Originally Posted by
Bart
I hear that a lot, but I've got to tell you that our company dropped the ball fairly frequently. You would think that the contract would have been cut, but it never was. Go figure.
I think we're talking past each other on this point. I'm not talking about terminating the contract of the company. I'm talking about terminating individual contract employees.
Originally Posted by
Bart
Now you say that you believe that airport security is important yet don't want to invest the time and resources it takes to train a professional staff. Makes me doubt that you really mean what you say.
You seem to have a habit of questioning the motives of everyone who disagrees with you. Pretty defensive on your part. And offensive, to be honest.
I believe we need a professional airport security staff. I've never said otherwise, your baseless insinuations notwithstanding. I believe it can be accomplished without federalizing the screening staff. The fact that a large airport like SFO continues to exist without a federalized staff supports my position.
Originally Posted by
Bart
Again, I disagree that the problem didn't exist. I accuse you of saying anything that will return your convenience over sound security because it suits your purpose. Not saying that I blame you. Just saying that security is intended to be inconvenient. That's reality, my friend.
That isn't reality, it's your preference, because it's your profession.
Originally Posted by
Bart
I seriously doubt that. I'd like to know where you get your data because I know for a fact that it does not exist. There is no national database that directly compares airports or that directly compares the federal contractors with TSA. You seem to believe that there is, probably based on a six-year old piece taken out of context.
Doubt it all you want. If you are going to be honest about it, you'll freely admit that TSA's own in-house inspectors have been caught tipping off airport sites in advance of a pending inspection.
I'm sure that if TSA leadership had any kind of evidence that TSA airports performed significantly better than contract security airports, it would be plastered all over the media by TSA.
Originally Posted by
Bart
I would gladly match the officers I've trained against any others.
I'm sure you would. And I'm sure you do a fine job. The problem is, in a November 2007 report, GAO has determined that there is really no difference between the federalized TSA workforce and the contract workforce.
Oh, and it isn't a "six-year old report."
In August 2006, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) substantially modified its passenger screening policies based on the alleged transatlantic bomb plot uncovered by British authorities. With the aim of closing security gaps revealed by the alleged plot, the revised policies severely restricted the amount of liquids, gels, and aerosols TSA allowed passengers to bring through the checkpoint. At the Committee's request, GAO tested whether security gaps exist in the passenger screening process. To perform this work, GAO attempted to (1) obtain the instructions and components needed to create devices that a terrorist might use to cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers and (2) test whether GAO investigators could pass through airport security checkpoints undetected with all the components needed to create the devices. GAO conducted covert testing at a nonrepresentative selection of 19 airports across the country. After concluding its tests, GAO provided TSA with two timely briefings to help it take corrective action. In these briefings, GAO suggested that TSA consider several actions to improve its passenger screening program, including aspects of human capital, processes, and technology. GAO is currently performing a more systematic review of these issues and expects to issue a comprehensive public report with recommendations for TSA in early 2008.
GAO investigators succeeded in passing through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with components for several improvised explosive devices (IED) and an improvised incendiary device (IID) concealed in their carry-on luggage and on their persons. The components for these devices and the items used to conceal the components were commercially available. Specific details regarding the device components and the methods of concealment GAO used during its covert testing were classified by TSA; as such, they are not discussed in this testimony. Using publicly available information, GAO investigators identified two types of devices that a terrorist could use to cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. The first device was an IED made up of two parts--a liquid explosive and a low-yield detonator. Although the detonator itself could function as an IED, investigators determined that it could also be used to set off a liquid explosive and cause even more damage. In addition, the second device was an IID created by combining commonly available products (one of which is a liquid) that TSA prohibits in carry-on luggage. Investigators obtained the components for these devices at local stores and over the Internet for less than $150. Tests that GAO performed at a national laboratory in July 2007, in addition to prior tests in February 2006 that GAO performed in partnership with a law enforcement organization in the Washington, D.C., metro area, clearly demonstrated that a terrorist using these devices could cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. Investigators then devised methods to conceal the components for these devices from TSA transportation security officers, keeping in mind TSA policies related to liquids and other items, including prohibited items. By using concealment methods for the components, two GAO investigators demonstrated that it is possible to bring the components for several IEDs and one IID through TSA checkpoints and onto airline flights without being challenged by transportation security officers. In most cases, transportation security officers appeared to follow TSA procedures and used technology appropriately; however, GAO uncovered weaknesses in TSA screening procedures and other vulnerabilities as a result of these tests. For example, although transportation security officers generally enforced TSA's policies, investigators were able to bring a liquid component of the IID undetected through checkpoints by taking advantage of weaknesses identified in these policies. These weaknesses were identified based on a review of public information. TSA determined that specific details regarding these weaknesses are sensitive security information and are therefore not discussed in this testimony. GAO did not notice any difference between the performance of private screeners and transportation security officers during our tests.