I think many of you lost the point.

Secondary screening is a follow-up to initial screening. That is, after you've submitted your accessible property to x-ray examination and after you've gone through the walk through metal detector (primary screening), secondary screening is conducted for one of the following reasons:

a) you alarmed at the WTMD (after the second pass) and a much more detailed follow-up inspection needs to be performed using a hand held metal detector,

b) the x-ray operator either detected a prohibited item or could not clear the bag because it is too cluttered with opaque or other objects too difficult to see through using the x-ray. The follow-up screening involves a physical search and/or explosives detection technology to properly clear the bag,

c) you fall under one of the categories that require secondary screening such as having a brace, cast or prosthetic (although these usually will alarm the WTMD) or are wearing shoes that meet a certain criteria and MUST be either cleared through x-ray examination or explosives detection technology.

Selectee screening is something else completely different. It existed long before TSA was created (the airlines just didn't use the "SSSS" code; each one had their own special code; something many of you apparently apparently didn't know). Selectee screening is based on the theory that by intensely screening certain passengers who fall within a very broad category of patterns based on previous terrorist incidents, security checkpoints will increase the likelihood of detecting bombs, guns and knives being brought on board aircraft. TSA screeners use the terms "secondary screening" or "additional screening" strictly as a euphemism.

Here is the problem with selectee screening:

It is based on a 20 year model that dates back to the Lockerbie bombing. It isn't completely invalid; however, the bad guys have changed their modus operandi since then yet the selectee methodology still remains the same.

The specific criteria is so broad that it will unfortunately include a great majority of law-abiding citizens who are guilty of nothing more than purchasing a one-way ticket or having the bad luck of being rebooked on another flight due to cancellation or delay of a previous one.

Contrary to popular belief, the airlines actually DO have the authority to "de-select" passengers. Many of them don't simply because nobody wants to assume the responsibility of removing someone from a selectee status. The path of least resistance is to either blame it on the computer system that prints out boarding passes, blame it on TSA, or both. This is why passengers who are redirected to another flight due to cancellations end up being selectees even though they weren't selectees on the original flight.

Another popular misperception is the belief that you cannot be removed from the selectee list. Well, once you've entered the checkpoint, this is true. However, technically, the checkpoint supervisor is supposed to refer passengers back to the airlines where they can make the decision to remove the passenger from the selectee list. Most, if not all, passengers decline this because they are running late for a flight (in most cases due to rebookings or cancellation of a previous flight); they shudder at the thought of having to stand in another line at the ticket counter and then stand in the security checkpoint line again....with the possibility that the airlines may not even change their selectee status; or because they are at the height of frustration and would rather get it over with than go through any more hassles.

In my humble opinion, selectee screening is a farce. Everybody gets screened at the checkpoint (refer to my first point about secondary screening above). So, the "additional screening" of passengers is redundant and pointless. Still, there has to be a process based on up-to-date intelligence information, current terrorist methodologies, known criminal records and other input from the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies that allow airlines to pre-determine if a passengers poses a potential threat to commercial aviation. Supposedly, this is what CAPPS II is all about. But here is where I take a different path: IF, for any reason, someone poses a potential threat to commercial aviation, then that person should be denied from boarding a commercial airliner. Period. Why take any chance at all if there is a belief that a person may be a potential terrorist or a person conducting reconnaissance for a future terrorist attack? Otherwise, if no such information exists, or if there isn't a proponderance of evidence to conclude that a person poses a potential threat, then leave them alone and let them undergo regular screening just like everybody else.

This is one of those "be careful what you wish for" type of ideas. In order to achieve this type of screening, government would have to be more intrusive into the backgrounds of people travelling by commerical air. I'm not so sure that would be such a good thing. Government already intrudes on our liberties enough; this would be opening a Pandora's Box. As I've posted on other threads, with all the whining and complaining about having to remove a pair of shoes, I can only imagine the outcry if we were ever to go to the system I propose.

Perhaps it will take a few more skyjackings to wake people up.