testing eye drops
Jul 10, 2012, 5:28 am
#61
Join Date: Nov 2010
Posts: 360
OK, I'm going to make everyone's head hurt with facts. There is not, as of yet, any non-contact test for peroxide. There might be one on the way, courtesy of a couple of plastics chemists from San Diego.
One of the things we forensic chemists try to do well is qualitative analysis. Give us some "stuff" and we will use the available tools to tell you what the stuff is. TNT (trinitrotoluene) based explosives are a piece of cake - well not actually cake - because of the aromatic rings and nitro groups given off. That is not so with respect to the newer peroxide based explosives, such as triacetone triperoxide. But a new plastic synthesized using a boronic acid (3,6-bis (pinacolatoboron) fluoran is showing some promise in detecting peroxide vapor in the 3 part per billion range. But it's not on the market yet, so Ron is again showing his lack of expertise. At present, there are NO strips that you can wave around to detect peroxide. I'm waiting for a test strip you can wave around in the presence of TSOs to detect rampant bulls%%t.
One of the things we forensic chemists try to do well is qualitative analysis. Give us some "stuff" and we will use the available tools to tell you what the stuff is. TNT (trinitrotoluene) based explosives are a piece of cake - well not actually cake - because of the aromatic rings and nitro groups given off. That is not so with respect to the newer peroxide based explosives, such as triacetone triperoxide. But a new plastic synthesized using a boronic acid (3,6-bis (pinacolatoboron) fluoran is showing some promise in detecting peroxide vapor in the 3 part per billion range. But it's not on the market yet, so Ron is again showing his lack of expertise. At present, there are NO strips that you can wave around to detect peroxide. I'm waiting for a test strip you can wave around in the presence of TSOs to detect rampant bulls%%t.
Jul 10, 2012, 5:45 am
#62
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: USA
Posts: 555
~~ Irish
Jul 10, 2012, 9:54 pm
#64
Join Date: Apr 2009
Posts: 2,195
No security system is 100% perfect. That’s a fact. The government is required to provide for the common good and protect its citizens, its in the constitution. On 9/11/2001 the USA was attacked by … well we all know that story. The government’s response to the threat was to federalize the screening workforce and the system that failed so miserably.
Since 2002 there has not been a successful attack on an airline from a US airport. Attacks there have been, but not from one of the airports secured by the TSA or one of its civilian contract organizations. Is this all because of the TSA? No. It’s because of the US government. Agencies who work with the TSA, for the TSA, and who provide every other kind of support to TSA’s activities. It is also in part to the changes in screening methodology, removing the airlines from the business of screening passengers and letting them put their resources to better use. It is also in part due to the passengers themselves, passengers who will no longer sit idle while someone threatens their aircraft and their lives. People who will take an active part in notifying the authorities of suspicious activities by one of their fellow passengers, people who keep their eyes open and their ears sharp.
In other words its many things. Many people. Much effort. And yes, expanded funding for the required changes. The folks here who complain the loudest are also the type that screamed the loudest for the changes needed, likely the very same people in fact. They will never admit it, but it’s true none the less.
Yet even with all of that, there is still no perfect system. None. There are holes. There are personnel failures, criminal activity, and thoughtlessness. Just because the folks here cannot (or refuse to) understand purposes for the procedures we have, does not mean that they are wrong or meaningless. It just means that they are choosing ignorance over knowledge.
Jul 11, 2012, 3:10 am
#65
Join Date: Oct 2011
Programs: Ham Sandwich Medallion
Posts: 889
No security system is 100% perfect. That’s a fact. The government is required to provide for the common good and protect its citizens, its in the constitution. On 9/11/2001 the USA was attacked by … well we all know that story. The government’s response to the threat was to federalize the screening workforce and the system that failed so miserably.
Since 2002 there has not been a successful attack on an airline from a US airport--<snip>--People who will take an active part in notifying the authorities of suspicious activities by one of their fellow passengers, people who keep their eyes open and their ears sharp.
Now, as to the notion that the TSA has stopped attack attempts, I offer this analogy. A gang put out hits on four police officers in 2001. Three hits were successful, but the fourth failed because the officer knew what was happening and called for backup to handle the threat. Every day since, that officer has worn riot gear to work, and during that time, he has never been shot. Is that because he's wearing the riot gear, or is it because gangs know that he's expecting it and knows how to handle it going forward, so a similar attack would end in failure?
It will be a generation or more--if ever--before there's another successful attack on an American airliner, and the TSA has absolutely zero to do with that.
I also want to address the notion of passengers turning each other in by saying that the whole "See Something, Say Something" program is revolting. If you see a guy sitting at McDonald's trying to light his underpants on fire, yeah, say something. But this idiotic, offensive program encourages people to "turn in" anyone who looks suspicious, i.e., the guy wearing a hoodie and standing in a vacant gate. You know, the guy who's just early for his flight and wanted a quiet place to chill beforehand. Or the woman who's so nervous about flying that she's sitting at the gate shaking. Clearly, if you're that nervous, you're a terrorist, right? If I ever see someone playing with a wristwatch connected to a small bag, I'll call 9-1-1 and let a police officer know. Rest assured that I will never, never report anything to a TSA screener.
In other words its many things. Many people. Much effort. And yes, expanded funding for the required changes. The folks here who complain the loudest are also the type that screamed the loudest for the changes needed, likely the very same people in fact. They will never admit it, but it’s true none the less.
Yet even with all of that, there is still no perfect system. None. There are holes. There are personnel failures, criminal activity, and thoughtlessness. Just because the folks here cannot (or refuse to) understand purposes for the procedures we have, does not mean that they are wrong or meaningless. It just means that they are choosing ignorance over knowledge.
Think about that. Billions of dollars later, and the TSA, as it exists today, would be incapable of preventing a 9/11-style attack, because its prized detection equipment cannot detect thin strips of metal placed out, alongside the body in a baggy shirt. That's why I have a problem with the TSA. The rallying cry was "9/11! 9/11!". In exchange for the spending of billions upon billions of dollars--money that could have gone to healthcare, education, infrastructure or, God forbid, paying down our debt--and the sacrificing of virtually all personal liberties and dignities in order to get onto a flying Greyhound, we have an organization that would have failed to detect the hijackers, and failed to stop the terrorist attack it was formed in response to.
Last edited by T.J. Bender; Jul 11, 2012 at 3:15 am
Jul 11, 2012, 6:41 am
#66
Join Date: May 2009
Location: LGA, JFK
Posts: 1,018
Actually, that’s a fairly accurate statement. We are not chemists, therefore they make the systems we use pretty simple to operate. I am not a computer engineer either, but that does not prevent me from using one.
Not needed, but thanks for the offer. What is needed is a bit of perspective. We screen just about 2,000,000 passengers each and every day. The system in place is specifically designed to meet that work load and be able to expand if needed. We cannot waste our time on the trivialities that each passenger brings to the checkpoint with them, they have places to go and we a job to do. The rules are pretty clear, but every single minute of every single day people break them. Is the American public truly that stupid? I honestly don’t think so, at least until the next passenger brings his firearm to the checkpoint. At that point I have to wonder.
No security system is 100% perfect. That’s a fact. The government is required to provide for the common good and protect its citizens, its in the constitution. On 9/11/2001 the USA was attacked by … well we all know that story. The government’s response to the threat was to federalize the screening workforce and the system that failed so miserably.
Since 2002 there has not been a successful attack on an airline from a US airport. Attacks there have been, but not from one of the airports secured by the TSA or one of its civilian contract organizations. Is this all because of the TSA? No. It’s because of the US government. Agencies who work with the TSA, for the TSA, and who provide every other kind of support to TSA’s activities. It is also in part to the changes in screening methodology, removing the airlines from the business of screening passengers and letting them put their resources to better use. It is also in part due to the passengers themselves, passengers who will no longer sit idle while someone threatens their aircraft and their lives. People who will take an active part in notifying the authorities of suspicious activities by one of their fellow passengers, people who keep their eyes open and their ears sharp.
In other words its many things. Many people. Much effort. And yes, expanded funding for the required changes. The folks here who complain the loudest are also the type that screamed the loudest for the changes needed, likely the very same people in fact. They will never admit it, but it’s true none the less.
Yet even with all of that, there is still no perfect system. None. There are holes. There are personnel failures, criminal activity, and thoughtlessness. Just because the folks here cannot (or refuse to) understand purposes for the procedures we have, does not mean that they are wrong or meaningless. It just means that they are choosing ignorance over knowledge.
Not needed, but thanks for the offer. What is needed is a bit of perspective. We screen just about 2,000,000 passengers each and every day. The system in place is specifically designed to meet that work load and be able to expand if needed. We cannot waste our time on the trivialities that each passenger brings to the checkpoint with them, they have places to go and we a job to do. The rules are pretty clear, but every single minute of every single day people break them. Is the American public truly that stupid? I honestly don’t think so, at least until the next passenger brings his firearm to the checkpoint. At that point I have to wonder.
No security system is 100% perfect. That’s a fact. The government is required to provide for the common good and protect its citizens, its in the constitution. On 9/11/2001 the USA was attacked by … well we all know that story. The government’s response to the threat was to federalize the screening workforce and the system that failed so miserably.
Since 2002 there has not been a successful attack on an airline from a US airport. Attacks there have been, but not from one of the airports secured by the TSA or one of its civilian contract organizations. Is this all because of the TSA? No. It’s because of the US government. Agencies who work with the TSA, for the TSA, and who provide every other kind of support to TSA’s activities. It is also in part to the changes in screening methodology, removing the airlines from the business of screening passengers and letting them put their resources to better use. It is also in part due to the passengers themselves, passengers who will no longer sit idle while someone threatens their aircraft and their lives. People who will take an active part in notifying the authorities of suspicious activities by one of their fellow passengers, people who keep their eyes open and their ears sharp.
In other words its many things. Many people. Much effort. And yes, expanded funding for the required changes. The folks here who complain the loudest are also the type that screamed the loudest for the changes needed, likely the very same people in fact. They will never admit it, but it’s true none the less.
Yet even with all of that, there is still no perfect system. None. There are holes. There are personnel failures, criminal activity, and thoughtlessness. Just because the folks here cannot (or refuse to) understand purposes for the procedures we have, does not mean that they are wrong or meaningless. It just means that they are choosing ignorance over knowledge.
Since I seem to miss "quite a bit" of your information, could you please point me exactly to the part in which a test strip (not an electronic "sniffer" like the one you showed here, which, by the way, also does not detect peroxides) waved above a solution is capable of detecting peroxides.
http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/18843282-post27.html
I have used the strips and can say as a professional that they work just fine. Peroxides are the easiest to detect, some others not so much.
Last edited by GaryD; Jul 11, 2012 at 7:07 am Reason: provide further context for question
Jul 11, 2012, 7:07 am
#67
Join Date: May 2007
Posts: 203
Ron, I am likely to regret engaging you, but once in a while you post something with a certain degree of thoughtfulness. Your last post, though polluted with assertions I disagree with, is a case in point.
But however thoughtful your post may be, it is not relevant to the issue at hand. Let’s stop the misdirection and come back to the thread’s subject. You attempted to provide evidence that peroxides could be detected by waving test paper over a liquid. Two individuals with content expertise asserted this was impossible and refuted what you had to say. Did you retract your claim or marshal additional evidence?
No. Rather, you went on the attack, calling BubbaLoop’s statements “outlandish and unsupported.” Indeed, your “evidence” (and I use that term loosely (well, facetiously)) showed your statements to be outlandish and unsupported. You then launched a borderline personal attack, questioning BubbaLoop’s credentials. You know this argument is a red herring; you can use it any time on an anonymous internet forum such as this. I believe his posts lend credibility to who he says he is; he has posted nothing that leads me believe otherwise.
Your mindset, which seems to run rampant in the TSA, infuriates me. Address the issues haphazardly. Proven wrong? Just employ some misdirection. Or spin. Or attack the messenger. Or not address anything at all. If I wanted such a heaping helping of baloney, I’d go read Blogger Bob.
You might get away with it when you do it under the color of government authority. But it’s a level playing field here, my friend.
But however thoughtful your post may be, it is not relevant to the issue at hand. Let’s stop the misdirection and come back to the thread’s subject. You attempted to provide evidence that peroxides could be detected by waving test paper over a liquid. Two individuals with content expertise asserted this was impossible and refuted what you had to say. Did you retract your claim or marshal additional evidence?
No. Rather, you went on the attack, calling BubbaLoop’s statements “outlandish and unsupported.” Indeed, your “evidence” (and I use that term loosely (well, facetiously)) showed your statements to be outlandish and unsupported. You then launched a borderline personal attack, questioning BubbaLoop’s credentials. You know this argument is a red herring; you can use it any time on an anonymous internet forum such as this. I believe his posts lend credibility to who he says he is; he has posted nothing that leads me believe otherwise.
Your mindset, which seems to run rampant in the TSA, infuriates me. Address the issues haphazardly. Proven wrong? Just employ some misdirection. Or spin. Or attack the messenger. Or not address anything at all. If I wanted such a heaping helping of baloney, I’d go read Blogger Bob.
You might get away with it when you do it under the color of government authority. But it’s a level playing field here, my friend.
Jul 11, 2012, 7:32 am
#68
Suspended
Join Date: Dec 2010
Posts: 3,728
Your mindset, which seems to run rampant in the TSA, infuriates me. Address the issues haphazardly. Proven wrong? Just employ some misdirection. Or spin. Or attack the messenger. Or not address anything at all. If I wanted such a heaping helping of baloney, I’d go read Blogger Bob.
Jul 11, 2012, 10:10 am
#69
Join Date: Apr 2009
Posts: 2,195
First off, I agree that no security system is 100% perfect. That said, if a major component of that system--that being the liquid testing strips--can be scientifically proven to not do what it's intended to do, doesn't it go from a component of a security system to absolute theatrics? And don't you think the boogeyman has people in his employ who are well aware of that, and well aware of how easy it would be to get dangerous liquids aboard? And given that information, isn't it kind of telling that no one's blown up a plane with their bottle of breast milk or their insulin supply?
Here's what happened on 9/11: four planes were hijacked. Three made it to their intended targets, as passengers were likely conditioned to expect that, in a hijacking, the safest thing to do is not resist and wait for the hijackers to release you once their demands are met. The passengers on the fourth plane, however, got a heads-up thanks to cell phones, knew what was going on, overpowered the hijackers and foiled the plot. United 93 was proof to terrorists that such an attempt would never succeed again, as passengers would not allow it.
Now, as to the notion that the TSA has stopped attack attempts, I offer this analogy. A gang put out hits on four police officers in 2001. Three hits were successful, but the fourth failed because the officer knew what was happening and called for backup to handle the threat. Every day since, that officer has worn riot gear to work, and during that time, he has never been shot. Is that because he's wearing the riot gear, or is it because gangs know that he's expecting it and knows how to handle it going forward, so a similar attack would end in failure?
I also want to address the notion of passengers turning each other in by saying that the whole "See Something, Say Something" program is revolting. If you see a guy sitting at McDonald's trying to light his underpants on fire, yeah, say something. But this idiotic, offensive program encourages people to "turn in" anyone who looks suspicious, i.e., the guy wearing a hoodie and standing in a vacant gate. You know, the guy who's just early for his flight and wanted a quiet place to chill beforehand. Or the woman who's so nervous about flying that she's sitting at the gate shaking. Clearly, if you're that nervous, you're a terrorist, right? If I ever see someone playing with a wristwatch connected to a small bag, I'll call 9-1-1 and let a police officer know. Rest assured that I will never, never report anything to a TSA screener.
So lets play a game. You see something. Because of your personal belief’s you choose to not say something to authorities. When you get to your destination you find out that an aircraft exploded in flight, a flight from the same airport you departed from, and they believe that the cause may very well have had something to do with what you observed. Were you right or wrong in following your beliefs and refusing to notify authorities? If you had said something to security, the police, or even a member of the TSA, could you have made a positive impact on the fate of that aircraft?
Expanded funding for expensive equipment that will sit unused in a warehouse? Expanded funding so that the Thousands Standing Around become the Tens of thousands Standing Around? Expanded funding for MMW+ATD scanners that are notorious for false positives to the point that, at one or two unnamed airports I've been to, the clones don't even bother to pat you down if there's only one yellow box in a known-falsing area--information that the boogeyman would love to have?
Puffers didn’t work out. OK, we no longer use them and cant find anyone to sell them to. Parts of the technology are sensitive (information wise) and cannot just be junked. All that’s left is storage fee’s.
MMW+ATD systems have very few “false positive’s”. Since they are designed to detect anomalies and not specific items which can vary in size, composition, and shape, in an many ways as there are products on the planet, they cant be programed for anything else. It’s the personnel working with these units that can miss something important, not the unit. And since you don’t know what the “yellow box” means or what our procedures are in those cases, you are unqualified to venture an opinion on if they were doing their jobs correctly or not.
No, it means that we choose to question rather than accept, and the answers to the questions don't paint a pretty picture for the TSA. You want to talk about holes? Here's a huge one for you. The weapons used to hijack planes on 9/11 were box cutters--devices that can easily be concealed from carry-on X-rays, and have now been shown to be easy to hide from the AIT scanners that are now used as primary at (wild guess) 80% of passenger airports in the country.
Think about that. Billions of dollars later, and the TSA, as it exists today, would be incapable of preventing a 9/11-style attack, because its prized detection equipment cannot detect thin strips of metal placed out, alongside the body in a baggy shirt. That's why I have a problem with the TSA. The rallying cry was "9/11! 9/11!". In exchange for the spending of billions upon billions of dollars--money that could have gone to healthcare, education, infrastructure or, God forbid, paying down our debt--and the sacrificing of virtually all personal liberties and dignities in order to get onto a flying Greyhound, we have an organization that would have failed to detect the hijackers, and failed to stop the terrorist attack it was formed in response to.
As for your “personal liberties”, the courts have spoken many times on this as concerns airport screening checkpoints. Take a few hours and review what they have said. They at the very least understand the law and how it applies to the subject. More than I can say for just about everyone here.
Why haven't you answered BubbaLoop's perfectly reasonable question (asked after he provided his impressive credentials at your request), raised on this very thread on July 9, at 7:02 a.m., see http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/18894842-post54.html:
But however thoughtful your post may be, it is not relevant to the issue at hand. Let’s stop the misdirection and come back to the thread’s subject. You attempted to provide evidence that peroxides could be detected by waving test paper over a liquid. Two individuals with content expertise asserted this was impossible and refuted what you had to say. Did you retract your claim or marshal additional evidence?
No. Rather, you went on the attack, calling BubbaLoop’s statements “outlandish and unsupported.” Indeed, your “evidence” (and I use that term loosely (well, facetiously)) showed your statements to be outlandish and unsupported. You then launched a borderline personal attack, questioning BubbaLoop’s credentials. You know this argument is a red herring; you can use it any time on an anonymous internet forum such as this. I believe his posts lend credibility to who he says he is; he has posted nothing that leads me believe otherwise.
Your mindset, which seems to run rampant in the TSA, infuriates me. Address the issues haphazardly. Proven wrong? Just employ some misdirection. Or spin. Or attack the messenger. Or not address anything at all. If I wanted such a heaping helping of baloney, I’d go read Blogger Bob.
Hmm, level playing field ‘eh? One of me, more than a dozen of you. Nothing I provide is taken as fact (even when it’s a direct quote from a court, a manufacturer, or a recognized expert in the field), but you are willing to accept credentials from a member of the discussion who has presented no credentials of any kind. Please explain to me how that makes it a level playing field?
Jul 11, 2012, 10:43 am
#70
Join Date: Jun 2009
Posts: 616
Mr. “TSAOUTOFOURPANTS”’s video far more than useless, it’s misleading and may very well be more of a fake than you would prefer to believe. I have seen it. His testing method is completely questionable, the video itself proves nothing (other than how bad a cinematographer or investigator he is).
http://tsaoutofourpants.wordpress.co...-get-defeated/
http://tsaoutofourpants.wordpress.co...-camera-in-hd/
It sure looks like he got that metal box in his side pocket through the scanner undetected.
Jul 11, 2012, 10:58 am
#72
Join Date: Oct 2011
Programs: Ham Sandwich Medallion
Posts: 889
So lets play a game. You see something. Because of your personal belief’s you choose to not say something to authorities. When you get to your destination you find out that an aircraft exploded in flight, a flight from the same airport you departed from, and they believe that the cause may very well have had something to do with what you observed. Were you right or wrong in following your beliefs and refusing to notify authorities? If you had said something to security, the police, or even a member of the TSA, could you have made a positive impact on the fate of that aircraft?
Puffers didn’t work out. OK, we no longer use them and cant find anyone to sell them to. Parts of the technology are sensitive (information wise) and cannot just be junked. All that’s left is storage fee’s.
MMW+ATD systems have very few “false positive’s”.
Since they are designed to detect anomalies and not specific items which can vary in size, composition, and shape, in an many ways as there are products on the planet, they cant be programed for anything else. It’s the personnel working with these units that can miss something important, not the unit. And since you don’t know what the “yellow box” means or what our procedures are in those cases, you are unqualified to venture an opinion on if they were doing their jobs correctly or not.
You may question all you like, we invite them. Your assumptions concerning something you have little direct knowledge about are what should be expected from someone in such a situation. Inaccurate, but one cannot reasonably expect anything more. You have quite a way to go, education wise, before you can venture an informed opinion on either the equipment or the procedures.
His testing method is completely questionable, the video itself proves nothing (other than how bad a cinematographer or investigator he is).
As for your “personal liberties”, the courts have spoken many times on this as concerns airport screening checkpoints. Take a few hours and review what they have said. They at the very least understand the law and how it applies to the subject. More than I can say for just about everyone here.
I stand by my assertion, based upon personal experience and conversations with TSOs, that the TSA would be incapable of stopping a 9/11-style attack, as its technology is faulty, its methods are flawed, and a sizable number of screeners seem not to care. I'd feel more safe with the local high school's Junior ROTC guarding airport checkpoints, because I know they'd take it more seriously than many TSOs I encounter do. But hey, what can you expect when your agency, tasked with national security, is hiring people off of pizza boxes?
Last edited by T.J. Bender; Jul 11, 2012 at 12:04 pm Reason: typo
Jul 11, 2012, 11:30 am
#73
Join Date: May 2009
Location: LGA, JFK
Posts: 1,018
I am a scientist, a full professor in one of the world´s most prestigious universities. One of the many things we do in my laboratory is detect peroxides in liquid solutions. According to both Scopus and the Web of Knowledge I have ~30 peer-reviewed publications in indexed journals with the word "peroxide" or "H2O2" in the title or abstract.
Did I suggest I haven't read the whole thread? I have.
Now, again, to the question you seem to be unable to answer:
Since I seem to miss "quite a bit" of your information, could you please point me exactly to the part in which a test strip (not an electronic "sniffer" like the one you showed here, which, by the way, also does not detect peroxides) waved above a solution is capable of detecting peroxides.
Well, I don't believe it, thanks to your tactics.
Last edited by GaryD; Jul 11, 2012 at 11:34 am Reason: "detect" not "identify"
Jul 11, 2012, 2:04 pm
#74
Join Date: Jul 2011
Posts: 5
There may be another possibility. Maybe the rules aren't that clear. If a private company produced a product that every single minute of every day customers used incorrectly, do you think that would assume a: they are stupid, b: they are purposely using it wrong, or c: we need to rewrite the directions for use
Jul 11, 2012, 2:15 pm
#75
Join Date: Oct 2011
Programs: Ham Sandwich Medallion
Posts: 889
There may be another possibility. Maybe the rules aren't that clear. If a private company produced a product that every single minute of every day customers used incorrectly, do you think that would assume a: they are stupid, b: they are purposely using it wrong, or c: we need to rewrite the directions for use
That said, I pretty frequently see people get anything from a lecture to a chewing-out because they left their toothpaste in their bag, didn't think that the ID in their pocket would trigger the NOS, or, my favorite, didn't take their belt off before going through the WTMD/NOS. That last one's my favorite because taking your belt off is not a requirement, just a suggestion.
While I can get behind some of the TSA's rules, like, you know, no guns on planes, it's the inane little ones like the shoe carnival and the Freedom Baggie that I see accidentally broken so often that I would agree with your thoughts entirely that it's not stupid passengers, it's stupid rules.