They tell you before they grope you that they are going to do it (at least that has been my experience). If you ask for particulars I am sure they will tell you the areas that they will touch.

While I sympathize with the legitimate concern regarding the lack of public information on TSA practices and procedures, I don't think a federal judge is going to have any trouble finding that you have given implied consent to the search that the person in front of you just underwent. Unless of course you object.

Again I'm not in any way condoning or validating the TSA practices which I detest, just explaining why a lawsuit is a waste of time. Of course that's just my opinion, you are free to bring your lawsuit, waste your money and time and roll the dice. In fact a privacy organization is already doing that for you with respect to the nudeoscope.

I don't know - that sounds quite a bit like coercion to me. "I'm going to stick my hand in your pants, and you're going to let me do it, or you don't get to fly home". How can that be construed as voluntary consent?

That's actually the issue with a minor. How can a minor give informed consent to a person of authority who controls their ability to fly?

Bull.

We have consented to reasonable administrative searches, not to physical/sexual assaults nor to strip searches (both virtual & real), all of which are happening at TSA's checkpoints today.

Anyone who pretends otherwise has his head stuck in a paper bag.

It's an issue for anyone. Consent obtained under duress is not consent.

It appears that this question hasn't received a direct answer yet. Forgive me if I missed something.

Here's the problem: private citizens can't "file" charges against anyone. The prosecutor (or district attorney, or whatever the position is called in your state) does that. A private citizen make a complaint or otherwise ask that charges be filed, but ultimately, it's up to the prosecutor.

Someone else brought up the issue of a citizen's arrest. This may be permissible, depending upon state law. But it can result in you getting sued and/or prosecuted if the arrest is later deemed improper. As much as I dislike the TSA and this "enhanced pat-down" nonsense, I'm not willing to be the test case.

(Before anyone asks, yes, I'm a lawyer. Unfortunately, perhaps.)

There are two weapons which will prevent another 9/11 attack, and neither is a result of the TSA. They are reinforced flight deck doors and passenger vigilance. Two attempted mid-air attacks (shoe bomber and underwear bomber) were both thwarted by passengers paying attention and taking action. And the new, more secure flight deck doors will prevent further breaches.

The danger of another 9/11 was/is the possibility of someone else using an aircraft as a weapon. There has been fear of terrorists blowing up planes for decades and while any incident of such is a tragedy, unlike 9/11, it is relatively contained. The risks posed by potential bombers of aircraft to society at large is no greater now than 40 years ago; the end result of such an attack will be the same and several hundred people will lose their lives. It's tragic, but it's not the thousands of potential fatalities of someone using an airliner as a WMD, which none of the TSA screening measures will protect against. Remember, every item brought on by the 9/11 hijackers was LEGAL to bring onto a plane until 9/12/01.

The threat of another 9/11 type attack have been seriously mitigated by the above-mentioned measures (the non-TSA ones). Frankly, if pre-9/11 security were back in place I would feel no less safe than I do today, or than I do entering a train station, a stadium or crossing a bridge. We have these measures, in my opinion, because the Bush administration was so power-hungry and fear-mongering and the Obama administration lacks any and all capability to step back and see the big picture or make any meaningful change at all.

Which, I think, is the rationale for the October 28 changes: the focus has moved from weapons (which are mostly metal and would be used for a 9/11 type attack) to IEDs (which are most non-metalic).

But that's JumboD's entire point (this week's Ask the Pilot article on Salon.com made the same point), that ever since commercial aviation has existed, we've always had and dealt with the threat of incendiary devices on aircraft. We just used to deal with it in a much more sane manner. I think everyone would be happy to go back to those days of security rather than deal with the insanity at the checkpoints we are today.

Stopping another 9/11 attack is fighting last years battle.

Any new attempt to disrupt air commerce will come from a different direction. The toner cartridge attempt is a good example.

I fully support reasonable screening of everyone who enters the secure areas of all airports. No exceptions. Whatever method chosen for screening should not be applied unequally since any person can introduce contraband. If the method is WBI then so be it but technology is available to mitigate the incisiveness of the images.

If anomalies are detected then and only then should a pat down be used and only to the extent needed to resolve the concern. Any pat down should require the presence of an airline observer to document if the pat down was excessive.

TSA employees should be held to a very high standard of personal performance and their actions should be monitored closely for how they deal with the public. Hollering, disrespectful communications and other faults should result in immediate on the spot suspension and if multiple cases are documented they should be fired for cause.

Pilots, crews, airport/airline employees, vendors and all others who cross the barrier should be screened.

No cargo should be loaded on commercial passenger aircraft unless inspected by TSA. No trusted shippers. This is a direct responsibility of TSA. Nothing should cross the sterile area boundary without direct inspection by TSA, another responsibility that has been shifted to others.

While these things will take a effort TSA can compensate by stopping doing those things which add little or nothing to safety.

This is your opinion J, and an uninformed one for all of that. Facts are stubborn things...but so are those that like to ignore/twist them. In other words, it's always someone else's fault and no amount of truth or logic will change that mentality...or address the root of the real problem. The facts are against you, but you are more than welcome to your opinion.

An interesting opinion. Not one I share. The folks here tend to perpetuate inaccuracies and proven falsehoods. IMO its not about the facts or the truth but more about how they can poke another stick at the government (TSA) claiming that the big bad government treats its citizens so poorly. Facts only get in the way of that goal.

Yes

And neither do you. The point is that while you can speculate all you like you have no direct knowledge of the capabilities of the AIT systems, and he does. So the question is, which of you is more likely to provide a credible answer?

Because at any time during the process you can say “STOP”, and we will. Of course there may be consequences for doing so, the least of which is that you will not be allowed into the sterile area, but at least you maintain final control of the screening.

And we know that historically, the defense of "I was only following orders" has always been quite effective.

Does anyone else have the feeling that some other person has been writing our beloved TSORon's posts for him recently?

Most of these TSO accounts are obvious shills.

Exactly! Today's terrorists are just trying new methods of doing what terrorists have done for 50 years or so, but the dangers to the general public of a successful attack are significantly smaller than the dangers of another 9/11, which have all but been eliminated by several simple, non-invasive steps.

We have to accept that we'll never be able to preempt every conceivable type of terrorist attack and live with it. That won't change no matter what type of security we have in place. There will be other attempts. They will utilize methods currently undetectable by security measures in place and in doing so will prove their futility.