Procurement and Operational Specs
 

Yes, they were posted on the EPIC website in response to a FOIA. Actually, anyone who went to the original bidder's conferences has a copy. Here are some facts based on my reading of the specs, and with considerable experience in the government acquisition business:

1. The specs are independent of technology. Both types of machines (actually any type of scanner which was proposed) had to meet these requirements.

2. There are three modes specificied:
a. Test mode: Performed at the factory, according to the specs. There is a full capability to store and transmit images either in the unit itself or via a USB port
b. Training mode: Used at airports. Essentially the same capability to store and transmit as the training mode
c. Operational mode: Identicial to training and test mode, except that the storage and transmittal functions are turned off

3. There is no requirement to install different software for each mode. To do so would significantly increase the non-recurring and recurring cost of each scanner.

4. The operational spec contains a table setting up authorities by job title for access to the various modes. The ability to go between the various modes is a password away. Some authorities are as low as the shift supervisor. As usual, a contractor sysadmin person has virtually unlimited authority. There is no operational requirement for two-person control or any other personnel security safeguard. The software contains a record of logins and the modes used. But, the individual with the authority to change modes is also the individual with the authority to erase the logs.

My reading of the specifications leads me to conclude that the only thing separating Britney Spears' or anyone's image from posting the internet is a password and the integrity of individual screeners.

Do you question the validity of the documents at EPIC?

I will grant you that's most likely the case. But evidence can include precursors that caused the search and would likely be very valuable to the agency in the event that they are sued over an illegal or unwarranted search.

However, let's take this hypothetical just one step further. Suppose another "incident" occurs on a airliner. Might be blown up, might be hijacked, might be flown into a building. Doesn't really matter the specifics other than death and destruction occur. (I'm certainly hoping nothing else ever occurs, but we're playing hypothetical here)

Are you certain that TSA, DHS, and the FBI won't want computer records of everyone that went through a strip-search machine at the originating airport? Seems to me that would be valuable evidence in the event that something happened. FBI was (and still is) embarrassed by not being able to catch Dan Cooper (aka D.B. Cooper), in part because there were no ID checks....

If images cannot be stored, why the need for a high capacity hard drive?

I would bet that images are being stored.
Now, accessing those images are most certainly restricted, but all images are stored.

When TSA propagandists keep proclaiming statements that are "artfully concealed" by carefully crafted words, then there is a good chance they are lying.

Just admit that all images are saved.

Exactly.

And trusting the integrity of a TSA employee is not a good idea.

So, they'll be subjected to further "retraining?"

What prevents the vendor(s) from downloading AIT images?

Just a hypothetical.

If TSA found something of real concern during WBI screening would not a reasonable person want the ability to go back and see if a group effort had been attempted to breach security?

What does "not permitted" look like in real terms? Is the screener scanned in an AIT and/or patted down before entering?

And if they're "patted down" by another TSA employee, how does that guarantee that the two (or more) are not in collusion to violate the rules?

Soooo, no response from Bart on this yet.
It appears we have gone from "there is no possible way to save images on these machines" to definitive proof that the ability exists. Bart, is it possible that you simply did not know that these features exist?

I doubt very much any screener is screened before entering the viewing booth. Why would there be any more attention paid to proper oversight of screeners engaged in this function than the rest of the checkpoint functions?

(Bolding mine)

While it bothers me that some blue shirt could potentially take cell phone pictures of WBI images, I am much more worried about someone with the right paperwork and credentials (i.e. TSA administrators) accessing images that we were told never existed with the intent of creating a biometrics database or something. THIS is one of the two main reasons I opt out (the other being radiation safety). There is never a digital rendering of a pat down, and therefore no possibility the TSA can use data acquired in that way as part of a permanent record (other than video footage).

I will NEVER believe that WBI images go to The Great Beyond after they are examined. I will put my computer and programming knowledge up against Bart's any day. Unless you make very deliberate efforts to completely wipe a hard drive, data recovery is child's play. I don't think the TSA is willing to simply let that amount of information just evaporate.

Not to hijack (har har) your train of thought but I fear the terror bar is set much lower: The mere perception of failure on the part of government agencies is enough to turn normally rational citizens into towers of jello.