No wonder our nation's response to the hurricanes this past summer was so screwed up. Instead of managing his agency, and recognizing the failures of Brownie, the head of DHS was here insulting people.

Glad to see all the problems at DHS have been solved, freeing you to spend more time here.

I am always happy to be quoted! I'll take it as a compliment.

Bruce

The reason for following an SOP, instead of a supervisor exercising "discretion," is the likelihood that the people who wrote the SOP thought of something that doesn't occur to the supervisor. Another poster rased the sharp object question, but that may not be it.

The reason for working from an SOP is that you want to work from a study that's examined all security incidents over the last whatever years, in all countries, at all airports, and non-airport situations, not one supervisor's experience. How long has he or she been on the job?

And saying you won't believe it unless one of the TSA supporters gives you a reason is like saying a cop shouldn't enforce a speed limit unless he can quote you the traffic death statistics that were used for the 35 mph limit.

I'm not asking for a reason for following the SOP. I'm asking for a reason of why the SOP is the way it is. Shouldn't the people enforcing the rules understand them?

I never said I didn't believe them unless they gave me a reason. I've asked for two things -

Proof that SOP is what they say it is.

For them to show some understanding of why the rules are the way they are.

And cops use discretion ALL THE TIME. That's why everyone who speeds doesn't get a ticket. Or sometimes you get pulled over but don't get written up. Discretion is pretty much the foundation of any uniformed cops job.

After 3+ years, we have learned that showing the SOP to the public violates the SOP. Really! The height of irony!

Many TSA employees (oh, wait, I almost forgot: "officers") have neither the interest nor the ability to understand their own rules. What most of them do well enough is follow the rules, without any need to understand them. Of course, many can't even do that!

If managers don't have any discretionary authority, then why does the TSA have managers? Just to hire people and make sure the shifts are properly staffed? I don't think so.

Bruce

Dgilman, let's try this another way, just for intellectual curiosity.

The SOP says to scan videotapes. Your desire not to have them scanned (i.e. - personal preference based on personal preference) isn't a valid reason for them to even consider ignoring the SOP. The fact that the alternative (ETD scan) might be sufficient (or even better) in your opinion is also irrelevant. But, if you have proof that damage could occur to your videotape, that would be a reason to say that the SOP should be ignored (sort of like Bruce's concern about the Hope Diamond).

So, what evidence do you have that the SOP should *not* be followed? Proof of damage (non-anecdotal) to video tape from exposure to scanners? Proof that ETD scan will detect blades hidden inside a videotape?

(I am not supporting the SOP, as I said above. Rather, I want to know if you have *any* factual basis for your objection to the SOP.)

I don't object to the SOP. I initially misunderstood what SOP was, and thought that it was NOT being followed at LAS.

Now that I understand what the purported SOP is, I object to people who follow the SOP, but don't understand why the SOP is the way it is.

All I've asked of the SOP supporters here is to explain NOT why they follow the SOP (it's their job, duh), but why the SOP is the way it is.

Having been somewhat involved with the security for more than a few high security special events (think a ball being dropped on a building around the end of December), I can't imagine implementing security requirements without understanding what those requirements meant, and why it was important to follow them.

An as far as blades being hidden the video cassettes, a walk with the box through the magnometer would solve that - I'm pretty sure a genuine tape is all plastic.

Do they still coat tape with ferrous oxide (Fe3O4) and if so, would a box of tape contain enough to trigger the WTMD? After all, isn't it called "magnetic tape?"

I completely agree with you. Passengers should not be forced to submit Extremely High-Value Items like your tape to the x-ray machine when alternate methods of screening can easily clear the item.

Which actually isn't a fact at all, but simply the OP's invention. As in:

I've got a couple responses to this entire thread...

1) TSA Officers aren't cops.
This seems to me to be such a no brainer that it isn't worth saying. Sure police officers are given plenty of discretion. And they are also given the power to arrest, the power to carry and use firearms, etc.

2) Cops probably have less discretion than you think.
Sure cops can decide who to give a ticket to. But they have an SOP and a set of rules they have to go by. They probably are told exactly how to frisk people, how and when to search a vehicle, etc. I bet the areas in which they have discretion are clearly outlined in their policies and procedures.

3) TSA Officers do have discretion.
But it is within their scope of authority. That is I have to communicate certain things to passengers before I hand wand them or screen their bags. It is up to me how I do that. But I don't have the authority to deviate from the SOP when it clearly tells me to do something a certain way as in the video tape example.

4) TSA Officers don't pay much attention to the reasons behind the SOP.

None of us has any input into the formation of the SOP. It is presented to us, and we are told to follow it. Heck I don't even know who writes the SOP.

Thinking about the problems with the SOP is a losing proposition for a TSA Officer. It will drive you crazy and there is nothing you can do about it. It is what it is.

I know that passengers get real frustrated with the "It's SOP" answer. But it is really all we've got. You might be able to convince me on a personal level that your pocket knife isn't a threat to aviation. However I don't have the authority to go against established policy. And no one who works for TSA at an airport does.

5) SOP violations are a symptom not the problem.

Heck SOP problems are just the visible sign of all sorts of problems. These include bad management, poor direction from headquarters in Washington DC, terrible federal hiring processes, etc.

I don't think that going to a private system is the solution because I see contractors basically just squeezing as much cash out of the federal government but providing crappy service. Every other privatized government operation that I see is basically a joke. Check out the privatized security at military bases around the country.

I have a bunch of ideas to make the system better. But the bottom line for me is that I would make every level of the organization accountable not just for knowing the SOP but following it. I'd hire independent evaluators to check each airport on a regular basis.

Then I would make raises, promotions, and discipline decisions based largely on the report of these auditors. Screeners who want raises and promotions would need to demonstrate a pattern of following the SOP. Likewise Leads, Supervisors, Screening Managers, FSDs would need to ensure that their people were following the SOP.

This would need to be a substantial oversight effort. You can't evaluate an airport with one pass through a checkpoint. And you wouldn't remove someone from his job simply because of one report. The auditors would have to visit the airport multiple times, write reports on violations, and look for improvement or failure to improve.

It would end the cowboy mentality that happens at every level of the organization. Their needs to be oversight. Good screeners want to be evaluated and have no problem having their actions observed.

6) TSA needs to do a better job spreading information.

There are some parts of the SOP and some TSA info that probably needs to be kept from the general public. But there should be a document that TSA can show to the public and make available online that outlines some basic TSA policies. The supervisor should have access to a document that says "video tape cassettes must be x-rayed" or whatever.

SSI shouldn't be a way for the TSA to avoid accountability. It should be designed to keep sensitive info away from people who would harm us. And reasonable speaking any document made available to as many people as the SOP is, is probably in the terrorists hands already.

^ This post makes a lot of sense. ^

DING DING DING!!! Johnny Olsen, tell our contestant what he won!

The only reason why TSA would insist on X-rays of VCR cassettes as opposed to ETD swabbing is the obsession with blades. As I pointed out last night in post #27, yet again TSA is fighting the last war. Boxcutters may have worked on 9/11, but given strengthened doors and refusal to deal with hijackers, a handful of terrorists armed with only blades will not take over an airliner. This SOP that insists on X-raying VCR cassettes is contrary to Kip Hawley's intention to concentrate more on explosives. But what else should we the taxpayers expect from TSA/DHS, which appears to be sadly lacking in experience in real-world security and imagination to counter resourceful, patient terrorists.

While you keep pointing out how you make the same point over and over, said point is wrong.

What you mistakenly refer to as the "last war" is part of a multilayer approach to physical security that, if left unplugged, would be used again. And again.

Your analysis and conclusion isn't borne out by the facts.

So intentionally failing to screen cargo is part of a multilayer approach to physical safety? What an unorthodox approach to security! I guess that only passengers can harm an airliner. But if we pay so much attention to shoes because of one attempt, why are we ignoring the fact that explosives in cargo is a method that has brought down several airliners? Meanwhile, hardened cockpit doors, refusal to obey the demands of hijackers, and vigilant passengers who will not be cowed by blades will prevent another 9/11. This is the real plugging of the hole, and this plugging of the hole does not violate Americans' 4th Amendment rights.

Or, in other words, plugging the hole that does not bother you is good, but plugging the ones that do bother you are bad. Your constitutional argument will make sense when some court of ultimate jurisdiction agrees with your opinion. Till then, it's your opinion.