Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
Jun 28, 2019, 1:53 pm
#2941
Join Date: Jan 2012
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Posts: 468
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...ar-11561685894
Boeing 737 MAX Likely Grounded Until Late This Year
Latest problem to emerge involves potential failure of flight-control computer chip
Boeing 737 MAX Likely Grounded Until Late This Year
Latest problem to emerge involves potential failure of flight-control computer chip
Jun 28, 2019, 3:01 pm
#2942
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YXU
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Posts: 971
Amazing! Shows once again Boeing is simply cutting corners to make a buck! Essentially using outdated chips from NG in Max, while adding much more code, specially MCAS which probably needs more processing power! If there is to be hardware changes, this plane is grounded until 2020 at the earliest!
Jun 28, 2019, 3:58 pm
#2943
Join Date: Jan 2017
Location: Halifax
Programs: AC SE100K, Marriott Lifetime Platinum Elite. NEXUS
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It still may be a software problem. Apparently optimizing the software is not so easy (where is Jaysona when one needs him?). If it really is the hardware, it won't be easy to nor fast to certify a new FCC. Granted, there are much newer examples available, but it has to be properly interfaced to the aircraft. At that point they may as well redesign the horizontal stabilizer to solve the problem properly.
Neither are flight certified.
Jun 28, 2019, 10:17 pm
#2944
Join Date: Jan 2012
Programs: AC E50K, MM, BA, Delta, PriorityClub Platinum, Marriott Gold.
Posts: 468
It still may be a software problem. Apparently optimizing the software is not so easy (where is Jaysona when one needs him?). If it really is the hardware, it won't be easy to nor fast to certify a new FCC. Granted, there are much newer examples available, but it has to be properly interfaced to the aircraft. At that point they may as well redesign the horizontal stabilizer to solve the problem properly.
Jun 28, 2019, 10:34 pm
#2945
Join Date: May 2015
Location: Vancouver
Programs: Aeroplan, Mileage Plus, WestJet Gold, AMEX Plat
Posts: 2,026
What is this sub-system on the MAX programmed with?
Jun 29, 2019, 4:02 am
#2946
A FlyerTalk Posting Legend
Join Date: May 2002
Location: YEG
Programs: HH Silver
Posts: 56,454
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...qvA3BtfTdfMTqU
It remains the mystery at the heart of Boeing Co.’s 737 Max crisis: how a company renowned for meticulous design made seemingly basic software mistakes leading to a pair of deadly crashes. Longtime Boeing engineers say the effort was complicated by a push to outsource work to lower-paid contractors.
It remains the mystery at the heart of Boeing Co.’s 737 Max crisis: how a company renowned for meticulous design made seemingly basic software mistakes leading to a pair of deadly crashes. Longtime Boeing engineers say the effort was complicated by a push to outsource work to lower-paid contractors.
Jun 29, 2019, 7:34 am
#2948
Join Date: Jan 2017
Location: Halifax
Programs: AC SE100K, Marriott Lifetime Platinum Elite. NEXUS
Posts: 4,572
My point was that a $50 computer would have more than enough processing power. For that matter, with a few addon shields even have enough pins to get input from as many as two AoA sensors. Two!
Alternatively, a fairly cleanly written pure flight control engine could be written in some reasonable language, and literally compiled to Verilog and then down to output that is sent for an application specific integrated circuit chip to be produced. An ASIC isn't going to win any benchmarks, but be reliable at doing exactly what it is supposed to do.
For comparison sake, buddy at $work flies private planes and was complaining the other week about the $300 cost for an FAA certified USB charger port.
Jun 29, 2019, 4:20 pm
#2949
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: YYC
Programs: BA bronze, Aeroplan peon
Posts: 4,747
Jun 29, 2019, 5:50 pm
#2950
Join Date: Jun 2005
Programs: EVA Air , * G, QR Privilege Club S
Posts: 5,189
It won't be that easy as EASA is not going to accept just FAA's word on this anymore. Neither would the CAAC. So these two will do their own independent assessment before they allow the 737 Max to operate under their jurisdiction.
Jun 29, 2019, 7:17 pm
#2952
Join Date: Jan 2017
Location: Halifax
Programs: AC SE100K, Marriott Lifetime Platinum Elite. NEXUS
Posts: 4,572
But this does seriously question the leading role of the FAA in the long term steady-state.
Jun 30, 2019, 6:44 pm
#2954
Join Date: Aug 2014
Programs: AC 100K
Posts: 53
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...qvA3BtfTdfMTqU
It remains the mystery at the heart of Boeing Co.’s 737 Max crisis: how a company renowned for meticulous design made seemingly basic software mistakes leading to a pair of deadly crashes. Longtime Boeing engineers say the effort was complicated by a push to outsource work to lower-paid contractors.
It remains the mystery at the heart of Boeing Co.’s 737 Max crisis: how a company renowned for meticulous design made seemingly basic software mistakes leading to a pair of deadly crashes. Longtime Boeing engineers say the effort was complicated by a push to outsource work to lower-paid contractors.
Jun 30, 2019, 6:57 pm
#2955
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,810
There was nothing wrong with the software, nor with the programers who wrote it. The software did exactly what it was supposed to do; it commanded full down stab trim based on a single faulty input. The problem lies directly with the higher-ups - the engineers who developed the system in order to save some $$, as well as the QC people who signed off.
Real issue is software "solution" to a hardware problem. But it looks to me the issue was only related to $ indirectly: mostly schedule promises that would no longer be feasible if a real solution would have to be developed. Plus certification issues.