GUWonder

Or Anders Behring Breivik, the person arrested for yesterday's terrorist attacks in Oslo and an island outside of it that was hosting a youth summer camp for the Norwegian Labor Party -- he too would have chosen military service as his national service option under different governing leadership, but he is also certainly not representative of people doing so.

No contraband WEIs on board my commercially-scheduled passenger flights is a sufficient outcome for my security without the TSA doing yet more of its "risk based screening" and imagining who passengers are (or are not) and/or imaginging what "risk" passengers pose (or don't pose, as the case ordinarily is).

The TSA's got a history of doing "risk based screening": blacklisting individuals (and/or names) by use of no-fly and watch lists with names; and hassling some people more than most merely because of which party issued the valid identification presented to the TSA obsessed with photo ID and boarding passes to such ludicrous extent that the TSA spends a lot of resources on looking at ID and boarding passes instead of using the same to focus on contraband WEI interdiction.

chollie

Agree. Nearly a decade, and TSA (and some TSOs) don't seem to have a clear vision of what a TSO is/should be capable of doing well.

Should a TSO have a framework of protocols and a solid understanding of what the overall goal is and be allowed to exercise some judgement? (IE, drops of water in a clearly 'empty' water bottle are not likely to bring down a plane. A two-ounce bottle of hand lotion that is not in a baggie is also not going to bring down a plane because there's no baggie).

Or should a TSO function like a mindless automaton? 'Anomalies' on the face/head of a bald pax (without glasses or jewelry) still requires a full-body grope, including running hands over the top of the head. Full-body gropes include running hands down bare arms and legs. A single LGA of appropriate size but not in a baggie gets confiscated because "the rules say...".

And the ugly truth: if TSA wants motivated folks on the frontline capable of using their intelligence and not just following rote procedure when it doesn't make sense (and makes the organization look stupid), then TSA probably has to admit that there are folks who are currently in positions they are not qualified (and never were) to hold.

It doesn't take a very large percentage of 'bad apples' before the whole barrel starts stinking. Too often, we get exactly the wrong mix - TSO who deviates from procedure not because it makes sense from a security standpoint ("The operator says there are anomalies all over pax's head and face, but I can see there's nothing there so I don't need to run my hands over his head") but because the screener is lazy, ignorant or hostile.

Management bears a lot of the responsibility, for sure. But individual TSOs have a responsibility (if they take pride in the organization and the mission) to 'see something, say something' when co-workers don't behave properly. I have witnessed too many occasions when that doesn't happen. Peer pressure can be used in a good way sometimes.

BUT...like everyone here, I've worked for bad managers. The one thing a bad manager generally can't do is make a good employee behave badly. There are too many (and again, it doesn't take many) 'bad apples' who are not reined in by either their management or their co-workers.

Bart

I agree. For almost 10 years now, TSOs have been conditioned to conduct risk avoidance screening. That means focusing on items rather than the intent of the people who have those items. I don't foresee intentionally allowing knives, for instance, to be carried through the checkpoint as permitted items. However, if an off-duty law enforcement officer processing through as a regular passenger happens to have a pocketknife in his or her carry-on, what's the big deal? That LEO has been vetted by the appropriate city/state jurisdiction as a peace officer. Clearly, he or she does not have the intent of harming any passengers or bringing down the plane. The cultural change is to look at the specific circumstances and make a common sense decision. I think the workforce is capable of applying that discretion but it's going to take some time in terms of making the cultural change and, more significantly, for upper management to TRUST the on-the-floor decisions made by officers.

InkUnderNails

As have I as evidenced by my CCP and approval for NEXUS. Would you feel the same about my knife? (I am not asking about my firearm.)

chollie

You still won't be a member of the 'club' that is trusted for life.

Bart

I don't know. Maybe, maybe not.

But the overall principle is to define which passengers can be treated as "low risk" based on a reasonable standard. If that passenger has undergone a vetting process that allows TSA to reasonably determine that the individual is not a risk, then this should be the basis for a less intrusive screening methodology than a passenger who has not been scrutinized or whose risk potential has not been ruled out. The point is that all passengers would still undergo a screening process. No one is exempt. It's a matter of being smart about which ones have to undergo a more thorough process and which ones undergo a less intrusive process.

carolinaflyr

Politics tells us that there will never be a "rule" that says that it's ok for Inkundernails and carolinaflyr to carry weapons on board because we were prescreened and found not to be a threat.

But good risk management can say "We know that carolinaflyer and inkundernails probably won't bring a Glock on board and we really don't care about their pocketknife, shave gel or shampoo so let's spend time and money on something , and bother someone, else.

chollie

Unfortunately, it doesn't look like any of this is likely to improve the lot of pax physically unable to assume and hold the position in the NoS. They'll all still be subject to hands-on processing. Permanent SSSS.

Bart

Your information is incorrect.

Persons who are unable to hold the AIT screening position are screened by the WTMD.

GUWonder

Your information is incorrect at least in part too. There are persons unable to independently hold a position in the strip search machines who are not screened by the WTMD.

Superguy

False choice. I choose neither.

Now to the main topic ...

If TSA were to really employ a risk based model, statistically speaking, the greatest risk is significantly higher for trusted insiders than outsiders. The agency I work for get this, and spends significantly more resources on protecting against internal threats. This is despite everyone in the facility having very high level clearances after very thorough vetting. Information access is limited by the "need to know" principle and it's enforced on many levels.

That doesn't mean the outsider threat is ignored - it clearly isn't. Measures are taken to mitigate those risks too. However, much more emphasis is placed where it belongs.

TSA has already shown that the greatest threats we face are from the inside. Drug dealers, gun runners, thieves, sexual predators (and no, I'm not talking about those working the checkpoint but ones actually charged and arrested), convicted felons, and more have been found to be working at TSA. Yet these guys are given a pass because they've had a minimal background check.

TSA does not understand what risk analysis is and how to mitigate it. It only knows a way to try to avoid it or find a way to ignore risks that it'd rather not deal with - like the insider threat. It doesn't surprise me in the least that we see significantly more breaches resulting from inside TSA than we see from pax causing them. That's statistically how it works and how it has played out over the last several years.

If TSA were to truly implement a risk management approach, it would pretty much require a drastic overhaul of not only the equipment it uses, but also how it does business. I don't see any of that happening anytime soon. The only real way to do that would be to dismantle it and start all over again. It's been 10 years and it's deeply ingrained in the culture. That isn't going to be fixed.

Super

DeafBlonde

I call Bravo Sierra on this one...

iowakatie1981

I have a full-length leg prosthesis, therefore, I am permanent SSSS. I will never again board a plane without having my breasts and labia touched. Can you fix that, Bart? Can you convince someone that I'm not really a risk, so I don't have to be molested and have my ovaries xrayed every time I fly?

I didn't think so.

Until then, I will continue to maintain that the TSA discriminates against disabled passengers.

nachtnebel

No reasonable person will object to having some people scrutinized less than others, as most of these choices will be obvious and the others should be defendable. But no reasonable person will assent to strip searches and groping over their private areas, touching breasts, feeling up to and sometimes into the genitals, massaging your whole body, basically a prison custodial search, WITHOUT CAUSE, as you are doing now. RBA will not give you the green light to do that, ever.

Intelligent RBA and a functioning ATR (with rare false positives, proven safeguards against nude image rendering and data transmission or storage) provide a way forward. Given TSA's track record, we are not entirely confident in the prospects.

The biggest change will have to occurr on TSA's side. The "passengers are perps" mindset of management, the mindset of rank and file, and a massive sifting through the ranks. The job market is such that if you change the agency's rep by stop doing these terrible things to people, you would have lots of good people applying. Get rid of the employees who have poor customer skills and who are incapable of making good judgements.

Superguy

There are always unintended and unplanned consequences. Some of them can't reasonably be anticipated. However, many can be and I think they're being ignored.

There are many ways to do risk based screening. Some ideas are good, some aren't. This is one of them that isn't.