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Facts are facts indeed. The TSA is a whopping big waste of money, with its behavior detection approach conducted by inconsistent and poorly-performing employees being yet another sign of the organization being a waste of resources.
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Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 12085762)
BDO’s find things significant with passengers every single day wally. I know you don’t believe that, but then again to see it you would first have to get your head out of the sand.
Oh, wait. You're lying. Forgot who I was talking to for a second. |
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 12085253)
Sure jimmie.
TSA and other airport security measures have always focused on the "things" that cause security concerns. Guns, bombs, flammables, etc. Finding them and preventing them from getting on an aircraft. But that has been shown to not work so well. The hijackers of 9/11 used that against us and thereby created the situation we have now. They brought non-prohibited items on board and used them to kill 3000+ people.
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 12085253)
That’s what the BDO’s and some other programs are designed to do. BDO’s can’t tell if a person is a terrorist, but they can tell if a person is exhibiting the signs of someone hiding something significant, and they can use that information to find out if what they are hiding is the intent to harm an aircraft or the passengers.
By Thomas Frank, USA TODAY WASHINGTON — Fewer than 1% of airline passengers singled out at airports for suspicious behavior are arrested, Transportation Security Administration figures show, raising complaints that too many innocent people are stopped. A TSA program launched in early 2006 that looks for terrorists using a controversial surveillance method has led to more than 160,000 people in airports receiving scrutiny, such as a pat-down search or a brief interview. That has resulted in 1,266 arrests, often on charges of carrying drugs or fake IDs, the TSA said. The TSA program trains screeners to become "behavior detection officers" who patrol terminals and checkpoints looking for travelers who act oddly or appear to answer questions suspiciously. Critics say the number of arrests is small and indicates the program is flawed. "That's an awful lot of people being pulled aside and inconvenienced," said Carnegie Mellon scientist Stephen Fienberg, who studied the TSA program and other counterterrorism efforts. "I think it's a sham. We have no evidence it works." TSA spokeswoman Ellen Howe said the program has been "incredibly effective" at catching criminals at airports. "It definitely gets at things that other layers of security might miss," Howe said. In many cases, the extra scrutiny is a casual conversation with a TSA behavior officer that shows someone is innocent, Howe said. Studies are underway that analyze the program's effectiveness, she added. The program has grown from 43 major airports last year to more than 150 airports, including some with just 20 flights a day. The number of behavior officers will jump from 2,470 to 3,400 by October. The TSA has not publicly said if it has caught a terrorist through the program. The agency says that some who are arrested, particularly on fake ID charges, may be scouting an airport for a possible attack. Some scientists say the TSA effort is just as likely to flag a nervous traveler as a terrorist. "The use of these technologies for the purpose that the TSA is interested in moves into an area where we don't have proven science," said Robert Levenson, a psychologist at the University of California-Berkeley. Although observers can perceive whether someone appears anxious or is acting deceptively, they can't tell whether that person is planning an attack or something such as an extramarital affair, Levenson said. Levenson and Fienberg were part of a National Academy of Sciences team whose report last month said "behavioral surveillance" has "enormous potential for violating" privacy. The report calls for more research and says surveillance should be used only as "preliminary screening" to find people who merit "follow-up investigation." That is how the TSA uses the program, Howe said. Paul Ekman, a San Francisco psychologist who helped design the TSA program, said it can be effective. But it needs more study, he said. "The shortcoming is, we don't know how many people are showing suspicious behaviors and aren't being noticed," Ekman said.
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 12085253)
Some of the folks out there have complained about the cost of the program. Perspective. How much did the hijackers of 9/11 cost the USA with their act of terrorism?
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El Al uses the same principles.
Should they stop doing it because they haven't had a successful hijacking in decades? |
Originally Posted by We Will Never Forget
(Post 12087000)
El Al uses the same principles.
And what they do, they do correctly.... |
Originally Posted by We Will Never Forget
(Post 12087000)
El Al uses the same principles.
Should they stop doing it because they haven't had a successful hijacking in decades? Oh, and according to securitymanagement.com, "The strategy is based off an Israeli model, although U.S. behavior detection officers receive less training than their Israeli counterparts." |
Originally Posted by halls120
(Post 12087052)
Israel has five airports, a longstanding well-trained security force, and a country that has been in a state of perpetual vigilance since 1948.
Oh, and according to securitymanagement.com, "The strategy is based off an Israeli model, although U.S. behavior detection officers receive less training than their Israeli counterparts." |
Originally Posted by We Will Never Forget
(Post 12087234)
I don't doubt that fact and the level of screening is less than that in Israel. There has to be a compromise between efficiency and effectiveness. If this is it, I have no idea, but a standard has been set by a nation facing the same threats that we fear.
A standard that the TSA does not meet, or attempt to meet. Thus the TSA does not use the same principles.... |
Originally Posted by We Will Never Forget
(Post 12087234)
I don't doubt that fact and the level of screening is less than that in Israel. There has to be a compromise between efficiency and effectiveness. If this is it, I have no idea, but a standard has been set by a nation facing the same threats that we fear.
You're kidding, right? What possible good can a BDO program be if it doesn't operate to the standard required to be effective? Other than providing another stage for TSA's Kabuki Theatre? |
Originally Posted by We Will Never Forget
(Post 12087000)
El Al uses the same principles.
Should they stop doing it because they haven't had a successful hijacking in decades? During the late 90's and early 00's my father flew to Israel regularly on business. One of the things he saw was during a refueling stop in Europe, El Al personnel surrounded the aircraft and were armed with automatic weapons, they were watching anyone coming towards the aircraft. Lets see that happen at American airports. |
Originally Posted by TSORon
(Post 12085722)
So who is to say that the guy with the pistol in his bag at JFK is not a terrorist?
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Originally Posted by magellan315
(Post 12087377)
El Al does it because they have had real hijackings for many years, they also do it because of an assault by terrorists in one of their airports. They even prevented a bombing of an aircraft. The difference is the Israeli's do it right and they have real layers of security in place. A lot more than X-raying luggage and badly trained TSO's and BDO's, several of the layers occur before you even get inside the actual airport. The TSA was created in haste and their solutions are reactive, not proactive
During the late 90's and early 00's my father flew to Israel regularly on business. One of the things he saw was during a refueling stop in Europe, El Al personnel surrounded the aircraft and were armed with automatic weapons, they were watching anyone coming towards the aircraft. Lets see that happen at American airports. |
Originally Posted by We Will Never Forget
(Post 12087397)
I believe that El Al's methods are more drastic than the average American would approve of. That's just me.
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Originally Posted by halls120
(Post 12086880)
Ronnie, you can't even get the basics correct. Lax gate security was not the cause of the 9/11 hijackings. I know you and the rest of the TSA kool aid drinkers want everyone to believe this, but it is simply NOT the case.
The 9/11 hijackings were planned and executed on the correct belief that once on board, the hijackers could take control of the aircraft with any number of implements available, because prior to 9/11, airline policy in force forbid crews from resisting a hijacking. Your precious BDO program might be designed to find people who could post a danger to other passengers, but it hasn't been a success, has it? Let's see. No proven science, and all you are catching is evidence of non-aviation safety related criminal activity. And you wonder why courts are starting to rule against TSA? Again, the 9/11 lie. Does everyone in TSA have to sign a loyalty oath swearing they believe in this false statement? |
Originally Posted by magellan315
(Post 12087391)
The job of a TSO at the checkpoint is to make sure that guns that passengers don't bring guns into an airplane. Given the high failure rate for the Red Team tests I would be more concerned about a gun getting past a checkpoint than the amateur training that BDO's receive and how effective they really are.
Rarely do any of these incidents receive media attention. Channel 6 does not have reporters and cameras prepositioned at every checkpoint. But you can read the numbers on the TSA web site if you are interested. And I can’t tell you how many knives we find each week. Thousands maybe. And none of these are “red team” tests. So your reasoning is in error, faulty. But that won’t be enough for you and I know it. The proof is in the pudding, but all you can see is a box. |
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