JumboD

Making sure everyone is screened (as they were for roughly 35 years prior to 9/11) and making sure everyone is photographed/molested in the current fashion are quite different.

SATTSO

What are you talking about? In one thread, people are saying this will only be good if they get special benefits from this program by being able to leave their shoes on, etc. In the other thread, people are saying these benefits are horrible. They are not different. Please read before you respond. Thanks.

JumboD

I was clarifying the previous post, which was clearly beyond your comprehension. Both of the statements you are alluding to can be true.

1. Everyone should be screened the same way and by offering benefits to certain groups it makes things worse for everyone else, and that screening shouldn't be the current scope and grope.

2. The new program will provide meaningful benefits to those who participate because it will bring screening closer to to what it should be, for everyone and every additional person who can avoid the current sexual assaults is a good thing.

Saying "here's how to make the program attractive to those eligible to join, even though offering it is discriminatory and opens up other potential problems" isn't contradictory, it's just stating two separate facts.

GUWonder

The way this is developing is a joke, as is the idea when applied to a mass-transit-using general population absent justification of -- and implementation of -- the infrastructure of an intrusive, authoritarian, unaccountable police state. [Pardon whatever redundancy there is in that statement.]

The filthy TSA ways will continue to apply to an overwhelming majority of the populace who has the unfortunate need/desire to use common carriers.

And what starts with airports is not going to be limited to airports if history is any guide.

GUWonder

Most everyone -- current and former US military personnel included -- presents little (no) risk to air commerce.

This thing is just another desperate divide-and-conquer approach from the TSA. And it is married to a big propaganda effort that has drafted in the major US airlines -- tools, the lot of them.

Dubai Stu

While retired military sounds good at first blush, I'd point out that Tim McVeigh was retired military and had a pretty impressive service record.

The elephant in the room (in my mind) is that elite check-in lines may be the fatality of this approach. The TSA is probably not going to want to multiply lines too much. I can just see it, let's have family lines, casual traveller lines, expert lines, elite lines, and trusted traveler lines.

In a year, we will also someone posting that they diamond elite, flying with the same airline for thirty years, and now being thrown into TSA steerage because of a 1971 marijuana conviction that they got in college and which was expunged back when Jimmy Carter was President.

Chaos.Defined

note how TSA can't keep it's employee's payroll or personal info from being sold or lost. what happens when a massive, centralized database of personal info gets hacked into, or sold by a contractor because the bureaucracy is flooded with inept and or corrupt favor positions who are either ignorant of or complicit to what's going on. Best case- they'll say our bad and offer to pay a few months credit monitoring... more likely, they'll try to pretend it didn't happen until someone pieces together the link between massive increases of credit card fraud.....

other issues, will your risk assessment affect upgradability? Will you always be forced to the aft do to your dinging?

do you think that if you opt out of the program long enough, eventually they'll claim it's suspicious to face increased security willingly; I remember being told that AIT was only to be used for secondary screening when it first started...


Major Hassan had background checks as well

nachtnebel

that would certainly be a reason against 'em. do you have links to reputable sources for this assertion?

InkUnderNails

There is a simple reason for the conflicting thoughts on this issue. Long post, my apologies.

Theoretically, it makes logical sense to identify those passengers that present limited or no risk to transportation security. Once identified, those passengers would be issued credentials that when presented at the checkpoint would allow them to proceed with minimal inconvenience and without the intrusive search and examination that is now applied to every passenger. The application for the credentials would be voluntary and any passenger applying and subsequently not qualifying would be told of the reason for the rejection and be granted opportunities to correct or clarify the discrepancies.

Those that have not pre-qualified would present themselves for screening as they do now with no changes.

Once again, in theory, this would remove a significant group of passengers from the detailed screening, making the overall process faster and more efficient. It would do nothing to address the constitutional concerns or the concerns of safety. It would just reduce the number of passengers subject to the complete screening.

By nature of my NEXUS status, I would think that I would likely qualify for this program, and I would probably apply based on the theoretical benefits.

It is not the theoretical that concerns me. It is the application.

The TSA has shown an inability to apply their own procedures consistently and appropriately. The have engaged in retributive screenings for insults and simply questioning the process. The disallow photography where is has been stated that it is specifically allowed. For a long time, they did not recognize the credentials of the existing trusted traveler programs, but this has been getting betting from my experience. They randomly require passengers to submit to procedures or answer questions that are not documented as necessary or even possible on the web site that describes what is expected of the passenger at the checkpoint. The intrusiveness of the screening varies from airport to airport and even from checkpoint to check point withing the airport. They insist on applying questionable practices such as Code Bravo, gate checks, magic strip liquid checks, "say your name," and "spell you name." The are secretive in nature in that the procedures to which we must submit can not be disclosed.

I will grant that the number of times where the process is consistent and reasonable outnumber the failures but the failures still exist, and in much greater number that would be expected in an organization that has a culture of quality and accountability. It is a structural failure and a managerial failure. More than those it is a failure of the philosophical nature of the process.

If this were implemented, over time the attitude of the organization could easily become one of if one can not qualify as a trusted traveler, then there certainly must be something wrong with them and we better give them a closer look. In other words, it would give even greater credence to the "everyone is a terrorist until we say otherwise" mentality. The only way this could be prevented is with active and continuous training and reinforcement. That does not happen consistently now.

There are also the minority of screeners that already seem to take pleasure is giving extra hassles to those that travel frequently. There is anecdotal evidence that even the trusted travelers may get retaliatory treatment just because they are "trusted."

Finally, even though I would likely qualify, there is something unsettling about the process whereby we separate and classify people based on what may be arbitrary criteria. In our society, we try to avoid such discrimination even when it is done legally and logically. It would be far better to address the constitutional and safety issues for everyone, not just establish a procedure where some selected passenger my avoid them.

Bottom line: The theoretical may be good, but the TSA has consistently shown that their weakness is in consistent and proper application of even proper processes.

nachtnebel

true. just strip searches and for opt-outs and many disabled folks, invasive, unconstitutional and offensive massages of your body under duress, including buttocks, breasts, and pubic areas. And in the case of ETD alarms, which are nearly 100% false, you get treated to a thorough genital rub and boob rub.

which is why you folks are trying to fix this. You realize that this is offensive. Finally.

It is because of TSA's behavior since October 2010, forcing this strip search and sex organ and butt groping regime suddenly on everyone, punitively treating opt-outs until the backlash against it, having outlandish and degrading searches of obvious NON threats like 95 year old terminal cancer patients in wheelchairs, (etc, the list would go on far too long) that we distrust (a) the motivation of TSA in fixing this, (b) the commitment of TSA to provide screening that is NOT invasive and degrading as it now certainly is, and (c) the capability of TSA of providing such screening in a way that does not further violate the person and compromise their personal information.

Yet, miracles sometimes happen. That is why this belated attempt to fix an intolerable situation is a decent step forward, assuming it is good willed and not just another Pistole deflection attempt. But two principles are required for this to be a real solution: First, everyone should be allowed to participate in establishing bona fides, and be denied only on defensibly reasonable threat criteria that has some kind of due process, unlike the no fly list. Second, strip searches and invasive body rubs including genital areas, groin areas, buttocks, breasts, hair, are reprehensible when done on citizens with no probable cause. Those are prison/jail custodial searches and are on their face offensive and degrading. This means the random post checkpoint searches too.

A reasonable search process must be established for those who don't have this pre-cert option, for whatever reason. There is still no grounds to strip search them or feel their breasts, butts, and pubic areas. Perhaps require them to show up by a certain time and use dogs on them in batch mode, which seems to work better with the dogs.

Risk-based screening must involve access to personal data. There is really no way around it. TSA should not be storing any of this info, they should only be granted momentary access to the data provided by a secure clearinghouse or even the providers who already do this, such as IRS, medical insurance databases, etc for a threat assessment only.

jkhuggins

I'm not the poster in question, but I'll give my perspective. I don't see the contradiction as irresolvable.

I tend to fall into the category of "screen everybody, no exceptions" --- if that everybody includes everybody: TSOs, flight crews, airport concession workers ... in short, everybody.

As things stand, though, this doesn't happen. TSOs don't have to be screened at all. Flight crews receive lesser screening. Airport workers appear not to be screened at all, though that seems to vary by location. Those with diplomatic-ish standing (like some Members of Congress) can be waved through entirely.

So, now TSA suggests that it might create yet another category of individuals receiving lesser screening. It's not immediately clear what qualifies you to be in the pilot study (other than being close to one of the test airports). But the named categories (participating in other DHS screening programs, and being an extremely FF) seem inadequate. Active duty military and veterans might seem to naturally qualify as well.

So, to sum up my position (and perhaps that of the person you asked). Ideally, everyone gets screened, no exceptions. TSA shows no signs of doing that; in fact, it seems to be moving in the opposite direction. Given that TSA is moving in that direction, we FTers might be allowed to offer suggestions of classes of passengers that ought to participate --- if not in the pilot study, at least in the full implementation.

RadioGirl

Thank you - very well said!

jfunk138

SATTSO,

Hopefully you can address this problem I find with the proposed system. During the initial stages of the program it seems likely that the majority enrolled will be frequent travelers. Agreed? The majority of "non-trusted" travelers will be old people and children. Won't this simply exacerbate the current problem of a system that seems to target people wearing diapers? That those most unfamiliar with the system will be the most targeted for additional screening?

Second, suppose the program is "successful" enough that all non-terrorists enroll in it. What I am sure you understand is, that there just aren't that many terrorists in the US. In this scenario the "trusted" line is out the door and the "non-trusted" line has tumbleweeds blowing around. What does this say about the necessity of the checkpoint at all?

rochel

For me this still doesn't change the fact that the current TSA procedures have caught no points of risk during security inspections at all. All of the current inspection protocol is reactive to past events - underwear bomber, liquids bomber, shoe bomber.

mikeef

Thanks for the update.

Mike