatened to detonate bombs (which they most likely didn't have). Ron, has someone been coaching you?
No coaching, just getting a bit tired of Spif calling me names. |
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11768438)
Rumor has it that they said there were bombs, but all the witness's are deceased. Kind of hard to get them to say one way or the other. But hten again I may have missed that in the news articles.
No coaching, just getting a bit tired of Spif calling me names. |
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11768303)
Once again spiff, I’m going to prove you wrong. It should be getting pretty old for you by now, the newest TSO of the forum showing you your errors on an ongoing basis.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,356491,00.html http://www.time.com/time/nation/arti...225032,00.html http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/200...id_explos.html And of course, this last one is the kicker: “In order to use Kinepak, the liquid component is simply poured into the solid component. Within about five to fifteen minutes, the liquid (which is usually colored red) will soak down to the bottom of the container, as evidenced by the pink color. At this point, it has the consistency of moist powder and is a cap sensitive, high explosive. It can be used in most situations where it would be suitable to use cartridged explosives such as dynamite, water gels and small diameter emulsions.” “only other known commercial product is marketed under the name Binex. Binex uses a two component system of an aqueous solution of sodium perchlorate and aluminum powder. When these two components are combined, a liquid explosive is formed that is cap sensitive.” “Pure nitromethane is actually a very powerful explosive. However, without the addition of some additives or modifiers, it is so insensitive that it is classified as a "Flammable Liquid" for transportation purposes.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...ves-liquid.htm Now, care to retract your statement calling me a liar sir? There are several liquid explosives that can be mixed without the controls you say are required. Mixed on an aircraft, in a car, on a boat, with green eggs and ham if you like. I await your apology. Solid explosives are detectable by ETD or ETP. So are their precursors. Binex: Sodium Perchlorate (NaClO4) is detectable by ETD. Furthermore, the second component of Binex is powered aluminum (that's right, a solid). A blasting cap (solid detonator) is needed to detonate the resulting Binex mixture. So no, this is not a binary liquid explosive. Kinepak: The liquid component of this explosive is nitromethane (CH3NO2). In addition to being flammable, it is very easily detectable by ETD. The solid component of Kinepack is our old friend from the Murray Federal Building bomb, Ammonium Nitrate (NH4NO3). It is also easily detectable by ETD or ETP. It requires a blasting cap (#8 detonator, to be precise) to initiate the explosion. This is also not a binary liquid explosive. You've identified 2 explosives. Neither one is a binary liquid explosive (add 2 liquids together and detonate with a fuse/match). Each has one liquid and one solid component. No apology will be forthcoming. |
For me, it would take some proof of "effectiveness". TSA's cost of 6B$/year + asking each of 2,000,000 passengers for a security tax of an additional hour for the shoe-dance is a huge cost to society. On the benefit side, we have what?
I think that TSA probably kills more people than it saves just by making the safer air-travel more expensive in time and hassle than the more dangerous driving option. Due to TSA's security theatre, millions of passengers choose more risky forms of travel than flying and some die. For each individual traveller, the TSA security tax might be small, but when TSA does it to 2,000,000 passengers per day, it pushes some people to opt to drive instead of fly, and the aggregate cost isn't insignificant. Compared to the blustery, vaporous benefits of TSA over pre-TSA security, we might be far better off spending TSA's 6B$, 200Memployee-hours, and our 730Mpassenger-hours on making the roads safer. If TSA could show that they actually produce more good than harm, it would help me accept that the damage they visit upon travellers is worthwhile. |
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11768438)
No coaching, just getting a bit tired of Spif calling me names.
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11768373)
Like old Spiff there, he just cannot get past the fact that he is wrong about liquid explosives, or about non-metalic firearms. I’m not denigrating him, not one bit, I just know that he is not going to be able bring himself to admit that he is wrong in public, to a member of a workforce he hates.
Firearms not detectable by WTMD: show me the money! Show me one peer-reviewed journal article, one manufacturer's data sheet, one published test on a firearm(s) that passes through the WTMD. All you've provided is a Google search that hints at the existence of such firearms. That's not evidence. That's gossip, at best. The same is true of your very recent attempt to back up your handlers over so-called binary explosives. Your effort to tout a Google search with no supporting chemical explanation is once again bunk. Don't feel bad though. You're in the good company of the no-talent assclowns "in charge" of the TSA who routinely attempt to substitute science with smokescreens. |
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11767916)
Does anyone else see the gaping holes in these theories?
“Fail a Red Team test? You’re fired”. And not allow them the chance to learn from their mistake? What if it’s a brand new employee? Someone just certified on their first day working the checkpoint alone? Gonna fire the newbies?
Originally Posted by TSORon;11767916“
A pattern of complaints from PAX and not following the SOP? You’re fired.” How many? Over how long a period? General complaints or specific complaints only? How about compliments, do they offset the complaints?
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11767916)
“Ditch the LEO look-alike uniform and tin badge”. Oh, we have to run around naked on the checkpoint? No one is going to want to see my naked body in public, it would close the airport for good. The uniform and badge change was 10% for passengers, 90% for TSO’s. An integral part of the whole Engage Training program.
Originally Posted by TSORon;11767916“
Actually, its called “Random Screening”. If we use the same screening methods day in and day out just how long do you think it would take a bad guy to see the pattern and find a way around it? Lets put our thinking caps on folks.
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Ron, dude, you're bringing a plastic knife to a real gun fight here.
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Originally Posted by goalie
ron-what was wrong with the white shirts with cloth badges? can you provide documentation that the change was in fact 90/10 as you stated. afaic, the logic is simple-give someone a badge and people think they have legal authority (and i mean this both in terms of tso's who think they are sworn leo's and pax who think they are dealing with a leo). ihmo, the switch to the tune of $14 million was done simply for image & implied intimidation and nothing more.
The white shirts were a PITA, Goalie. They were nearly impossible to keep clean, and that was the whole big shebang about it. When I turned in my white shirts for the blue ones, I had over 26 of them. Only 4 were actually in usable condition, and three of them were darn-near close to retirement status. There was an almost-unanimous cry from the entire workforce for a different-colored shirt. The front of it went from white to gray to, eventually, black, and nothing I ever tried could get that color out of it. Other TSOs elsewhere have talked about sweat-stain yellowing of the shirt, too, but that's a different issue entirely from the show-of-use discoloration. Much more nasty, though. I actually preferred the cloth insignia. The second one, anyway. The first iteration of the TSA uniform (the old DoT uniforms), the orange cloth badge looked like it came out of a Fisher-Price™ playset. |
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11768303)
<SNIP> There are several liquid explosives that can be mixed without the controls you say are required. Mixed on an aircraft, in a car, on a boat, with green eggs and ham if you like.
Mass murder in the skies: was the plot feasible? Let's whip up some TATP and find out By Thomas C Greene 17 August 2006 Binary liquid explosives are a sexy staple of Hollywood thrillers. It would be tedious to enumerate the movie terrorists who've employed relatively harmless liquids that, when mixed, immediately rain destruction upon an innocent populace, like the seven angels of God's wrath pouring out their bowls full of pestilence and pain. The funny thing about these movies is, we never learn just which two chemicals can be handled safely when separate, yet instantly blow us all to kingdom come when combined. Nevertheless, we maintain a great eagerness to believe in these substances, chiefly because action movies wouldn't be as much fun if we didn't. Now we have news of the recent, supposedly real-world, terrorist plot to destroy commercial airplanes by smuggling onboard the benign precursors to a deadly explosive, and mixing up a batch of liquid death in the lavatories. So, The Register has got to ask, were these guys for real, or have they, and the counterterrorist officials supposedly protecting us, been watching too many action movies? <> <SNIP> <> So the fabled binary liquid explosive - that is, the sudden mixing of hydrogen peroxide and acetone with sulfuric acid to create a plane-killing explosion, is out of the question. Meanwhile, making TATP ahead of time carries a risk that the mission will fail due to premature detonation, although it is the only plausible approach. Certainly, if we can imagine a group of jihadists smuggling the necessary chemicals and equipment on board, and cooking up TATP in the lavatory, then we've passed from the realm of action blockbusters to that of situation comedy. It should be small comfort that the security establishments of the UK and the USA - and the "terrorism experts" who inform them and wheedle billions of dollars out of them for bomb puffers and face recognition gizmos and remote gait analyzers and similar hi-tech phrenology gear - have bought the Hollywood binary liquid explosive myth, and have even acted upon it. We've given extraordinary credit to a collection of jihadist wannabes with an exceptionally poor grasp of the mechanics of attacking a plane, whose only hope of success would have been a pure accident. They would have had to succeed in spite of their own ignorance and incompetence, and in spite of being under police surveillance for a year. But the Hollywood myth of binary liquid explosives now moves governments and drives public policy. We have reacted to a movie plot. Liquids are now banned in aircraft cabins (while crystalline white powders would be banned instead, if anyone in charge were serious about security). Nearly everything must now go into the hold, where adequate amounts of explosives can easily be detonated from the cabin with cell phones, which are generally not banned. |
Originally Posted by Spiff
(Post 11768561)
Don't feel bad though. You're in the good company of the no-talent assclowns "in charge" of the TSA who routinely attempt to substitute science with smokescreens.
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Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 11768373)
Halls, I never said that there was lax security. I said that their policies and procedures were not up to the task. The hijackers of 9/11 brought with them weapons that were allowed, so it was not a failure of the folks on the checkpoint. It was a failure of their plans and programs section for not anticipating the possibility that box cutters could be used to hijack a plane. And because the air crews of the time were trained to not resist but to comply with any hijackers requests/demands.
Your turn, care to retract your claim that I have lied? Let's look at the following statement: "I never said that there was lax security. I said that their policies and procedures were not up to the task." Ron, when you say "their policies and procedures were not up to the task," how is that any different from saying there wasn't "lax security?" You still don't get it. Gate security procedures in effect at the time had nothing to do with the hijackings. It wasn't the box cutters that made the hijackings successful - it was the knowledge that there would be no resistance to the hijackings. The 9/11 hijackers could have successfully taken over each plane with nothing other than a ball point ben held at the appropriate point on a flight attendant's neck to produce the required result. That decision - to offer no resistance - was the logical result of forty years of post-WWII commercial air travel, where the overwhelming number of hijackings ended with the minimal loss of life. To the extent that we should have known about the change in tactics, the non-existence of TSA before 9/11 played no role whatsoever. Even today, real counterterrorism efforts are the province of real LEO's, not the wannabes of TSA. If you really think TSA is taken seriously by the federal law enforcement community, you are simply deluding yourself. I realize your job is to come on FT and preach company gospel. We get it. But while each of us is entitled to our own opinions, we don't get to have our own facts. |
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