The whole Boeing attitude seems to continue to be that of cost cutting, save money, sweep everything under the rug, and do the very minimum required to get the plane re-certified. Which does not inspire any confidence.

That's an interesting comment! What I see is a systematic failure to communicate major safety issues within the company. It seems like a fairly major problem was identified during testing. Rather than having a "chief safety officer" to whom these types of problems are reported, documented, and tracked, a small isolated team came up with the decision to "extend" the reach of the MCAS system. It appears that many within Boeing and the FAA were totally unaware of the issue and the resulting solution. As a result, a "less than safe" system with inadequate backup was allowed to "solve" the issue. Frankly, at this point, the FAA, airlines, pilots, and Boeing should takes their time and make sure the plane is totally safe before letting it back in the air.

That said, I do agree that Boeing strategically engaged in relentless cost-cutting by relying on the 3rd major redesign/update of a 1960's aircraft. I could have totally seen a redesign/update of the 1980's-designed 757/767 line.

At this point, given that they know that they have an inherently unsafe airframe, they should at least stop production and start redesigning a new plane. That will be the logical thing to do. But of course, if they do this, they realize that they are admitting guilt and an inherently unsafe aircraft. So, they are doubling down on the Max and hope that there will never be another MCAS crash. It is a "damn if you do, damn if you don't" scenario, after having made the original error...

I am guessing it may be a bankruptcy now or bankruptcy later scenario for them (if there is another MCAS-related crash in the future), so they are taking their chances on the later scenario, hoping it will never happen...I am not sure about their finances and the impact of the Max debacle on them, but I am assuming this would be a serious loss either way.

By 1950s standards those aircraft were death traps at the time. By today's standards the MAX is basically a death trap now.

Exactly. But Boeing was too worried a re-engined 767 would hurt sales of the 787. An updated 757 would have been exactly what Boeing needs to be offering at this point. The current 737 line isn't even really competitive with the A320 products anymore. Really it never was.

Why MCAS - train the pilots to fly the aircraft with its characteristics. If he can easily go into a stall, then train pilots to recover from an unexpected stall. Put 3 pilots in the aircraft since autopilot for take off can't be used, and train them how to avoid a stall on takeoff. The MAX requires more full time pilot monitoring.

They need 3 pilots, a priest, and a therapist on every flight...:p

Not to mention a specific 737MAX "Type Rating" for the pilots.

Every plane over 50,000 kilos needs a flight engineer.

any word if we can no fee change off of these?

deleted (misread post I was quoting)

For now, generally yes. The question is whether AA is savvy enough to extend the free change option beyond the date the MAX will be back on reliable schedule again - after they’re recertified to fly, the parked MAXes updated as necessary.

For AA that’s mostly a software update, as these birds already have the AoA sensor indicator and disagree warning (but UA and those airlines who decided they didn’t need those will have to have them installed gratis under Boeing’s changes), prepped for service from their preserved status, operating manuals updated, pilots retrained, etc.

Further, the pilots seem quite assertive about wanting simulator time (vs iPad time) and simulators are scarce. (Ironically, AA has an operating A350 simulator at the DFW AA Flight Academy, about as useless as giving a fish a jackhammer, but iirc the sole MAX simulator is at MIA.)

BTW, some of the pilot concerns - and their concerns over Boeing’s original delivery and FAA certification of what many have called out as a defectuous MCAS product that was half-baked when released - can be read in this NPR article (including aviation safety expert Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger).

One thing I wonder - AA purchased all the options - UA and others didn't. As part of the re-certification process, will all airlines be required to update to the full safety package - and if so, does this help with simulator availability as AA pilots with planes ready to fly would take priority over UA pilots that are still waiting on modifications. Perhaps the simulator concern isn't as big of a deal as some are making it out to be.

I am wondering if AA will try and claim a refund for the AoA option since it paid for it, when other competitors will now get it for free. In addition to the already exorbitant grounding compensation that is.

Are we sure AA "paid" for the AoA options (additional sensor and disagree light)? Although those options were offered as supplemental options to other airlines, as the airline that essentially forced the MAX into existence, could AA have received certain perks that other airlines didn't?

I'm wondering what AA maybe knew about the MAX that other airlines didn't.

That may eventually happen. I might add that Boeing has done a terrible job of managing the public's fears and expectations of this aircraft.