TSA, Airline - does not matter.

SSSS will NOT stop or find a terrorist - other than the possibly totally stupid one.

I think everyone agrees it is stupid in its current form, so why do we keep doing it?

### What if it was your family that was in the twin towers than maybe you would look at things different, There are many of people that thanks us everyday for what we are doing. I have had many of people tell other passengers they are glad we are here cause they lost a loved one in the towers. But than again there are those people who think nothing is ever going to happen to them.

How about this one:

You are a hypocrite (bomb in their pants?) and you will never convince a fair-minded person of your point with the way you make it. All you do is whip up frenzied support amongst those with the same extreme one-eyed viewpoint.

I'm done with you. At least GradGirl can sometimes make a argument based on something other than emotion.

Very true. So why am I being told uncategorically that it HASN'T prevented an attack?
Well, I would never even try to say it's perfect - or even close - but it would certainly deter SOME from trying something, and you don't propose an alternative. You just complain about what is there. A vocal (small) minority you could say.

It might help if you suggested a reason why the goverment wants to harass us.

I have taken the time to look through this post and I think there have been fine examples of cirlce logic on both sides. Example since no planes have hit buildings or blownup SS must be working. Or Since not bombs have been found in shoes in the US SS must not be needed. While both are interesting points neither is completely correct or incorrect.

My point is that SS as it is today is not were it needs to be, since most of the reasons you go to SS seem silly (I am not saying those who set the detector off should not go through the screening). If I buy a one way ticket I am subject to SS. Therefore anyone wanting to commit a violent act will buy a round trip with a credit card (since cash may do it also, besides it is cheaper and that saves money for the others to use). If I make a last minute reservation I go to SS, these people plan months and years in advance.
THese are just a few of the reasons you go through SS that can easily be avoided and will be by those whising to do harm.
Hmmm 'SS" isn't that a interesting term makes you think !

sorry, for the bad spelling and grammer for those of you who look for such things.

Two things: first of all, the chain is only as strong as its weakest link. There is no sense in doing these extremely invasive searches at great cost to the flying public, both in dollars and dignity, when much wider security holes remain unplugged. The plotters on 9/11 were excessively, amazingly, well-trained and well-prepared and well-informed about the security measures in place. To give a small example, people mention that less invasive screening is applied to airport concession workers. Thus, there is no point in applying any more invasive screening to passengers holding tickets, because any bad guy with any sense will just get a job in airport concessions.


I believe the reason the government wants to harass us at checkpoints is to make us feel better. To give the illusion of security. And also, to soften us up so that we won't fight the biggest proposed surveillance plan on law-abiding citizens ever - CAPPS II. The government background check trusted traveler plan that keeps resurfacing actually sounds good to me after what I've endured at checkpoints. Under normal circumstances I would never consider paying the government to give it a blank okay to create a dossier on me!

Cool, it's been a couple of weeks since the old "Twin Towers" line.

FACT had the TSA been on the job on 9/11/2001 with the 2001 rules, the attacks would have occured. The private screeners did NOTHING wrong. I challenge any TSA apologist to point out any failing of the screening process on 9/11.

FACT had the private screeners been on the job with a credible prohibited items list (no knives or box cutters), then the attacks may or may not have occured. Why do I say may not? At the time, passengers and crew cooperated with Hijackers.

We do not need a government agency with over 100,000 overpaid employees to perform airport screening. We need private screeners under the guidance of the Secret Service or Marshall's Service to perform airport screening.

No, I would not feel different.

I have lost family in car accidents - I don't advocate stupid solutions like 20 MPH speed limits and speed regulators.

I'm sorry those people were murdered, but that's no excuse to piss away our civil liberties by engaging in un-American, ineffective "security" at airport checkpoints.

Excellent - I feel I am wasting text typing at you as well.

I may be many things but I am no hypocrite. Perhaps you might examine how bombs are actually constructed. Any volume of plastic explosives that can be placed in shoes can be placed in pants or in a body cavity. That explosive may be removed after clearing the checkpoint. Now, one only needs a blasting cap and a wire, as a voltage source is available readily. Wire - any electronic device. Blasting cap - hide a small one in a laptop.

Notice that none of these components have to go in shoes, though that is where the fools in charge of the TSA have their little fetish.

Yet another tired old argument in favor of symbolic screening, instead of real security.

I think many of you lost the point.

Secondary screening is a follow-up to initial screening. That is, after you've submitted your accessible property to x-ray examination and after you've gone through the walk through metal detector (primary screening), secondary screening is conducted for one of the following reasons:

a) you alarmed at the WTMD (after the second pass) and a much more detailed follow-up inspection needs to be performed using a hand held metal detector,

b) the x-ray operator either detected a prohibited item or could not clear the bag because it is too cluttered with opaque or other objects too difficult to see through using the x-ray. The follow-up screening involves a physical search and/or explosives detection technology to properly clear the bag,

c) you fall under one of the categories that require secondary screening such as having a brace, cast or prosthetic (although these usually will alarm the WTMD) or are wearing shoes that meet a certain criteria and MUST be either cleared through x-ray examination or explosives detection technology.

Selectee screening is something else completely different. It existed long before TSA was created (the airlines just didn't use the "SSSS" code; each one had their own special code; something many of you apparently apparently didn't know). Selectee screening is based on the theory that by intensely screening certain passengers who fall within a very broad category of patterns based on previous terrorist incidents, security checkpoints will increase the likelihood of detecting bombs, guns and knives being brought on board aircraft. TSA screeners use the terms "secondary screening" or "additional screening" strictly as a euphemism.

Here is the problem with selectee screening:

It is based on a 20 year model that dates back to the Lockerbie bombing. It isn't completely invalid; however, the bad guys have changed their modus operandi since then yet the selectee methodology still remains the same.

The specific criteria is so broad that it will unfortunately include a great majority of law-abiding citizens who are guilty of nothing more than purchasing a one-way ticket or having the bad luck of being rebooked on another flight due to cancellation or delay of a previous one.

Contrary to popular belief, the airlines actually DO have the authority to "de-select" passengers. Many of them don't simply because nobody wants to assume the responsibility of removing someone from a selectee status. The path of least resistance is to either blame it on the computer system that prints out boarding passes, blame it on TSA, or both. This is why passengers who are redirected to another flight due to cancellations end up being selectees even though they weren't selectees on the original flight.

Another popular misperception is the belief that you cannot be removed from the selectee list. Well, once you've entered the checkpoint, this is true. However, technically, the checkpoint supervisor is supposed to refer passengers back to the airlines where they can make the decision to remove the passenger from the selectee list. Most, if not all, passengers decline this because they are running late for a flight (in most cases due to rebookings or cancellation of a previous flight); they shudder at the thought of having to stand in another line at the ticket counter and then stand in the security checkpoint line again....with the possibility that the airlines may not even change their selectee status; or because they are at the height of frustration and would rather get it over with than go through any more hassles.

In my humble opinion, selectee screening is a farce. Everybody gets screened at the checkpoint (refer to my first point about secondary screening above). So, the "additional screening" of passengers is redundant and pointless. Still, there has to be a process based on up-to-date intelligence information, current terrorist methodologies, known criminal records and other input from the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies that allow airlines to pre-determine if a passengers poses a potential threat to commercial aviation. Supposedly, this is what CAPPS II is all about. But here is where I take a different path: IF, for any reason, someone poses a potential threat to commercial aviation, then that person should be denied from boarding a commercial airliner. Period. Why take any chance at all if there is a belief that a person may be a potential terrorist or a person conducting reconnaissance for a future terrorist attack? Otherwise, if no such information exists, or if there isn't a proponderance of evidence to conclude that a person poses a potential threat, then leave them alone and let them undergo regular screening just like everybody else.

This is one of those "be careful what you wish for" type of ideas. In order to achieve this type of screening, government would have to be more intrusive into the backgrounds of people travelling by commerical air. I'm not so sure that would be such a good thing. Government already intrudes on our liberties enough; this would be opening a Pandora's Box. As I've posted on other threads, with all the whining and complaining about having to remove a pair of shoes, I can only imagine the outcry if we were ever to go to the system I propose.

Perhaps it will take a few more skyjackings to wake people up.

Interesting synopsis -- Just a couple of points (I'm not picking on you -- just asking):

1. You left out the most completely useless form of secondary screening: the "continuous screening" farce in which passengers who haven't beeped are sent to secondary screening using "We have to conduct continuous screening" an a lame excuse.

2. How do you define a "potential threat to commercial aviation?" -- Known & verified terrorist? Someone with a joint in their purse? Someone with an Arabic name? Someone with unpaid parking tickets? A deadbeat dad? Someone openly criticizing the Administration? Someone who opposes the Patriot Act? Somebody who bought a one-way ticket? David Nelson?

Again, given that TSA employees and airport concessions workers are exempt from both secondary screening and selectee screening, why should passengers have to undergo either? The bad guys are not unprepared. They will find the weakest forms of screening and go for those. Any screening that surpasses the very weakest kind of screening is overkill and is guaranteed only to be applied to law-abiding citizens and never to be applied to the people you want to catch.

TSA employees, such as screeners and such are subjected to screening and secondary screening if they alarm the walkthru or their bag can't be cleared. Higher management employees for some reason have been labeled as none threats and can completely by-pass screening which does upset me.

Concessions employees who don't have access to SIDA will go through secondary screening also if they alarm the walkthru or their bag can't be cleared. But they are not subjected to the shoe policy if on duty, either are TSA employees on duty. I can't give you a honest reason of why.

Under the new SOP the only way higher management can bypass screening is if they have TSA credential the TSA badge is not credentials. At my airport even the FSD does nto have credential, yet. He has to go thru screening unless he uses his SIDA badge. AS a supervisor once I go thru screening I am cleared to go thru if the FSD oks it. IF I had to get screened everytime I would be screened on average 20 time in a 8 hour shift. I think everyone will agree that on of the biggest holes any aiport has is under the terminal. The airline and skycaps and concession employees who have SIDA access do not get the background checks that TSA gets. They only check local/state police records. Each one has to police their own employees I.E. the southwest guy who put things on the aircrafts. The TSA had no control over him he went under the airport and had access to the aircraft. This tells me the airlines and airport need to step up their end of the security. Security is everyone job not just the TSA