Flushing out terrorists
May 4, 2009 | 1:06 pm
#46
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Posted by AngryMiller:
Posted by docmonkey:
Posted by Trollkiller:
Posted by jkhuggins:
Care to try again, Ronnie?
Quote:
Even the folks who arrested the guy admit that the guy wasn't a terrorist. Nice try though. Come back and play when you find a real terrorist.
Officials discounted the idea that Nobles was involved in a terrorist plot and he said he meant no harm.
From the article:
"Officials discounted the idea that Nobles was involved in a terrorist plot and he said he meant no harm"
"Officials discounted the idea that Nobles was involved in a terrorist plot and he said he meant no harm"
From the article you linked to
Quote:
This example of the TSA stopping a terrorist fails.
Quote:
Officials discounted the idea that Nobles was involved in a terrorist plot and he said he meant no harm.
Quote:
TSOROn, with respect, I'm not sure how the link is relevant to this particular argument. Doober asked for evidence for a terrorist attack averted by the TSA. Your link describes the capture of a man for attempting to bring a pipe bomb aboard an aircraft --- but the article itself states:
Quote:
So ... it doesn't appear that this is evidence of TSA catching a terrorist. Or am I missing something?
(Aside: yes, attempting to bring a pipe bomb aboard an airplane was dangerous and stupid, and TSA should've stopped him, as they did. Good job, TSA. But that doesn't answer the question on whether or not this person was a terrorist.)
Originally Posted by doober View Post
If you believe that was a terrorist act that was stopped by the TSA and other Federal agencies, why have we heard nothing further on this? Why were not these "terrorists" charged and brought to trial. Why did an FBI agent call the incident "benign?"
If you believe that was a terrorist act that was stopped by the TSA and other Federal agencies, why have we heard nothing further on this? Why were not these "terrorists" charged and brought to trial. Why did an FBI agent call the incident "benign?"
Quote:
Originally Posted by TSORon View Post
Could be because you are just not reading in the right places.
http://www.newsday.com/news/local/su...0,692213.story
Originally Posted by TSORon View Post
Could be because you are just not reading in the right places.
http://www.newsday.com/news/local/su...0,692213.story
Quote:
Afterward, Nobles' lawyer, Anthony La Pinta of Hauppauge, said his client had intended to use the device only for a Fourth of July celebration in Las Vegas and had used "extremely bad judgment" in attempting to bring it on the plane on his way home last October.
...
Officials discounted the idea that Nobles was involved in a terrorist plot and he said he meant no harm.
...
Officials discounted the idea that Nobles was involved in a terrorist plot and he said he meant no harm.
(Aside: yes, attempting to bring a pipe bomb aboard an airplane was dangerous and stupid, and TSA should've stopped him, as they did. Good job, TSA. But that doesn't answer the question on whether or not this person was a terrorist.)
May 4, 2009 | 7:11 pm
#48
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I don't disagree with you that gate security didn't cause the hijackings. I do disagree with you that private security companies could do better. Let me define, at this point, what I mean by private security companies: companies hired by airlines to perform passenger screening in accordance with FAA regulations and other applicable policies independent of TSA efforts. Contrary to popular belief, there are no private security companies working today at airports under this definition. There are a small handful of non-TSA employees who work at airports performing these functions, but they are, for all intents and purposes, more like government contractors than they are true private security companies. They are hired, trained and evaluated on the exact same standard as TSA employees. The only difference is their uniforms and personnel management system.
Yeah, you're right, federalizing checkpoint screening was not a direct remedy. And you can blame media hysteria for part of that. If you recall, there were a lot of news stories that came out during that time pointing out the flaws in airport security screening and only inflamed demands for a federalized screener workforce. But I disagree with you that there's a better alternative than TSA. I think TSA does fulfill this function; and I think TSA still has room to grow and improve.
I do think there is a better alternative than TSA. It's been proven in random testing over the past several years. It's call Team SFO, the contract operation that routinely outperforms its TSA brethren.
May 4, 2009 | 7:51 pm
#49
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You left out one critical difference, Bart. Contractors can be easily terminated, unlike federal employees. Which is why TSA should have used the model currently in place at SFO - a group of contract employees working under the supervision of a TSA FSD. Much cheaper in the long run for the taxpayer, and with no loss of effectiveness.
Even if that is indeed the case, so what? We've already established that the 9/11 hijackers did not succeed because of lax gate security. Other than providing guaranteed federal employment, we've got this "wonderful" improved above the wing security, when we should have been concentrating on under the wing security.
TSA has an organized training program. And it has a very strict testing policy. I won't go into all the details, but I will say this: recently, I seem to have had the "bad luck" of losing students. Within the first few days, they would drop out of the course. Lost three in one course and two in another. Thought I was under some curse until one of the other students revealed something to me. Seems that some people come into this job thinking that it's easy money, that it's just a matter of standing around the checkpoint for eight hours a day and going home with a paycheck plus benefits. Then I or one of my other instructors comes along and teaches them all the ins and outs of hand wanding, stressing the importance of certain procedures and then following up during the practical labs with very picky, very detailed critiques (and that's the easy part---we get very picky during the certification finals). So now I don't feel so badly about losing these students; if they don't have what it takes, then I don't want them on the floor.
Now you say that you believe that airport security is important yet don't want to invest the time and resources it takes to train a professional staff. Makes me doubt that you really mean what you say.
Again, I disagree that the problem didn't exist. I accuse you of saying anything that will return your convenience over sound security because it suits your purpose. Not saying that I blame you. Just saying that security is intended to be inconvenient. That's reality, my friend.
I would gladly match the officers I've trained against any others.
May 4, 2009 | 7:54 pm
#50
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You left out one critical difference, Bart. Contractors can be easily terminated, unlike federal employees. Which is why TSA should have used the model currently in place at SFO - a group of contract employees working under the supervision of a TSA FSD. Much cheaper in the long run for the taxpayer, and with no loss of effectiveness.
Even if that is indeed the case, so what? We've already established that the 9/11 hijackers did not succeed because of lax gate security. Other than providing guaranteed federal employment, we've got this "wonderful" improved above the wing security, when we should have been concentrating on under the wing security.
Personally, I like being able to converse with screeners in English. Most pre-9/11 screeners had issues with that, IME. Just sayin'....and that better education, training, etc. should, on paper, make a better workforce better able to deal with the next attack.
Whether that goal has been met, or not, is subject for most discussion. But I find it hard to agree that the pre-9/11 screeners were up to any kind of real job preparing for true terror attacks.
And no, the SFO screeners were NOT the same as the pre-9/11 screeners I dealt with. Much, much better.
To sum up: better screeners were needed, not because the others failed on 9/11 but because the game had changed. We needed better trained people at those positions. Whether we had to federalize is arguable, but I think it obvious that pre-9/11 screening was unsat.
My .02.
May 4, 2009 | 8:53 pm
#51
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I believe we need a professional airport security staff. I've never said otherwise, your baseless insinuations notwithstanding. I believe it can be accomplished without federalizing the screening staff. The fact that a large airport like SFO continues to exist without a federalized staff supports my position.
Again, I disagree that the problem didn't exist. I accuse you of saying anything that will return your convenience over sound security because it suits your purpose. Not saying that I blame you. Just saying that security is intended to be inconvenient. That's reality, my friend.
I seriously doubt that. I'd like to know where you get your data because I know for a fact that it does not exist. There is no national database that directly compares airports or that directly compares the federal contractors with TSA. You seem to believe that there is, probably based on a six-year old piece taken out of context.
I'm sure that if TSA leadership had any kind of evidence that TSA airports performed significantly better than contract security airports, it would be plastered all over the media by TSA.
I'm sure you would. And I'm sure you do a fine job. The problem is, in a November 2007 report, GAO has determined that there is really no difference between the federalized TSA workforce and the contract workforce.
Oh, and it isn't a "six-year old report."
In August 2006, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) substantially modified its passenger screening policies based on the alleged transatlantic bomb plot uncovered by British authorities. With the aim of closing security gaps revealed by the alleged plot, the revised policies severely restricted the amount of liquids, gels, and aerosols TSA allowed passengers to bring through the checkpoint. At the Committee's request, GAO tested whether security gaps exist in the passenger screening process. To perform this work, GAO attempted to (1) obtain the instructions and components needed to create devices that a terrorist might use to cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers and (2) test whether GAO investigators could pass through airport security checkpoints undetected with all the components needed to create the devices. GAO conducted covert testing at a nonrepresentative selection of 19 airports across the country. After concluding its tests, GAO provided TSA with two timely briefings to help it take corrective action. In these briefings, GAO suggested that TSA consider several actions to improve its passenger screening program, including aspects of human capital, processes, and technology. GAO is currently performing a more systematic review of these issues and expects to issue a comprehensive public report with recommendations for TSA in early 2008.
GAO investigators succeeded in passing through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with components for several improvised explosive devices (IED) and an improvised incendiary device (IID) concealed in their carry-on luggage and on their persons. The components for these devices and the items used to conceal the components were commercially available. Specific details regarding the device components and the methods of concealment GAO used during its covert testing were classified by TSA; as such, they are not discussed in this testimony. Using publicly available information, GAO investigators identified two types of devices that a terrorist could use to cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. The first device was an IED made up of two parts--a liquid explosive and a low-yield detonator. Although the detonator itself could function as an IED, investigators determined that it could also be used to set off a liquid explosive and cause even more damage. In addition, the second device was an IID created by combining commonly available products (one of which is a liquid) that TSA prohibits in carry-on luggage. Investigators obtained the components for these devices at local stores and over the Internet for less than $150. Tests that GAO performed at a national laboratory in July 2007, in addition to prior tests in February 2006 that GAO performed in partnership with a law enforcement organization in the Washington, D.C., metro area, clearly demonstrated that a terrorist using these devices could cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. Investigators then devised methods to conceal the components for these devices from TSA transportation security officers, keeping in mind TSA policies related to liquids and other items, including prohibited items. By using concealment methods for the components, two GAO investigators demonstrated that it is possible to bring the components for several IEDs and one IID through TSA checkpoints and onto airline flights without being challenged by transportation security officers. In most cases, transportation security officers appeared to follow TSA procedures and used technology appropriately; however, GAO uncovered weaknesses in TSA screening procedures and other vulnerabilities as a result of these tests. For example, although transportation security officers generally enforced TSA's policies, investigators were able to bring a liquid component of the IID undetected through checkpoints by taking advantage of weaknesses identified in these policies. These weaknesses were identified based on a review of public information. TSA determined that specific details regarding these weaknesses are sensitive security information and are therefore not discussed in this testimony. GAO did not notice any difference between the performance of private screeners and transportation security officers during our tests.
GAO investigators succeeded in passing through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with components for several improvised explosive devices (IED) and an improvised incendiary device (IID) concealed in their carry-on luggage and on their persons. The components for these devices and the items used to conceal the components were commercially available. Specific details regarding the device components and the methods of concealment GAO used during its covert testing were classified by TSA; as such, they are not discussed in this testimony. Using publicly available information, GAO investigators identified two types of devices that a terrorist could use to cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. The first device was an IED made up of two parts--a liquid explosive and a low-yield detonator. Although the detonator itself could function as an IED, investigators determined that it could also be used to set off a liquid explosive and cause even more damage. In addition, the second device was an IID created by combining commonly available products (one of which is a liquid) that TSA prohibits in carry-on luggage. Investigators obtained the components for these devices at local stores and over the Internet for less than $150. Tests that GAO performed at a national laboratory in July 2007, in addition to prior tests in February 2006 that GAO performed in partnership with a law enforcement organization in the Washington, D.C., metro area, clearly demonstrated that a terrorist using these devices could cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. Investigators then devised methods to conceal the components for these devices from TSA transportation security officers, keeping in mind TSA policies related to liquids and other items, including prohibited items. By using concealment methods for the components, two GAO investigators demonstrated that it is possible to bring the components for several IEDs and one IID through TSA checkpoints and onto airline flights without being challenged by transportation security officers. In most cases, transportation security officers appeared to follow TSA procedures and used technology appropriately; however, GAO uncovered weaknesses in TSA screening procedures and other vulnerabilities as a result of these tests. For example, although transportation security officers generally enforced TSA's policies, investigators were able to bring a liquid component of the IID undetected through checkpoints by taking advantage of weaknesses identified in these policies. These weaknesses were identified based on a review of public information. TSA determined that specific details regarding these weaknesses are sensitive security information and are therefore not discussed in this testimony. GAO did not notice any difference between the performance of private screeners and transportation security officers during our tests.
Last edited by halls120; May 4, 2009 at 9:26 pm
May 4, 2009 | 8:56 pm
#52
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Concur with the need for better training. But the jump to a federalized work force was made without any real debate and discussion about whether there was another alternative.
May 4, 2009 | 10:32 pm
#53
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I believe we need a professional airport security staff. I've never said otherwise, your baseless insinuations notwithstanding. I believe it can be accomplished without federalizing the screening staff. The fact that a large airport like SFO continues to exist without a federalized staff supports my position.
You said they were performing better, and I challenged that claim. I do not challenge that they are performing about the same. I would expect them to.
I may have been a bit hasty. I've been haunting this board for several years and the frequent whiners, uh, flyers, love to quote this six-year old report as their basis for replacing federal officers with private screeners.
By the way, why haven't the airports opted out of federal screening when given the opportunity? Actually, it's been TSA that opted out of certain airports and encouraged them to hire contract screeners, typically at one-horse airports where it would be more cost-effective.
Doh!
May 5, 2009 | 5:56 am
#54
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How about some civility, and some basic manners? I had a colleague who was a Navy Seal before he joined us. He wasn't rude, offensive, or impolite.
Blaming your former profession for your lack of manners is pathetic.
Ok, you want to pick nits, fine. I've never said we should have indpendent private security. Yes, SFO has federal managers, but the line screeners work for Covenant Airport Services, IIRC. Not another group of entitled federal employees with attitude.
For someone who professes to be a security professional, and knowledgeable about TSA, you apparently don't get around too much.
So much for Congressional oversight.
I do believe you claimed the same with regard to TSA employees. But that is beside the point. If contract screeners perform as good as TSA employees, why do we need 30,000 more federal employees on the payroll?
Blaming your former profession for your lack of manners is pathetic.
As for TSA inspectors themselves tipping off airports in advance, I have to tell you, I do not know of any. This is not to say, however, that they "OPSEC'd" themselves; in other words, in trying to be discreet, they do the opposite and tip themselves off. Not saying that it's not possible; just saying that I don't know about any specific instance of an inspector violating his or her code of conduct and being employed the next day.
TSA Tipped Off Screeners About Security Test
In E-Mail to Airport Staff, Agency Official Relayed Alert on Undercover Agents
By Eileen Sullivan
Associated Press
Saturday, November 3, 2007; D03
The Transportation Security Administration promotes its programs to ensure security by using undercover operatives to test its airport screeners. In one instance, however, the agency thwarted such a test by alerting screeners across the country that it was under way, even providing descriptions of the undercover agents.
The government routinely runs covert tests at airports to ensure that security measures are sufficient to stop a terrorist from bringing something dangerous onto an airplane. Alerting screeners to an undercover officer's timing and appearance would defeat the purpose.
But that's exactly what happened on April 28, 2006, according to an e-mail from a top TSA official who oversees security operations.
In an e-mail to more than a dozen recipients, including airport security staff, the TSA official warned that "several airport authorities and airport police departments have recently received informal notice" of security testing being carried out by the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration.
The e-mail from Mike Restovich, assistant administrator of TSA's Office of Security Operations, relayed an alert that described a couple who were testing security. The woman is white but has "an oriental woman's picture" on her identification card, it stated. "They will print a boarding pass from a flight, change the date, get through security (if not noticed) and try to board a flight and place a bag in the overhead."
Because the pair had altered the date on a boarding pass, the e-mail advised: "Alert your security line vendors to be aware of subtle alterations to date info."
The TSA inspector general is investigating the incident, and the agency would not discuss details of the case because it is part of an ongoing investigation.
TSA spokeswoman Ellen Howe said, "We are confident in the overall integrity of the program. Tip-offs are not a systemic problem because we do so much testing."
Lawmakers are asking for more details on the incident as well.
"Any effort to undermine the integrity of covert testing of TSA's screening checkpoints is unacceptable," Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.) wrote in a letter Thursday to TSA Administrator Kip Hawley. Thompson chairs the House Homeland Security Committee.
In E-Mail to Airport Staff, Agency Official Relayed Alert on Undercover Agents
By Eileen Sullivan
Associated Press
Saturday, November 3, 2007; D03
The Transportation Security Administration promotes its programs to ensure security by using undercover operatives to test its airport screeners. In one instance, however, the agency thwarted such a test by alerting screeners across the country that it was under way, even providing descriptions of the undercover agents.
The government routinely runs covert tests at airports to ensure that security measures are sufficient to stop a terrorist from bringing something dangerous onto an airplane. Alerting screeners to an undercover officer's timing and appearance would defeat the purpose.
But that's exactly what happened on April 28, 2006, according to an e-mail from a top TSA official who oversees security operations.
In an e-mail to more than a dozen recipients, including airport security staff, the TSA official warned that "several airport authorities and airport police departments have recently received informal notice" of security testing being carried out by the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration.
The e-mail from Mike Restovich, assistant administrator of TSA's Office of Security Operations, relayed an alert that described a couple who were testing security. The woman is white but has "an oriental woman's picture" on her identification card, it stated. "They will print a boarding pass from a flight, change the date, get through security (if not noticed) and try to board a flight and place a bag in the overhead."
Because the pair had altered the date on a boarding pass, the e-mail advised: "Alert your security line vendors to be aware of subtle alterations to date info."
The TSA inspector general is investigating the incident, and the agency would not discuss details of the case because it is part of an ongoing investigation.
TSA spokeswoman Ellen Howe said, "We are confident in the overall integrity of the program. Tip-offs are not a systemic problem because we do so much testing."
Lawmakers are asking for more details on the incident as well.
"Any effort to undermine the integrity of covert testing of TSA's screening checkpoints is unacceptable," Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.) wrote in a letter Thursday to TSA Administrator Kip Hawley. Thompson chairs the House Homeland Security Committee.
That's been my point all along. The so-called private companies are, in reality, federalized contractors. They are treated the same as their federalized counterparts except they are contracted whereas their federalized counterparts are not.
You said they were performing better, and I challenged that claim. I do not challenge that they are performing about the same. I would expect them to.
You said they were performing better, and I challenged that claim. I do not challenge that they are performing about the same. I would expect them to.
May 5, 2009 | 9:41 am
#55
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Once again, the name is Ron. Try to maintain some focus please, otherwise its going to make your posts very difficult to see.
He tried to bring a pipe bomb on board a commercial aircraft. I dont care if he said he was from Mars and this is a Martian suppository, it was an attempt to bring a bomb on board an aircraft. By definition that makes him a major threat to the crew and passengers. Was it for a political purpose? Can you read minds? Can you be 100% certain that he was telling the truth?
He tried to bring a pipe bomb on board a commercial aircraft. I dont care if he said he was from Mars and this is a Martian suppository, it was an attempt to bring a bomb on board an aircraft. By definition that makes him a major threat to the crew and passengers. Was it for a political purpose? Can you read minds? Can you be 100% certain that he was telling the truth?
May 5, 2009 | 9:45 am
#56
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Posts: 684
Once again, the name is Ron. Try to maintain some focus please, otherwise its going to make your posts very difficult to see.
He tried to bring a pipe bomb on board a commercial aircraft. I dont care if he said he was from Mars and this is a Martian suppository, it was an attempt to bring a bomb on board an aircraft. By definition that makes him a major threat to the crew and passengers. Was it for a political purpose? Can you read minds? Can you be 100% certain that he was telling the truth?
He tried to bring a pipe bomb on board a commercial aircraft. I dont care if he said he was from Mars and this is a Martian suppository, it was an attempt to bring a bomb on board an aircraft. By definition that makes him a major threat to the crew and passengers. Was it for a political purpose? Can you read minds? Can you be 100% certain that he was telling the truth?
Officials discounted the idea that Nobles was involved in a terrorist plot and he said he meant no harm.
Clearly people higher than your pay grade agreed there was no threat. What this makes him is an idiot, not a terrorist.
May 5, 2009 | 12:38 pm
#57
Join Date: Apr 2009
Posts: 2,195
Oh no, I read it. Hindsight being 20/20 and all, its a wonderful thing. Try making that decision at the checkpoint, in the X-Ray ops seat, or as the Supervisor, or as the responding LEO or BAO. The folks investigating can say what they like, but they do so after the fact. Sure, he was an idiot. So is every individual who walks around with a homicide vest.
May 5, 2009 | 12:55 pm
#58
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Oh no, I read it. Hindsight being 20/20 and all, it’s a wonderful thing. Try making that decision at the checkpoint, in the X-Ray ops seat, or as the Supervisor, or as the responding LEO or BAO. The folks investigating can say what they like, but they do so after the fact. Sure, he was an idiot. So is every individual who walks around with a homicide vest.
All of the cites you proffered for your point were not terrorists. Now you are trying to shift the subject to decision making at the checkpoint, which is irrelevant to the discussion.
Why can't you just admit that the TSA has yet to find a terrorist at a airport screening checkpoint?
(Are knives that Continental uses in its President's Clubs and front cabins permitted through your screening checkpoint?)
May 5, 2009 | 1:02 pm
#59
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May 5, 2009 | 1:11 pm
#60
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Oh no, I read it. Hindsight being 20/20 and all, its a wonderful thing. Try making that decision at the checkpoint, in the X-Ray ops seat, or as the Supervisor, or as the responding LEO or BAO. The folks investigating can say what they like, but they do so after the fact. Sure, he was an idiot. So is every individual who walks around with a homicide vest.
Originally Posted by doober
Oh my stars, where to start? Let's start with the link TSORon gives above.
If you believe that was a terrorist act that was stopped by the TSA and other Federal agencies, why have we heard nothing further on this? Why were not these "terrorists" charged and brought to trial. Why did an FBI agent call the incident "benign?"
TSO Ron
Quite honestly, I'm beginning to smell a real right wing extremist here.
Could be because you are just not reading in the right places.
http://www.newsday.com/news/local/su...0,692213.story
Oh my stars, where to start? Let's start with the link TSORon gives above.
If you believe that was a terrorist act that was stopped by the TSA and other Federal agencies, why have we heard nothing further on this? Why were not these "terrorists" charged and brought to trial. Why did an FBI agent call the incident "benign?"
TSO Ron
Quite honestly, I'm beginning to smell a real right wing extremist here.
Could be because you are just not reading in the right places.
http://www.newsday.com/news/local/su...0,692213.story