A functional binary bomb!
#76
Join Date: Dec 2004
Programs: AA, WN RR
Posts: 3,122
Exactly.
The basic law of system security is that a system can only be as secure as its weakest link. This applies to any system, from the infection-control in your car's air conditioning to a corporate intranet to the system of airspace control.
As governments seem hellbent on securing already reasonably good security procedures while keeping the weakest links every bit as weak as they've always been, the whole process will remain pointless at best and downright disingenuous at worst.
The basic law of system security is that a system can only be as secure as its weakest link. This applies to any system, from the infection-control in your car's air conditioning to a corporate intranet to the system of airspace control.
As governments seem hellbent on securing already reasonably good security procedures while keeping the weakest links every bit as weak as they've always been, the whole process will remain pointless at best and downright disingenuous at worst.
#77
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: May 2004
Location: Soon to be LEGT
Posts: 10,928
What is the benefit of the liquids ban if I can easily get a dozen kamikazis to simultaneously blow up in cropdusters over major cities across the western world and a leased Learjet or even E170 to penetrate government buildings (well probably not the white house, but a lot of others nevertheless)?
#78
Join Date: Aug 2004
Posts: 4,704
The money should be spent at strengthening the weakest links!
What is the benefit of the liquids ban if I can easily get a dozen kamikazis to simultaneously blow up in cropdusters over major cities across the western world and a leased Learjet or even E170 to penetrate government buildings (well probably not the white house, but a lot of others nevertheless).
What is the benefit of the liquids ban if I can easily get a dozen kamikazis to simultaneously blow up in cropdusters over major cities across the western world and a leased Learjet or even E170 to penetrate government buildings (well probably not the white house, but a lot of others nevertheless).
How many crop dusting terror attacks have occurred versus civilian airliners?
#79
Join Date: May 2005
Posts: 7,605
What is the benefit of the liquids ban if I can easily get a dozen kamikazis to simultaneously blow up in cropdusters over major cities across the western world and a leased Learjet or even E170 to penetrate government buildings (well probably not the white house, but a lot of others nevertheless)?
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/mai...irobots127.xml
#80
Join Date: Dec 2004
Programs: AA, WN RR
Posts: 3,122
To concentrate on airliners while ignoring cropdusters is fighting the last war, while simultaneously wasting billions of dollars and eroding our civil liberties. Terrorists think outside the box. So should governmental agencies. If we have made civilian airliners more difficult to exploit - a large if, given the holes in TSA "security" - then terrorists will look elsewhere for likely places of attack. Think of a tube of toothpaste. Well, that may be a poor example, given the war on liquids, but all should understand the analogy. An inflated balloon is a better example. Push in on one side, the rest expands. Similar principle: if one link is apparently less vulnerable, then terrorists have shown patientce and wilingness to probe to exploit other links.
#81
Join Date: Aug 2004
Posts: 4,704
To concentrate on airliners while ignoring cropdusters is fighting the last war, while simultaneously wasting billions of dollars and eroding our civil liberties. Terrorists think outside the box. So should governmental agencies. If we have made civilian airliners more difficult to exploit - a large if, given the holes in TSA "security" - then terrorists will look elsewhere for likely places of attack. Think of a tube of toothpaste. Well, that may be a poor example, given the war on liquids, but all should understand the analogy. An inflated balloon is a better example. Push in on one side, the rest expands. Similar principle: if one link is apparently less vulnerable, then terrorists have shown patientce and wilingness to probe to exploit other links.
If I hit you in the face with a jab, you should be also looking for a hook to the floating ribs and an uppercut to the jaw. But you'd be foolish to ignore the jab to the face, otherwise I'll hit you with it again. That's my fighting strategy - attack you repeatedly with successful blows until you do something that makes me stop it and do something else. If I'm successful, why change?
#82
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: May 2004
Location: Soon to be LEGT
Posts: 10,928
Of course agencies should think outside the box, but they should also not ignore the last successful attack.
If I hit you in the face with a jab, you should be also looking for a hook to the floating ribs and an uppercut to the jaw. But you'd be foolish to ignore the jab to the face, otherwise I'll hit you with it again. That's my fighting strategy - attack you repeatedly with successful blows until you do something that makes me stop it and do something else. If I'm successful, why change?
If I hit you in the face with a jab, you should be also looking for a hook to the floating ribs and an uppercut to the jaw. But you'd be foolish to ignore the jab to the face, otherwise I'll hit you with it again. That's my fighting strategy - attack you repeatedly with successful blows until you do something that makes me stop it and do something else. If I'm successful, why change?
Depending on your perspective, the level of protection commercial aviation is afforded can be seen as anywhere from "almost decent" to "completely over-the-top". Whereas anyone would agree that non-aviation public transport is completely nonsecure, and private aviation security is very lax.
#83
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: Salish Sea
Programs: DL,AC,HH,PC
Posts: 8,972
#84
Join Date: Aug 2004
Posts: 4,704
But it doesn't take a rocket (mmm rocket!) scientist to understand that it's a lot easier to attack through the nonsecure fronts...
Depending on your perspective, the level of protection commercial aviation is afforded can be seen as anywhere from "almost decent" to "completely over-the-top". Whereas anyone would agree that non-aviation public transport is completely nonsecure, and private aviation security is very lax.
Depending on your perspective, the level of protection commercial aviation is afforded can be seen as anywhere from "almost decent" to "completely over-the-top". Whereas anyone would agree that non-aviation public transport is completely nonsecure, and private aviation security is very lax.
OTOH, where is the best "bang for your buck?" Where do the bad guys want to attack to best accomplish their goal?
I'd say historically that civilian aviation ranks up there, whereas, to date, private aviation does not.
#86
Join Date: Aug 2004
Posts: 4,704
That's waaaaay above both my pay grade and my experience. I'd guess the Intel people would make that call. Us front-liners will just continue to follow orders.
#87
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: May 2004
Location: Soon to be LEGT
Posts: 10,928
Operational people may have their shortcomings, but I (and I suspect many others on this forum) would argue that the problem isn't really on the operational side...The strategic risk assessment (right at the top) is the main thing that's completely flawed (assuming that terrorists will do exactly what they've done in the past, thinking that "more of the same" security is the way forward and doing sweet FA on eliminating the things that cause terrorism).
#88
Join Date: Aug 2004
Posts: 4,704
But I don't think anyone here is attacking you as being a bad person or even bad employee.
Operational people may have their shortcomings, but I (and I suspect many others on this forum) would argue that the problem isn't really on the operational side...The strategic risk assessment (right at the top) is the main thing that's completely flawed (assuming that terrorists will do exactly what they've done in the past, thinking that "more of the same" security is the way forward and doing sweet FA on eliminating the things that cause terrorism).
Operational people may have their shortcomings, but I (and I suspect many others on this forum) would argue that the problem isn't really on the operational side...The strategic risk assessment (right at the top) is the main thing that's completely flawed (assuming that terrorists will do exactly what they've done in the past, thinking that "more of the same" security is the way forward and doing sweet FA on eliminating the things that cause terrorism).

I don't agree with a lot of what goes on in DHS and have stated so, publicly and privately. As a FLEO I have sworn to uphold the Constitution and the law. I try and do my best.
Also realize that sometimes here I take positions that I may not 100% agree with just to make a point or to put out another opinion. There aren't many opposing voices here, which lessens the dialogue, IMO.

