A functional binary bomb!
 

Being discussed in Newsstand and detailed here, some researchers managed to mix a binary bomb using materials easily capable of being packed in 100ml containers and mixed in a water bottle that could be purchased air-side. Although not explicitly stated in the article, it appears that the ingredients were not mixed in lab conditions.

Among fun quotes in the article:
You'd still need a detonator, but that doesn't seem to be such a big deal to get through.

So are we going to switch to no liquids or a solution that actually tests the liquids versus just trying to control their size?

I think it's a fairly safe bet to say that nothing will be done until and unless someone make a successful attempt to blow up a plane. That's the way the TSA works, isn't it?

but ... but ... all the FT chemistry experts have assured me that this is impossible ... :confused:

:D

"The explosive was made by mixing two easily obtainable chemicals that can be carried through security in the permitted 100 millilitre containers.

To a security guard, the chemicals - which the Standard is not identifying and cost only a few pounds - are colourless and odourless and seem like water. They can be easily disguised, if necessary, as toiletries.

Dr Sidney Alford, the leading explosives expert who made the bomb for us, said: "Terrorists could easily make this device. They could obtain access to the chemicals without too much difficulty. They're not particularly tightly-controlled liquids."

I'm still waiting for the identity of these magic chemicals, but as I've said all along, my money is on ETD/ETP catching them (the precursors) and that the x-ray is nearly useless for explosives detection purposes.

Without identifying the two liquids, we have no idea as to the accuracy of the test, whether it was real or staged, or have any other data necessary to assess the real risk.

Again, there are machines available right now for under 200K which can scan the contents of all bottles/containers of liquids/gels, un-opened, without sample prep, in the same amount of time needed to scan a checked bag - implement these machines at checkpoints and you can stop the liquid restrictions AND ensure safety at the same time. The only requirement: customers must drop their liquds/gels into the bin so the scanner can see them.

There is no excuse for not having this technology in place.

And without any word from the "experts" conducting said test (who just happen to be in the business of selling the government things) as to what went on, their statements about how easy it is to obtain, smuggle, and combine the liquids is questionable.

There have been viable binary explosives available for quite some time, and things that are not so sensitive as TATP or nitroglycerine and which don't require the difficulties in combining them (TATP and nitro both need lab-like conditions and a lot of time).

However, these things have, in entirity, consisted of things that are easily detected by ETD. (Most make use of nitromethane as one of the two ingredients, and there's no way ETD, if performed, misses that; any heavily nitrated compound is going to set off alarms left and right at the ETD.)

I can think of a few other ways to make a bomb, but not one that is as destructive or reliable as something like that. For example, some acid with some zinc powder will make a lot of hydrogen gas, which I suppose you could keep bottled up under pressure until you detonate it--but the energy density of hydrogen isn't going to make it an effective explosive (or one easily directed, which is what you need to make one to damage a plane's fuselage).

I'm also not sure of why there's so much fascination on liquid explosives. Solid explosives can be more easily smuggled aboard in this day and age anyway, and there's absolutely nothing being done to catch them. (Unfortunately for us, the first terrorist to come through a checkpoint with a C4 enema is going to make screening a distinctly more unpleasant experience for us all. :()


Indeed. I've yet to hear of any plausible explosive that doesn't involve nitrated materials, which are easily caught by ETD. (TATP and other related explosives is often bandied about as being "undetectable" by ETD due to its use of peroxides vs. nitration, but it and its related peroxide-based explosives are way too sensitive and difficult to assemble aboard a plane to be effective explosives... and ETD can be configured to catch their ingredients, too.)

1. Was the yield of this explosive sufficient to cause significant damage? I am not saying that it wasn't. I just want to know the validity of the evidence.

2. I am surprised at all the requests for testing machines, when so many people here have said that they stick their water bottle (not binary explosives, just water) in their pants. If we assume that there is significant danger from 25ml of fluid (4 people could easily collude to combine into 100ml), what level of personal search is necessary to ensure that no one is getting 25ml of unchecked fluid past security?

P.S. - My point is that we simply can't make air travel 100% secure. It is all risk/benefit analysis.

You would do well to consider the source(s): "Channel 4's Dispatches programme and the Evening Standard".

I think I still tend to put more credence in science than the media.

One possible method for screening liquids:


http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/bls.shtm

Think through the ENTIRE airside world... don't just limit yourself to what the bad guys may buy.. or bring... how about the cleaning solvents used at the airside restaurants... want to tell me that they are regulated? Want to tell me that every employee gets a background check? Uh huh...

Also, don't worry too much about chlorine found in Ajax/Comet (or something similar)... that gets through with no problems... of course, any high school chemistry teacher can show you how...

Travel is as safe as we want it to be... it is as safe as we, the traveling public will allow for our convenience.

My question is this... why are we fighting the last battle in the war... over and over again... do you think that the bad guys read Sun Tzu? I do...

Actually the technical part was given credit to Dr. Sidney Alford of Alford Technologies.

The question is "Can you get liquids past security and mix them airside to create a bomb capable of bringing down a plane?"

Muddy can't credibly answer (Im an obscure screen name on the internet just like all of us clowns here). I can however point to Dr. Alford who says the answer is yes. Is he right? I dont know for absolute sure, but he's got my attention and I have no reason to doubt him at this point.

Do you have any any dissenting opinions from a verifiable expert source? (please not an internet handle .. or my cousin's chemistry teacher)

from the article:

And a terrorist could also get onto to the airport grounds at Heathrow, carjack a fuel tanker and kill people on a plane that way too.

My position is that there is no such thing as safety. Safety is just a comforting illusion.

You face more danger when you step into a car than when you step into an airplane. That's never going to change, and because people react emotionally the chances of having less goofball-ish security in airports are slim.

LHR isnt secure??? :D
these guys would probably agree with that:

http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/eu...est/index.html

why do we lock our doors ... when a window is so easly broken?

It's not just bomb detectors
 

Why do we lock our doors ... when a window is so easly broken?

Indeed.

As the Israeli security chief testified after 9/11, it's foolish to depend exclusively on mechanical screening, the inference being that it can never be 100% effective, or even close. The numerous tests of the system which have exposed holes -- from lax inspection to machine shortcomings -- only confirms this. He said, what's vital is the active acreening, including, yes, profiling and scrutiny at every layer, from booking to check-in to airport police to vendor to cabin crew, to recognize certain behavior and to know the questions to ask and recognize red-flag responses. (Some "dumb" questions are meant more to elicit an affect than a particular answer.) This last part is key and requires formal training.

The problem is analogous to that of SIGINT versus HUMINT, where amongst the factors leading to 9/11 was the over-reliance on signals intelligence (information-gathering by machine), at the expense of human intelligence (people-to-people contact). Yes, we can always improve mechanical screening, but what's more important is to make sure that eyes and ears are kept as sharp as the machinery.

The problem here is that while it's easy for a TSA agent to test the system with a "bomb" in carry-on, it's very tricky actually to play a bad actor. I wonder if the TSA has a test to see if a "terrorist" could be interdicted independent of the machinery. Can an agent be trained, for the purpose of testing the system, to act suspiciously? Again, this is problematic, since detecting suspicious behavior is often a matter of intuition, which means suspicious behavior is infinitely variable and impossible to predict until you see it.

So, here we go back to recognizing that neither mechanical nor human screening is sufficient. Nor is domestic and foreign intelligence. But since the main lesson of 9/11 was that these layers must be complimentary rather than exclusive, the inevitable holes in each will be covered by the other. At least that's how it's supposed to work nowadays. Alas, testing just one layer, like bomb detectors, doesn't tell us the story.

more from Dr. Alford:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk...ly-411338.html

absolutely agree ... just enough security to promote telltale behavior ... and recognizing that behavior ... is probably the best we'll ever be able to do as far as airport screening goes ...

we can't pretend that certain things are impossible or that threats dont exist though ...

And if it is one of the two chemicals: nitromethane, used as a fuel for model aeroplane engines, or nitroethane, which is less well known but equally as effective and has fewer restrictions on obtaining and transporting according to the article, then this is not the same as the liquid bomb plot, which caused the crazy liquid ban. These chemicals would be found via ETD.

A broken window attracts much more attention than someone going thru a door. A lot of people would probably think that someone going thru an open door has reason to be there ... especially in an area where there are a lot of transients.

Except in rare circumstances, someone breaking and/or going thru a window is going to raise red flags with those in the area.

Do your own research; any number have been posted here and elsewhere.

Oh, and by the wayHmmm, disposal products.

Well, guess I was right about nitromethane. And my statement that ETD will catch it is validated. And everything I've said since 8/2006 about the farce of a "threat" from liquids being somehow more than that of the threat from solid explosives (or countless other threats) stands as it did then, with nothing from Dr. Alford to refute me.

The TSA and other security forces around the world are paying far too much attention to the water carnival, which in its obnoxious search for each bottle of water or hand lotion or shampoo is blinding those security forces to much more conventional threats. Weapons and bomb components make it through the checkpoints at an alarming rate, and it's quite arguable that the distractions of the water carnival are a large contributing factor to those failures.

"One of the chemicals, nitromethane, is used as a fuel for model aeroplane engines."

"A similar alternative, nitroethane, is less well known but equally as effective. There are fewer restrictions on obtaining and transporting this chemical. "

"A fourth candidate, methyl nitrate, is unusual in that it will explode as soon as it is combined with another substance. It does not need to be ignited by a detonator device."

ETD or ETP will detect these. X-ray will not.

"It can reliably be caused to detonate by mixing it with ingredient X," said Dr Alford. He was not willing to reveal the name of the activating chemical."

Putz. Ingredient X isn't going to remain a mystery for long. Just come out and say it so we can continue to evaluate the validity of these claims. :rolleyes:

"Liquid explosives would not necessarily be picked up by "sniffer" type security scanners if placed in carefully sealed and cleaned containers, said Dr Alford."

ETD, Dr. Alford. And ETP will still pick up less-than-carefully packed nitrates.

Ingredient X
 

"Nitromethane known to reduce the sensitivity of nitroglycerine. Nitromethane may be added to compositions containing nitroglycerine. The reference further teaches that trinitrotoluene may be added to said compositions. Pyridine is known to be a highly effective solvent for trinitrotoluene. It is also a well-known sensitizer for nitromethane; however, it is seldom used for its sensitizer properties because more effective sensitizers are known and available. Trinitrotoluene was found to be soluble in nitromethane. The US Army Ballistic Research Laboratory was not aware of this property until 1987. "

"There are ways to utilize nitroparaffins as the basis of a binary system. A stable explosive composition can be made by adding a sensitizer, in the form of resin balloons, to nitromethane. It is well known that amines (particularly ethylenediamine) will sensitize nitromethane so that it will detonate with a blasting cap. These mixtures become unstable and decompose after a few days. Most of these sensitizing agents are very toxic and difficult to work with safely. The basis of this patent is that by entrapping air into the nitromethane liquid, by means of micro balloons (resin, glass, etc.), it can be made cap-sensitive. However since the balloons will float to the surface of pure nitromethane, a thickening (gelling) agent must be added to prevent this."

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...ves-liquid.htm

and x-ray will pick up less-than-carefully disguised bombs ...

I wouldnt put too much faith in trace detection nor xray ...

Doesn't matter. You'll still have an 80% chance to get it thru anyway.

And besides, how many terrorists do you think are that stupid?

I put a lot more faith into trace detection, which works rather well, than x-ray which relies on bomber stupidity and x-ray drone attentiveness, and not at all on liquids.

no mention of methyl nitrate ... which mixes with the "ingredient x" ... or did i miss it?

Paragraph #1: Pyridine

Paragraph #2: ethylenediamine

Both are sensitizers for nitromethane, with the latter supposedly being more effective.

stupid enough to not use clean sealed containers for explosives? I dont know ... I suppose some would be that stupid ... others not ...

by ingredient x, I thought you were refering to the unamed ingredient that causes methyl nitrate to explode as soon as they are mixed

It's still much simpler to get an effective solid explosive past the checkpoint on one's person than to fuss with a binary. Why mess with liquids at all, if they require detonators (the binaries based on nitromethanes and related compounds do)? The ones that don't tend to be unstable enough to make them unsuitable, or take too much work to assemble effectively once airside.

I need to look into methyl nitrate in greater detail, but from what I've read, it is not going to be an explosive of choice for would-be terrorists on planes. It's too sensitive and too volatile, as well as being toxic; those properties make it difficult to secret aboard as a normal consumer product and then combine later into a large enough volume to be effective. And, it's a nitrated compound and as such should set off the ETD if checked.

Dr. Alford is trying to maintain the hysteria about liquids explosives in order to sell his products or services to the UK government (and to the USA as well, I'm sure). He doesn't seem to be pointing out anything new with his suggestions--we talked here about nitromethane-based binaries way back in 2006, and you can bet government authorities have as well.

So then either advocate for a COMPLETE BAN on all liquids (since the current restrictions would let this one through) or don't fly. Your choice.

Meanwhile, you're more likely to die on the way to the grocery store.

nah ... Im not afraid to fly with or without a liquids ban ... I don't put my head in the sand and pretend threats don't exist either ...

Any reasonably strong oxidizing agent will do the trick from what I understand. Maybe bleach would work.

And I don't pretend that the likelihood of those threats happening, with or without bans, is higher than winning the lottery either.

and who will protect bus or train or metro passengers?
I mean, a plane can have up to 500ish passenger...Hitting a long, busy tube train may take a lot more people out...
Obviously, those designing these "clever" measures are unlikely to be found in any public transport outside of commercial aviation...

dont forget the public water supply ... and the air we breathe ... :D

Did they actually state the ingredients in the BB, if not this sounds like another scare tactic by someone paid by TSA to keep this farce going.

566 days of code orange keeping the "threat" level this high causes a desensitization IE cry wolf. Good work TSA keep the poor work up because no one believes you anymore, no matter what spokeshole you use.