Are you sure this is what CartoonPeril meant? I don't dispute your explanation, but CartoonPeril made it sound more sinister. I'm just curious what he/she meant.

Agreed. And the moment a TSO brings in the necessary hacking equipment into the room, there's cause for concern.

But that's simply not happening.

I find it disconcerting that if the public has a concern about the TSA's policies and procedures, we're told "don't worry about possible malfeasance on the part of TSA employees, as it hasn't happened yet," while the TSA asks the public to bend over and take it for "threats" like a six-year-old girl being "patted down" against her will on the barest possibility that she might be carrying a weapon, explosive, or incendiary - despite the fact that it simply hasn't happened, and is even more unlikely than a TSA employee breaking their own rules.

No, I'm not sure that's what he's talking about. However that fits the bill nicely. It would allow for the exact image that is presented to the TSO to be sent to a central location.
Doesn't need to be done in the screening room. Anywhere between the booth and the scanner is vulnerable.

No argument here. And when I see mysterious wires hooked up at the checkpoint or other mysterious electronic intercept equipment at the checkpoint, I'll raise the alarm.

Until then, it simply ain't happening.

What makes you think "mysterious wires" would be necessary?

I don't recall seeing the TEMPEST shielding specification listed in the hardware requirements for the scanner contract.

Do you even know what that type of equipment looks like, or how it can be disguised? I highly doubt it.

I'm curious how it is that you know all about the contract requirements of the AIT. I'm impressed that you know more about the technical specifications of the AIT than our FSD, and he's a pretty smart fellow. Can you post a link?

If you want to obsess over the techno-voodoo about intercepted data or if you truly believe that someone is going to go through all the trouble and expense to intercept an AIT system in order to download low resolution images that resemble cartoon depictions of people inside a scanner, then be my guest.

And you do?

And you truly believe that someone is going to go through all the trouble, at the risk of being caught, to intercept the system for these images? Really?

The original topic was that TSA routinely stores these images. That's simply not true. Not saying that the computers don't have the capability to automatically store these images; I don't know if they do or do not. However, I do know that the operator cannot store or transfer the images. Once the operator clears the image from the screen, it is gone. Period.

So now you want to push the conspiracy theory that TSOs, the very same ones that many in here categorize as high school graduates who would barely qualify for a job at McDonalds, have the technical skills to hack into a system just to download cartoonish images of people standing with their arms over their heads?

Just like a Rocky and Bullwinkle cartoon -

This is a genuine Rapisan image released into the public domain by the imagee - John West of the UK.
This was made in 2006, before 4 years of image improvement.

You mean like this?

And yet you believe that a six-year-old girl wearing a thin shirt deserved to have her torso "patted down" on the off chance that she was concealing enough explosives or other "dangerous items" to present a threat to the flight.

Interesting.

Bart, the contract specs were posted on the internet. I believe you can still find them on the EPIC website.

Hardly. I think it's more likely (infinitely more likely) that a TSA clerk will simply use their cell phone to snap a photo of the image.

I think it's very, very likely that someone else has looked into snarfing the images in transit.

Camera phones aside, I agree that most TSOs cannot (and probably have no desire to) capture the images. Yet the function not only exists (even if there is plate currently covering the USB and ethernet ports), but was a fundamental requirement of the AIT procurement process. See below.

In your scenario, I would agree--there would be no need for an image of a bomb if a bomb was actully found.

But what about if a disgrunted passenger sued the TSA for sexual harassment? Having an image showing that there was a reason for the "enhanced" pat-down would go far, I suspect, in convincing a judge or jury that the search was reasonable.

As for Pistole and company lying, the message has been "TSA has not, will not and the machines cannot store images of passengers at airports." This just simply isn't true. The best that can be said is the save function is currently disabled.

I blogged about this a little bit on Sunday and you can find the specs here (scroll down toward the bottom of the post--two pages are presented in picture form with a link to the file itself).

I seriously question the validity of a source who admits is a disgruntled employee and goes by the name of A Jurai Knight. As for the excerpt in the article, I have said that I don't know whether or not the computer saves actual images or whether it reconfigures the files so that TSO users cannot access the data. I know that I can't retrieve the data even if I wanted to. I know that it would take someone pretty high up in the food chain with all of the required documentation before our FSD would permit anyone to access the hard drives of the computers used by the AIT. I know that of all the incidents we've had to date involving the AIT as the point of discovery, none of them resulted in any need to download any data from the system. I know that no one is permitted in the AIT viewing room with any electronic devices that have the capability to store or retrieve data. And I know that if anyone did, they would face immediate disciplinary action to include termination.

So if you want to argue that these machines can theoretically store images obtained from AIT scanning, I can't speak to the the technical aspects. I'm not a technician, but I assume that the system works no differently than any other computer. But if you want to argue that TSOs routinely download data or that they have the ability to download AIT images, then my response is that you're dead wrong. I think TSA has taken every measure to prevent that, and I know that TSA will essentially throw the book at any employee who attempts to violate this policy.

Can't make it any plainer than that.

Why assume that going into a strip search machine image viewing area with an electronic device capable of storing or receiving data would necessarily result in getting caught? Do you really believe that there isn't anyone who could do that without facing immediate disciplinary action (including perhaps termination)?

It takes an excess of faith to believe that the TSA has taken every measure to prevent the ability to store strip search machine images on even "unauthorized" electronic devices.