UA provides new (LOWER) financial guidance for Q1 2013 - loss will be wider.
#46
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: JZRO
Posts: 9,169
Jeff is betting on Kettles. And I think he's right.
Embittered Premiers can pine for UA's financial demise, but it won't happen. The Alliance carriers and Southwest are here to stay throughout the century.
RNE, opining that HVFs are not as V as they think they are.
Embittered Premiers can pine for UA's financial demise, but it won't happen. The Alliance carriers and Southwest are here to stay throughout the century.
RNE, opining that HVFs are not as V as they think they are.
#47
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: ORD
Programs: 1K, MM, Marriott Plat
Posts: 427
...referring to the well-documented practices regarding deferred maintenance items on United's 747 and 757 fleets in the bankruptcy years all the way up to the merger. It was normal procedure to only carry out maintenance on so-called MEL items (minimum equipment list) and to defer less critical, non-essential work as far as possible to reduce costs. Eventually, it all catches up...
#48
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: May 2001
Posts: 11,055
I am really worried about UA's future and my "relationship" with it given I am probably 2 years away from MM.
From my perspective, it seems UA is cutting too much. Being PHX based travelling to the Southeast, UA is simply not competitive. I think UA has given up PHX. Even PHX-ORD, UA's schedule is terrible and frequency is bad. It seems UA is giving up the PHX market. When US leaves *A, what do I do?
When I book my flights, US, AA and DL come up cheaper a lot of the time - this has been the case for years but the difference seems to get bigger and bigger. For now, I can fly US and credit to UA but what about next year when US leaves *A?
The strange thing is that UA planes are nearly 100% full a lot of the time and US seems not so much. So, US is doing OK with lower load factor and lower yield? (Or, UA has too many nonrevs?) What is UA trying to maximize?
I know I live in a well served low yield market so the situation is different. However, if UA wants to stay in this market and keep its customers, showing it is retreating does not give me any confidence - especially at this juncture when US is about to leave *A. The problem for us elites is that we probably move our business in 25K chunks and they add up.
From my perspective, it seems UA is cutting too much. Being PHX based travelling to the Southeast, UA is simply not competitive. I think UA has given up PHX. Even PHX-ORD, UA's schedule is terrible and frequency is bad. It seems UA is giving up the PHX market. When US leaves *A, what do I do?
When I book my flights, US, AA and DL come up cheaper a lot of the time - this has been the case for years but the difference seems to get bigger and bigger. For now, I can fly US and credit to UA but what about next year when US leaves *A?
The strange thing is that UA planes are nearly 100% full a lot of the time and US seems not so much. So, US is doing OK with lower load factor and lower yield? (Or, UA has too many nonrevs?) What is UA trying to maximize?
I know I live in a well served low yield market so the situation is different. However, if UA wants to stay in this market and keep its customers, showing it is retreating does not give me any confidence - especially at this juncture when US is about to leave *A. The problem for us elites is that we probably move our business in 25K chunks and they add up.
#49
Join Date: Apr 2005
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Posts: 144
#50
Original Poster
Join Date: Feb 2008
Programs: 6 year GS, now 2MM Jeff-ugee, *wood LTPlt, SkyPeso PLT
Posts: 6,526
I am really worried about UA's future and my "relationship" with it given I am probably 2 years away from MM.
From my perspective, it seems UA is cutting too much. Being PHX based travelling to the Southeast, UA is simply not competitive. I think UA has given up PHX. Even PHX-ORD, UA's schedule is terrible and frequency is bad. It seems UA is giving up the PHX market. When US leaves *A, what do I do?
When I book my flights, US, AA and DL come up cheaper a lot of the time - this has been the case for years but the difference seems to get bigger and bigger. For now, I can fly US and credit to UA but what about next year when US leaves *A?
The strange thing is that UA planes are nearly 100% full a lot of the time and US seems not so much. So, US is doing OK with lower load factor and lower yield? (Or, UA has too many nonrevs?) What is UA trying to maximize?
I know I live in a well served low yield market so the situation is different. However, if UA wants to stay in this market and keep its customers, showing it is retreating does not give me any confidence - especially at this juncture when US is about to leave *A. The problem for us elites is that we probably move our business in 25K chunks and they add up.
From my perspective, it seems UA is cutting too much. Being PHX based travelling to the Southeast, UA is simply not competitive. I think UA has given up PHX. Even PHX-ORD, UA's schedule is terrible and frequency is bad. It seems UA is giving up the PHX market. When US leaves *A, what do I do?
When I book my flights, US, AA and DL come up cheaper a lot of the time - this has been the case for years but the difference seems to get bigger and bigger. For now, I can fly US and credit to UA but what about next year when US leaves *A?
The strange thing is that UA planes are nearly 100% full a lot of the time and US seems not so much. So, US is doing OK with lower load factor and lower yield? (Or, UA has too many nonrevs?) What is UA trying to maximize?
I know I live in a well served low yield market so the situation is different. However, if UA wants to stay in this market and keep its customers, showing it is retreating does not give me any confidence - especially at this juncture when US is about to leave *A. The problem for us elites is that we probably move our business in 25K chunks and they add up.
UA has dramatically cut domestic capacity, but certain markets where the yeilds were evidently lower have taken more of those cuts. SEA and PHX and PDX are examples of this. All used to get all (or mostly) mainline service to UA hubs. SFO to each was mainline, and LAX was mostly mainline.
The new management wants to increase yields. So they put a smaller plane on the flight. Instead of having to sell 120 or 138 seats, they now only have to sell 50 or 66, they sell out the seats for more, and yield goes up. However, the RJs need a higher load factor to be profitable, so you have to nearly sell them out.
Planes are packed for a while. But then the elites who are in those cities (or where there is competition going to those cities) start to look around, don't want to fly a packed RJ. The PHX fliers start to look at SW or US, the PDX/SEA fliers switch to AS and take AA or DL. And the SFO/LAX based people look at flying another airline to avoid the crj-200/700. [U]They are then lost to the system [/U]overall. Those who are just looking at the flights (and have no lock in) avoid UA. Revenue falls, PRASM and yield starts to fall as well.
I think UA has begin to enter this spiral, as the profitable elites leave, then your yield goes down, despite the capacity cuts. Soon your "network" is no longer a selling point, and your yield is down.
It is also notable that DL has adopted 180 degrees the opposite of UAs strategy. They are getting rid of many RJs (which are expensive to operate) and upgaging. They assume that they will get more of the premium passengers this way, and can then compete on price for the rest. They then get a higher yield and as full of a plane.
Time will tell who is correct.
#51
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Feb 2003
Posts: 10,267
Your post both shows UAs current strategy,and its potential problems.
UA has dramatically cut domestic capacity, but certain markets where the yeilds were evidently lower have taken more of those cuts. SEA and PHX and PDX are examples of this. All used to get all (or mostly) mainline service to UA hubs. SFO to each was mainline, and LAX was mostly mainline.
The new management wants to increase yields. So they put a smaller plane on the flight. Instead of having to sell 120 or 138 seats, they now only have to sell 50 or 66, they sell out the seats for more, and yield goes up. However, the RJs need a higher load factor to be profitable, so you have to nearly sell them out.
Planes are packed for a while. But then the elites who are in those cities (or where there is competition going to those cities) start to look around, don't want to fly a packed RJ. The PHX fliers start to look at SW or US, the PDX/SEA fliers switch to AS and take AA or DL. And the SFO/LAX based people look at flying another airline to avoid the crj-200/700. [U]They are then lost to the system [/U]overall. Those who are just looking at the flights (and have no lock in) avoid UA. Revenue falls, PRASM and yield starts to fall as well.
I think UA has begin to enter this spiral, as the profitable elites leave, then your yield goes down, despite the capacity cuts. Soon your "network" is no longer a selling point, and your yield is down.
It is also notable that DL has adopted 180 degrees the opposite of UAs strategy. They are getting rid of many RJs (which are expensive to operate) and upgaging. They assume that they will get more of the premium passengers this way, and can then compete on price for the rest. They then get a higher yield and as full of a plane.
Time will tell who is correct.
UA has dramatically cut domestic capacity, but certain markets where the yeilds were evidently lower have taken more of those cuts. SEA and PHX and PDX are examples of this. All used to get all (or mostly) mainline service to UA hubs. SFO to each was mainline, and LAX was mostly mainline.
The new management wants to increase yields. So they put a smaller plane on the flight. Instead of having to sell 120 or 138 seats, they now only have to sell 50 or 66, they sell out the seats for more, and yield goes up. However, the RJs need a higher load factor to be profitable, so you have to nearly sell them out.
Planes are packed for a while. But then the elites who are in those cities (or where there is competition going to those cities) start to look around, don't want to fly a packed RJ. The PHX fliers start to look at SW or US, the PDX/SEA fliers switch to AS and take AA or DL. And the SFO/LAX based people look at flying another airline to avoid the crj-200/700. [U]They are then lost to the system [/U]overall. Those who are just looking at the flights (and have no lock in) avoid UA. Revenue falls, PRASM and yield starts to fall as well.
I think UA has begin to enter this spiral, as the profitable elites leave, then your yield goes down, despite the capacity cuts. Soon your "network" is no longer a selling point, and your yield is down.
It is also notable that DL has adopted 180 degrees the opposite of UAs strategy. They are getting rid of many RJs (which are expensive to operate) and upgaging. They assume that they will get more of the premium passengers this way, and can then compete on price for the rest. They then get a higher yield and as full of a plane.
Time will tell who is correct.
#52
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Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Denver DEN-APA
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There is a lot of logic in your post and I personally feel that Delta has adopted the correct strategy. I don't think, however, that UA will fail or has entered a death spiral. The current makeup of the airline industry in the US is very near an oligopoly and I think that all 3 majors will be able to maintain strong positions in the future. I believe we might have finally reached the point, due to lack of competition, that airlines are a good investment. I may be wrong, and we may need only 2 or even 1 major legacy airline in the US for that to happen but with only 3 majors now playing ball, I think the pump is primed for some good profits in the future for all 3.
#53
Join Date: Jun 2004
Location: What I write is my opinion alone..don't read into it anything not written.
Posts: 9,689
3 Intl network majors, each with their corresponding Intl alliance, plus 1 LCC hybrid without a network and very limited reach outside of mainstream America, in addition to (2) othr rapidly growing corporations that many of you fly on under vaious names, but may not realize that most of those carriers are only (2) unique corporations that have grown exponentialy over the past decade, filling in for "Too big for their britches" Atlantic Coast (aka, we'll tak what you have been paying us over the past few years at little to no risk, and start up a direct competitor to you and name it 'Independance Air')
Don't overlook the Skywest/Expressjet/ASA consortium (single ownership known as Skywest Inc) and the Republic Airways Holdings Corporation, which owns all of Chautauqua Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Republic Airlines and Shuttle America (as well as the rmains of Midwest Express) under 1 corporate umbrella. Sure, they pimp themselves out to many of the other carriers, but control over that much of the regional marketplace is not a small thing or something to be forgotten. Imagine what those last two could do to the majors if they wanted to. Eating competitors to remove them from competition has happened at a very rapid pace for the two major regional corporations, and a dualopoly is 1/2 the competition of a triopoly and 1/3 of that of the "big boys" if you include the Southwest/Valuejet partnership as competition for the mainlin carriers.
Don't overlook the Skywest/Expressjet/ASA consortium (single ownership known as Skywest Inc) and the Republic Airways Holdings Corporation, which owns all of Chautauqua Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Republic Airlines and Shuttle America (as well as the rmains of Midwest Express) under 1 corporate umbrella. Sure, they pimp themselves out to many of the other carriers, but control over that much of the regional marketplace is not a small thing or something to be forgotten. Imagine what those last two could do to the majors if they wanted to. Eating competitors to remove them from competition has happened at a very rapid pace for the two major regional corporations, and a dualopoly is 1/2 the competition of a triopoly and 1/3 of that of the "big boys" if you include the Southwest/Valuejet partnership as competition for the mainlin carriers.
Last edited by fastair; Mar 30, 2013 at 12:57 am
#55
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#56
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: New York, NY
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Curious then, based on your comments above...for the ten years during and after bankruptcy, I flew UAL all over the world and never ran into the maintenance issues/delays we are now seeing post merger. Is it really the case of pmUA not addressing needed maintenance or is it COdbaUA policies and lack of current investment causing the problems. Or maybe it's overworking the fleet and not understanding a larger network?
Of course, United kept its airplanes in safe and airworthy conditions at all times, no question about that. Maintenance staff and aircrews would never sign off or accept an airplane that wasn't fit to fly. Further, I have no anti-United bias when I make this point. All I am trying to illustrate is that it was common practice to defer maintenance on a number of non-essential items (but once that can affect reliability in the long-term) during the lean post-9/11 years at United. After the merger, when the company attempted to increase productivity with certain fleets, there was a commensurate drop in schedule reliability. To rectify these issues, the company is investing money in getting these birds caught up on any open maintenance items and carrying out preventive work to ensure that they can provide reliable service for some time to come.
I think most people at United are happy to see this investment. Flight attendants I have spoken to on 'refreshed' 757s are proud of the fact that the airplanes look, feel and smell cleaner. MX personnel are happy to be correcting a lot of issues 'behind the scenes' that have gone unresolved in these fleets for a while. It's a good thing all around.
#57
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Even today, after having addressed some of the issues, PLUS increasing the turn times on the aircraft, UA still has some of the poorest ON TIME in the industry. They even went so far as to bonus themselves against a flat target (80%) rather than a ranking, so that even though trail DL and US, they still can bonus themselves for their below-average performance.
We can certainly blame one aircraft or fleet if we want, but the fact of the matter is that PMUA had industry-leading ON TIME until various optimizations were eliminated, such as the boarding process and PSS. Heck, they're still boarding by row (coded as boarding group) which has been proven to be slower than window, middle, aisle (which was the PMUA methodology).
#58
Join Date: May 2007
Location: variously: PVG, SFO, LHR
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We can certainly blame one aircraft or fleet if we want, but the fact of the matter is that PMUA had industry-leading ON TIME until various optimizations were eliminated, such as the boarding process and PSS. Heck, they're still boarding by row (coded as boarding group) which has been proven to be slower than window, middle, aisle (which was the PMUA methodology).
On-time took a hit from the PSS cutover, no question. However, only pmUA flights took a big hit on dispatch reliability post-merger, which would support EW764's contention.
Second, if you go back through pmUA's financials, every single year from 2001 onward pmUA recorded lower capex spending than they booked as a loss due to depreciation - a growing or stable company should record capex >= depreciation. That meant that Tilton was basically depreciating out the airline, running down its capital stock. No new planes, minimum upgrades necessary to stay competitive, (new biz seats, but no wifi, no upgrade of Y cabins, no refurbs of clubs), etc. etc. etc.
This strategy fits exactly with one that EWR764 described of deferring maintenance to keep quarterly expenses as low as possible.
It's interesting the collective amnesia on this forum about how much of a cheapskate Tilton was.
#59
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If you stack everything up the way CO did, if anything goes wrong, that has a domino effect on downline flights. That's the reason that the PMUA flights got hit with more cancellations. Nothing changed with the planes, other than an attempted increase in utilization that they could not sustain when their cushions were taken away.
And that's a reflection of the CO bias -- that they think they know how to run everything better. Just like so many things they ignored or threw out during the merger process, this was yet another piece of business knowledge they ignored and had to re-learn for themselves.
Second, if you go back through pmUA's financials, every single year from 2001 onward pmUA recorded lower capex spending than they booked as a loss due to depreciation - a growing or stable company should record capex >= depreciation. That meant that Tilton was basically depreciating out the airline, running down its capital stock. No new planes, minimum upgrades necessary to stay competitive, (new biz seats, but no wifi, no upgrade of Y cabins, no refurbs of clubs), etc. etc. etc.
That said, it's no secret that Tilton was out to sell the whole house, and he was doing the bare minimum to keep competitive (as you point out, upgrade biz cabins, but not Y cabins).
Along the same lines, Tilton knew who his bread and butter was, which is why he worked hard to keep his core customer assets happy and was not despised by his frequent customers. That's something this management team either hasn't realized (or has realized and not admitted, or has realized too late). Hence the lower guidance which is the topic of this thread.
#60
Join Date: May 2007
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And that's a reflection of the CO bias -- that they think they know how to run everything better. Just like so many things they ignored or threw out during the merger process, this was yet another piece of business knowledge they ignored and had to re-learn for themselves.
A forgivable mistake in my opinion. And if I were running a business I would definitely pick the pmCO standard of keeping the fleet well-oiled and in good operating form so one can get high utilization rather than fly around a fleet of beaters that have to be babied all the time.
Along the same lines, Tilton knew who his bread and butter was, which is why he worked hard to keep his core customer assets happy and was not despised by his frequent customers. That's something this management team either hasn't realized (or has realized and not admitted, or has realized too late). Hence the lower guidance which is the topic of this thread.
How time makes memories so rose-colored.
Now, if you want to say that Smisek is more despised by certain pmUA elites, then I'll grant you that. But to pretend that Glen wasn't despised is rewriting history.