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Originally Posted by cbn42
(Post 24161636)
That's like saying you are against seatbelts in cars, because if someone dies in an accident, the insurance company will say that they probably weren't wearing a seatbelt and refuse to pay, but if there was no seatbelt installed then they won't be able to make that excuse and they will need to pay out, so it's more consumer-friendly. :p
If I am in an accident, a seatbelt may save my life. Chip & PIN provides me with no benefit whatsoever. |
Originally Posted by zyxlsy
(Post 24157687)
Wells Fargo Propel World is an amazing card. Be assured it will not get you DCCed.
Are you serious? You need to spend more time eating in HK than keeping spreadsheets~ Many of the small dim sum places are cash only, so DCC isn't usually a factor. I've got three DCC transactions that will post over the course of the next few days, and I'll report back. |
Originally Posted by cbn42
(Post 24161636)
That's like saying you are against seatbelts in cars, because if someone dies in an accident, the insurance company will say that they probably weren't wearing a seatbelt and refuse to pay, but if there was no seatbelt installed then they won't be able to make that excuse and they will need to pay out, so it's more consumer-friendly. :p
Originally Posted by VegasGambler
(Post 24161729)
That is a terrible analogy.
If I am in an accident, a seatbelt may save my life. Chip & PIN provides me with no benefit whatsoever. 1. Transition from magstripe to chip 2. Transition from signature-based verification to PIN-based verification. The British/EU banking industry has done a great disservice in combining the two. There is absolutely no need to - here in HK, and in PRC, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Australia (initially) (1) has been done without moving to (2). (1) is an improvement for everyone on the whole. It really is like the introduction of seat belts or the Polio vaccine - a technological improvement with little downside for either bank or cardholder. There may be transition problems but once in place it really does cut down fraud. (2) as as devious as DCC. At least in British-based Bills of Exchanges jurisdictions such as UK, Australia and HK, a bad signature is the bank's problem and not the customer's. What the UK banks have done is to introduce PIN-based authentication with DCC and surreptitiously move the liability for fraud from cardholder http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chip_an...s.27_liability on the basis chip authentication (which is really a separate matter as the Hong Kong experience shows) should reduce fraud. Although PIN authentication may seem more secure than a signature to Mrs. Jones on the High Street ("no-one checks a signature" is an approving remark I heard from such a Mrs. Jones from New Zealand) this is absolutely wrong from a legal point of view. From Bills of Exchanges law which later evolved to cheque law, a bad signature will release liability from the signer (cardholder) and also imposes liability on the person accepting the signature (the merchant) to satisfy himself the signer is who he says he is. If your card is said to have been used on a Rolex purchase transaction in Switzerland authenticated by signature you can have your liability released by proving you've never visited Switzerland at the time of transaction (a pretty easy action for us Hongkongers since we can request Immigration Department Hong Kong to release our travel records to our bank). If the transaction was authenticated by PIN then the banks can deny liability like ATM transactions and you have to prove the bank leaked card info... The UK belatedly reintroduced fraud liability for banks in 2009 but banks still sometimes act as if it is for the cardholder to prove his PIN has not been compromised http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/s...ist-banks.html |
Originally Posted by percysmith
(Post 24162711)
There's really two sepearate issues here:
1. Transition from magstripe to chip 2. Transition from signature-based verification to PIN-based verification. The British/EU banking industry has done a great disservice in combining the two. There is absolutely no need to - here in HK, and in PRC, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Australia (initially) (1) has been done without moving to (2). (1) is an improvement for everyone on the whole. It really is like the introduction of seat belts or the Polio vaccine - a technological improvement with little downside for either bank or cardholder. There may be transition problems but once in place it really does cut down fraud. (2) as as devious as DCC. At least in British-based Bills of Exchanges jurisdictions such as UK, Australia and HK, a bad signature is the bank's problem and not the customer's. What the UK banks have done is to introduce PIN-based authentication with DCC and surreptitiously move the liability for fraud from cardholder http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chip_an...s.27_liability on the basis chip authentication (which is really a separate matter as the Hong Kong experience shows) should reduce fraud. Although PIN authentication may seem more secure than a signature to Mrs. Jones on the High Street ("no-one checks a signature" is an approving remark I heard from such a Mrs. Jones from New Zealand) this is absolutely wrong from a legal point of view. From Bills of Exchanges law which later evolved to cheque law, a bad signature will release liability from the signer (cardholder) and also imposes liability on the person accepting the signature (the merchant) to satisfy himself the signer is who he says he is. If your card is said to have been used on a Rolex purchase transaction in Switzerland authenticated by signature you can have your liability released by proving you've never visited Switzerland at the time of transaction (a pretty easy action for us Hongkongers since we can request Immigration Department Hong Kong to release our travel records to our bank). If the transaction was authenticated by PIN then the banks can deny liability like ATM transactions and you have to prove the bank leaked card info... The UK belatedly reintroduced fraud liability for banks in 2009 but banks still sometimes act as if it is for the cardholder to prove his PIN has not been compromised http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/s...ist-banks.html |
Originally Posted by percysmith
(Post 24162711)
(1) is an improvement for everyone on the whole. It really is like the introduction of seat belts or the Polio vaccine - a technological improvement with little downside for either bank or cardholder. There may be transition problems but once in place it really does cut down fraud.
At best, it's neutral from my point of view. Seat belts and the polio vaccine, on the other hand, can both save my life. I don't see how you can compare the two. |
Originally Posted by VegasGambler
(Post 24163045)
How does the transition from magstripe to chip help me (the carholder?). What added benefit does it provide to me?
At best, it's neutral from my point of view. Seat belts and the polio vaccine, on the other hand, can both save my life. I don't see how you can compare the two. |
Originally Posted by tmiw
(Post 24162940)
Since HK is still chip and signature, how is merchant support for C&P cards? Are the terminals inaccessible to customers in some places? And do cards issued in HK generally have a PIN backup?
C&p cards will be chip read but a slip will be produced for signature. I've not been told about problems for chip and pin cards in HK. |
Originally Posted by VegasGambler
(Post 24163045)
How does the transition from magstripe to chip help me (the carholder?). What added benefit does it provide to me?
At best, it's neutral from my point of view. Seat belts and the polio vaccine, on the other hand, can both save my life. I don't see how you can compare the two. Also my card will have to be replaced less often - "higher availability"? |
Originally Posted by percysmith
(Post 24163126)
Card terminals are not generally produced to cardholder.
C&p cards will be chip read but a slip will be produced for signature. I've not been told about problems for chip and pin cards in HK. |
Originally Posted by tmiw
(Post 24163072)
If that UPS agent at the warehouse had refused to take back the unopened box that the card thief ordered online and had shipped to my house (!)
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Originally Posted by VegasGambler
(Post 24163257)
Huh?
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Actually we do collect PINs for PRC Unionpay cardholders. Although Unionpay is progressively moving to chip (their chip - "PBOC 2.0" not EMV), the majority of the cards I see brought down from the Mainland are swipe cards and the verification convention is to require both a PIN and signature.
But I don't see this being done for Visa or Mastercard cardholders from overseas. Even oreck, who used a RBC card to pay at Rainbow. |
Originally Posted by tmiw
(Post 24163264)
Someone used one of my cards a few years back to buy some stuff online. I think they were trying to ship stuff to them but the website shipped to me instead. UPS was a bit reluctant to take the box back until I explained what happened.
Not that I'm suggesting that that's what happened to you :) In your case, you would absolutely not have to pay for return shipping. You can just file a chargeback since the account use was unauthorized. You are under no obligation to ship it back at your expense. FWIW, magstripe in no way requires that stores hang onto your creit card info after you use it. They just have poor security practices. I'm sure that they will continue to have poor security practices in the future. |
Originally Posted by VegasGambler
(Post 24163294)
In your case, you would absolutely not have to pay for return shipping. You can just file a chargeback since the account use was unauthorized. You are under no obligation to ship it back at your expense.
In tmiw's case the card was used online so whether the card is chip or swipe would not have mattered. My wife had a similar experience this week http://www.hongkongcard.com/forum/fo...w.php?id=13859 but it appears the bank involved has compromised a whole bunch of card codes. With regard to chip authenticated transactions, at least in the HK case there is still the cardholder's option to require the HK bank to prove the transaction has been authorised by cardholder. If the cardholder still possesses the card, and the travel records show the cardholder can't have travelled to the merchant, the bank is almost certainly on the hook for accepting a bad transaction. The merchant will have to prove fraud or complicity in fraud, and most will simply pay up than bother. As with DCC, the default action/burden of proof is a significant factor. Thank goodness HK regulators are quite "reactionary" and are sticking with signatures.
Originally Posted by VegasGambler
(Post 24163294)
FWIW, magstripe in no way requires that stores hang onto your creit card info after you use it. They just have poor security practices. I'm sure that they will continue to have poor security practices in the future.
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For EMV vs mag, I think EMV is harder to reproduce, and transaction details are less prone to data hacks, right?
It does not help in online transaction cases though for sure. |
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