YEG_SE4Life

So, are you saying that you know better than the NTSB official who stated that this was not a reportable event?

dhuey

I do not have such evidence. If they did say it, though, it seems like the NTSB should have put that in the report. That would be at least as significant as the AC pilots' comments that "they believed the lighted runway on their left was 28L and that they were lined up for 28R" and that "they did not recall seeing aircraft on taxiway C but that something did not look right to them."

YEG_SE4Life

I don't believe that, at this point, anyone is debating whether it was pilot error or not. The discussion now appears to be surrounding the factors that contributed to the pilot error. In other words, why would an experienced expert with demonstrated competence make this error? You don't get to the corrective actions if you end this at "pilot error".

Why does the report need to indicate whether the event was reportable or not? How is that even close to being as significant as identifying what may have prevented this horrible close call? Are you suggesting that if it was reportable, then the pilots would not have made this error? Knowing whether it was reportable or not is so significant that it was a contributing factor to this close call? The pilots are suggesting that if things were lit the way they believe they were lit, they would not have made this error.

The NTSB official did report, to the press, that this was not a reportable event.

They may not have recalled seeing aircraft on the taxiway, but, based on the radio transmission, you can't deny that they saw lights. Who knows, that may have contributed to their feeling that something was wrong.

tcook052

Yeah it seems like a problem to this layman but more learned posters have offered quite coherent explanations for this such as in post 562.

dhuey

Do you think that how the AC pilots reportedly "believed the lighted runway on their left was 28L and that they were lined up for 28R" is reportable and significant? Or that they told investigators that "they did not recall seeing aircraft on taxiway C but that something did not look right to them."? Those AC pilots' comments made the initial report. If they made the editorial cut, I don't see why something like, "we initiated the go-around because we saw planes on taxiway Charlie" missed the cut.

Finkface

Surely you can't be serious about this ()? Unplug the cockpit voice recorders immediately following the first approach? Do you not think the pilots might be a bit busy flying the plane and preparing for another landing attempt? Or should one of them just drop everything and somehow figure out where and how to 'unplug' the CVR? And what is the criteria/whose judgment is it that something is serious enough to stop flying the plane at this critical flight phase to 'unplug' it?

And if that second landing attempt goes horribly wrong, even worse than the first attempt? God forbid there was a crash - there would be zero data on the second attempt/crash as the pilots had 'unplugged' the CVR after the first go around. Isn't the entire flight data, until landing, critical or should they just be able to 'unplug' it when they feel like it?

Not debating that 30 minutes is way too short. But to give the ability to/require pilots to decide when to 'unplug' the CVR? Yeah, no.

canadiancow

If you read the entire thread, all of your questions will be answered.

Exactly.

Debating whether or not the pilots should have taken explicit action to preserve the CVR is focusing on the WRONG issue.

The RIGHT issue (with respect to the CVR) is why it still only holds 30 minutes after 50 years.

dhuey

Gimmie a break. I'm talking about regulations and policies -- not how this AC crew might have figured out a way to "unplug" the recorders. I understand that there is a lot of old equipment out there (I said so). I'm contemplating a relatively simple adaptation for a situation like this: a kill switch for when a tower or other applicable authorities order it. With today's technology, the tower could probably flip that switch remotely, with no crew involvement. Regardless, once this AC went around, there was no emergency, and plenty of time to execute a simple command that they turn off the recorders to preserve evidence (if the equipment were adapted to permit that).

YEG_SE4Life

I am not sure about your context of reportable. I do think it was significant. It appears to be a contributing factor to the pilot error.

As far as the report is concerned. I have not seen where the report quotes everything said by the pilots so I have no idea what made the cut and what was edited. It was reported that the pilots did say that they inititiated the GA because something didn't seem right. By your logic, they also did not emphatically state that they initiated the GA because of any radio transmission. I don't know if that means that it isn't so. My armchair only makes room for the facts (what has been reported). Conjecture (something doesn't exist because it wasn't reported) is harmful.

After Burner

Actually, "unplugging" the CVR would've been very easy for a pilot to do. One of the pilots could have simply opened one of the aircraft doors, climbed rearward along the fuselage (using suction cups) until reaching the tail section where the access panel is located for the CVR and FDR. While making his way back there he could've been reading the section of the technical manual that describes how to open the access panel and disable the device.

YEG_SE4Life

Do you believe that anyone in the tower thought this was a reportable event? If so, why was it not reported until 2 days after the event?

dhuey

This answers one of my questions:

dhuey

This happened at 11:45 pm on Friday, July 9. It was reported to the NTSB on Sunday, July 11. You find much significance in that long delay?

After Burner

Nobody said there was a 2 day delay in reporting the occurrence. It wasn't until July 11 that the FAA reported it to the NTSB. I didn't see it reported that the FAA wasn't notified immediately.

dhuey

I was responding to this post:

Could there really have been any serious doubt in the tower, immediately after the incident, that this was a reportable event? It would be scandalous if this didn't trigger all of the serious incident procedures (drug testing, pilot interviews, etc.).