The conversation that I had with my uncle about FBW and nonFBW planes came about due to the Air France flight that went down in the Atlantic last year. He theorized that perhaps the pilots lost the ability to control the plane.

Thanks for the insight guys!

FBW has absolutely proven itself to be safe, no question. One of the principles behind FBW is that the computer will generally not allow human error to create a catastrophic situation (i.e. force the plane into a stall).

Aviation writer William Langewiesche wrote a book called "Fly by Wire" in which he makes the argument that the FBW technology on the Airbus Captain Sullenberger ditched in the Hudson played a central role in the crash landing being so successful.

On the other hand, FBW with no mechanical backup requires some power to control the plane.

There is also the issue the the computer could actually cause a crash. Although pure speculation, some have argued that the crash of the AF Airbus in June 2009, might have been caused, at least in part, by FBW.

Of the information that is known, it appears clear that the aircraft was receiving inconsistent air speed measurements. There was an identified problem with the pitot tube that measures airspeed. In this case, however, the pitot tubes might have simply iced up, thus rendering them ineffective as well.

But on the Airbus, inaccurate air speed measurements, espeicially if combined with strong winds, could lead the computer to mistakenly send the plane into a stall, if the computer believed the plane was reaching its maximum allowable speed. In other words, the computer mistakenly believes the plane is flying too fast (when it is not) because of faulty sensors, and slows it down so much that it goes into a stall (meaning it drops out of the sky).

Once the Airbus entered the stall, it might have been impossible for the pilots to take any kind of effective action to get it out of the stall, and the computer might have forced it to remain in the stall if it still believed the plane was exceeding its maximum speed.

No one knows this for certain, but it is not an inconceivable scenario in a FBW aircraft.

http://www.airdisaster.com/investiga...96/af296.shtml

"No fewer than 52 provisional flight notices have been published by Airbus Industry between April 1988 and April 1989. Hardly any new aircraft type has manifested such a large number of malfunctions. "

I can understand my uncle's resistance to Airbus products and I'm thankful that CO flies Boeing!

Besides, they have that catchy slogan, "If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going"

While there is little doubt that the French government did everything in its power to protect Airbus and to find a scapegoat in Captain Michel Asseline and his First Officer Pierre Mazi�re, and that there were a number of investivative irregularities, especially involving the black boxes, it should be pointed out that Captain Asseline had disabled many of the standard FBW features of the A-320 and was flying the plane as manually as possible.

Had he retained the FBW features, it is possible that this accident could have been averted.

Ultimately, one thing appears clear: Both Airbus and Asseline were taking tremendous risks to show the aircraft's capabilities. Air France asked Asseline to fly at 100-ft. altitude and force the plane into a stall to demonstrate its FBW ability to avoid a crash. Why did Asseline disable the FBW features? He says that he was asked to do so by Air France and Airbus to demonstrate the capacities of the aircraft even is a "disabled" mode.

The fact that there were passengers on the plane, however, was absolutely unacceptable.

Finally, regarding the manslaughter charges, which seem shocking to an American aviation observer, these are a standard part of the French legal system in any airplane accident. That said, the preponderance of the evidence would suggest that the French government tampered with the black boxes (they were held by the French civil aviation authority, the Direction g�n�rale de l'Aviation civile, for ten days in contravention of French law, and returned with an eight-second gap at the crucial time frame). Asseline and his supporters believe this was done in order to railroad the crew and to protect the repuation of Airbus.

Asseline, who had been Air France's chief training pilot, was sentenced to six months in prison, had his pilot's license suspended. He later wrote a book, "Le Pilote est-il Coupable?" (Is the Pilot Guilty?) which came out in 1992.

While there have been many issues with the Airbus since then, no Airbus has ever recorded a definitively provable FBW failure.

Nice bump. This thread has gone far too long without action.

I have a couple of questions since this thread seems to be active again...

1) How many subsets of 737 pilots are there at CO? I know that pilots can fly most (if not all) versions of the 73 with a single type rating and differences training. I guess what I am curious about is how that translates for the airline/pilots themselves.
- Is there one "737" category that goes all the way from the -500 to the -900ER?
- Is there a "classic" group vs. a NG group?
-Within these groupings, is there true flexibility...i.e. could a pilot fly one leg on a 73G, the next leg on a 739ER, and then back to the 73G, and so forth?

and

2) What are (generally) the overnight rest requirements for domestic and Canada/Carib/Central Am/Northern S. Am flights?

Actually, to simplify matters, a better question would be: how long does an AIRCRAFT have to be scheduled RON in order for the same crew to be able to legally fly her in in the evening and out again the next morning, assuming only one airplane of the type on the ground and no staggering of crews between inbounds and outbounds? Is domestic different than international, even with generally the same aircraft types? CO does not do standing overnights, correct?

Thanks for any insight.

On CO flight 62 yesterday from IAH to EWR the pilot announced that there was a brake lock problem and that he put the landing gear down for awhile after take off. Then when we landed we were met by fire trucks who examined things, but there were no problems. The landing was smooth and although we were told that we were going to land in an emergency way, we didn't have to bend over and brace ourselves or anything, it seemed to me a normal landing. The same plane was due to continue on to Madrid but they seem to have replaced that flight with a different plane. I'm curious as to how common this sort of problem is and why lowering the landing gear helped. The FAs and pilot were excellent on the flight from my impression.

Hot brakes aren't an everyday thing, and the gear being down helped because of the rush of cool air over the brakes.

1) One set for ALL 737's. There is a pay difference once you go to 738 and bigger.
One set for all 75 and 76's
One set for 777
Within their group they can swap plane types all day long.

2) It can be surprisingly short and the subject of a little controversy. Normally, the minimum is 9 hrs free from duty which, when you factor in deplaning and report to duty times, means 10 hrs on the ground from block in to block out. It can actually be reduced to 8 if more rest is given the next night. Where the controversy comes in is that the time does not include waiting for the van, transport to/from the hotel, checking in, winding down, showering, ironing shirt etc. On minimum rest, many feel that it's very difficult, if not impossible, to get 7 or 8 hours in bed. Fortunately, this doesn't happen often and when it does, were good at working through it. There has been some discussion about increasing these times but it hasn't happened yet.

The above limits are for FA's and I think the pilots are exactly the same or within 15 minutes or so.

pptp,

Thanks for the info. One quick clarification...pilots do actually bid lines that involve different subtypes of the 737 (and get paid more for those segments that are on the 738/739), as opposed to having separate bids for the higher/lower paying 737 types?



I know the rest requirements are controversial, and opening that can of worms was not the intent of my question! That's why I tried to frame it in terms of the airplane...I was just curious about how long the planes have to sit overnight in order to allow the crew rest when its the only plane of a given type RON at a given airport.


Another question for someone in the know...
It appears that the layout and interior of the 739 and 739ER are identical, but Boeing indicates that the -900ER has additional exit doors compared to the non-ER version. Are those optional, and CO, with a relatively low-density layout, did not need them? I have not flown on these planes so I can only go by pictures and seat maps.

PPTP answered this fairly well.

As a 737 pilot I am qualified on all of our models: -300, -500, -700, -800, -900, and -900ER. Our pairings incorporate all versions and we move back and forth among them all. Jumping back and forth is pretty straightforward actually.

The -300s required a separate simulator, and at least 5 hours of training during our IOE - Initial Operating Experience (I did a Miami turn from IAH for mine). Sim training also has a separate sim for the -500, and then separate sims for the NGs. We are in the process of removing the -300 sim from the training center and replacing it with an NG sim, or two.

Pay is better on the 8's and 9's, so all else being equal, most of us prefer to earn the extra bucks for an hour in the seat.

DRW

DRW,

Thanks for the followup. Its interesting that you have to add $ to the other variables you look at when bidding for trips, since more 738/739 hours mean more bucks!

We don't bid 'lines' anymore at CAL - although the FA's do. A line would be a pre-constructed pairing of trips for the month.

What the pilots now have is called PBS. Some hate it, some love it. PBS allows us to specify the parameters of our award group. Some want weekends off, others don't mind working weekends. We can define start/stop hours, equipment we want to work (900 for instance), equipment we want to avoid (300), airports we want to layover at (HNL), avoid (EWR), minimum pay per day (5 hours/day), etc. There are about 40 parameters we can define. The program runs for a few days and then awards us our schedule for the month......

800s and 900s are considered 'premium' pay for us 737 types and I can request 100% premium trips. Generally those might be hard to hold, depending on seniority, so I'm more likely to get awarded pairings that have 70% premium pay, and 30% on the old-gens. Guys junior to me are more likely to hold 50%/50% type pairings.....

My first bid group requests 100% premium, then I start relaxing the bid to 80%, 70%, etc. I actually like PBS. I'm able to define the things that work exactly for me, as opposed to trying to sort through 700 pre-constructed lines trying to ID the one that fits some of the things I want. I'm fairly generic on my requests, and normally get my first bid group choice every month - which I doubt I would get with the old system of lines.

DRW