This in no way justifies the idiotic ban on liquids and gels and x-rayings of limited quanities of liquids by people who are willingly complying with the requirement.

For those who defend the "war on liquids" at airports, perhaps they should shove a plastic tube of prohibited amounts of liquid or gel into areas covered by their underpants and see how often they get caught.

The current "war on liquids" nonsense are a waste since the standard security procedure in place at US and UK airports will fail to catch them most of the time when concealed on person in areas covered by underwear; and x-raying liquids and gels does not identify the nature of the liquid or gel.

In other words, whatever this Alford did, there is no defence for the current nonsense "war on liquids".

Putting one's head in the sand: worrying about the improbable while ignoring more probable threats.

You are so right - and I have a really difficult time understanding why others, i.e., the Kettles of the world, don't see this. Your automobile is so much more likely to cause your death than any aircraft, even if we were to do away with screening altogether.

If the threat Mr. Alford describes was in fact crediable two things would have happened already.

1) The agencies in question would have completely banned all liquids. This would have been a no exceptions policy and it would still be around. The fact that we have the stupid liquid rule gives at least some creadence that the threat in fact is not credible.

2) Some wacko would have already tried this. The fact that it hasn't been tried in the 1.5 years since the liquid fiasco tells me this isn't credible either.

The threat may be there, but I am not going to live my life running from this potential threat.

Also, I haven't seen it mentioned here, but if you look at the photos of the explosion there are several things that strike me as odd. (I am not an explosives expert). First it appears to me that the "test bed" plane was already cut into pieces before the test. The explosion ripped a 6 foot hole in the fusalage and broke the ribs of the plane. Now from my thinking, a plane that was already cut up would have a nice size hole for the explosive gasses to vent out that it shouldn't have that much pressure left to blow much of a hole in anything. That is unless this was a shaped charge with the force of the blast being directed to the outer hull of the plane. I saw no mention of a shape charge being used, and it doesn't look like they sealed the plane before the test. Thus, I think the explosion might have been enhanced for effect.

Found this interesting: http://archive.thisiswiltshire.co.uk...29/111147.html

Looking for new markets?

someone alluded to that earlier ... but I can't see it ... what specific services would he be trying to create a need for?

Bomb-proof trash bins at the airport to replace the plain ones into which all the "dangerous" liquids are tossed into? Just for starters...

Doesn't have to be specific. Just keep the Great Liquid Threat ramped up and his kind of general business will naturally increase, or at least maintain status quo.

We have yet to see a test carried out by a completely independent body. One that does not have a vested interest in 'security' (ie. DHS or DfT), or in direct profit therefrom. I don't know who approached whom for this particular demonstration, but I personally don't trust either the media or a business which has a dog in the fight.

The liquids wouldn't be dangerous without a detonator. That's the threat being looked for, not dangerous liquids per se.

Also remember that a tragedy at an airport is a tragedy, but not necessarily a national security concern, whereas something happening in a nation's airspace is very much a national security concern. This is the same way my house blowing up doesn't affect national security whereas the White House blowing up does.

And who draws the line on what is merely a tragedy and what constitutes a "national security concern"?
I take it that an urban bus being blown up by terrorists would be relegated to the level of "local security concern"?
What about a train? Would that be a "regional security concern"?

Really? Toss some bleach and ammonia into the trash and see what happens.

I can think of many "more tragic" casualties than losing the White House and its current occupants.

I'm sure Dr. Alford's company will be willing to sell (or subcontract out for) more than just the disposal bins. He's still stirring up fear to drum up business. After all, we on FT's TS&S forum discussed binary explosives involving nitromethane way back in August of '06 at the outset of the water carnival, so I'm sure the notion Dr. Alford posits that such bombs pose a risk is not news to the government security folks (unless they're far more incompetent than we make them out to be).

But that open trash cans are used to collect & dispose of confiscated liquids goes a long way toward showing how non-credible the governments find the threat of a liquid bomb. Some of the liquids proposed do not require a detonator (things like TATP or other peroxide-based explosives, for example). Others are toxic enough in and of themselves that dumping them into a bin open to the air poses a health and/or fire hazard to everyone at the checkpoint.

The government(s) involved apparently feel the threat to be so miniscule that the risk of someone's would-be explosives being poured out is able to be ignored. In other words, they know that a trash can filled with, for example, methyl nitrate is a disaster waiting to happen, but don't feel that it's ever really likely to end up in the bin.


In the case of a hijacking, I'd buy that argument, because of the whole guided missile aspect. But in terms of a terrorist wanting to blow up a plane in mid-flight, it's back to a tragedy, albeit a nasty one.

Jargon check on Aisle 1, please. :-:

Does it affect the security of the nation? If so, then it's national security. If not, then no, it's a local matter.

That's pretty much my take on it, at least.

Re-read my second sentence.

And you could do that with any acid and base combo in the parking lot, at the counter, the bathroom, baggage claim, etc. ad nauseum. So what? Again, it's not a national security concern until it hits the airspace, as a rule (unless it's a WMD, etc.)

C'mon Spiff, stop sugar coating it. Tell me how you really feel.

Suppose we agree on that.
What is your definition of "security of the nation"?

I see and understand your points, but what is blowing up, exactly, and where? If it's, say, radioactive and over a city, we could be back to national security issue again.

That which negatively impacts it's ability to survive or does serious harm to it. This might cover such areas as economics, infrastructure, physical security, etc.

My main point is air space security is strategy 101 and is the most heavily scrutinized of every major country in the world. No one allows things to go on in it's airspace if they can help it.

Yes, although if we've got terrorists carrying dirty bomb materials aboard planes, we've got more to worry about than the water carnival, too. :eek:

(And at that point, a dirty bomb on the ground becomes a national security threat as well; set one off in lower Manhattan or on the National Mall and you've achieved the same goals, largely--and perhaps more effectively so--than setting it off in the air.)

How well-scrutinised are takeoffs from small airfields? Are pilots scanned for explosives etc?

And some radioactive explosion can't happen in a tube train? How well are these scrutinised?

No kidding. :)

Absolutely. Whereas a normal bomb going off may or may not be a national security issue, depending upon location for the most part.

Then it comes down to what level of damage a small plane can do, in and of itself. No more than a car or van could, if also loaded up with explosives (ala Oklahoma).

Yes it's still in the airspace but how big a threat is it? A commercial jet? A lot.

Also, private versus commercial plays a significant role. Governmental intrusions into private planes would be Constitutionally less than commercial. If it's open to the public the government can step in easier than if it's not.

Or it could be a cropduster with any number of unspeakable things in the hopper.

For sure. But then it's private, which means the G needs some type of reasonable suspicion for searches. Admin searches don't work on private planes.

Given their creativity with the Constitution lately, I'm sure they could weasel some way to make an admin search.

Do you want to fly that plane today?

FAA licenses pilots and issues certificates for airplanes, right? There is the ability of the Federales to impose administrative searches on private aviation. The feds could also claim Interstate Commerce Clause as basis for searches.

The FAA has little interest in searching GA - the TSA has claimed it has the right to search pilots, bags and aircraft, but so far no plan has been created since the entire concept of dispatching screeners to the literally thousands of GA airports across the country is beyond ludicrous.

Dispatching them only to 'key' airports or the FBOs at large commercial service airports would only harass customers and drive GA to other facilities - the economic backlash would end any such initiative quickly.

The first time a TSA person attempts to block a private aviator from flying his/her own aircraft will be the first time a TSA person ends up sprawled across the pavement looking like one big bruise.

Making misrepresentations to get "consent" to access private property and check it out is something that does happen.

And should be severely punished with fines and prison time. :mad:

I agree completely, but I have never seen a more articulate discussion of America's obsession with "security" than the recent opinion piece by James Carroll, recently published originally in the Boston Globe and subsequently in the IHT. The piece can be found here

Caroll focuses more on America's obsession with military power as a source of security, but I believe his observations apply equally to other facets of American society -- the misguided belief that societal disorders can be solved through the application of increased force (hence the huge prison population and the stubborn insistence on retaining the death penalty), the delusion that the answer to terrorism is to declare "war" on it, and of course, the elaborate government-funded security theatre carried out in airports, rail stations, shopping malls and other public places that is designed to create the appearance that the government is "doing something."

From Caroll's opinion piece:

"In this era, humans have been cut loose from ancient moorings of meaning and purpose. The context within which this condition is most manifest in the United States is the debate - or, more precisely, the lack thereof - over what is called "national security." The phrase is potent because it promises something that is impossible, since the human condition is by definition insecure. When candidates vie with one another over who is most qualified to be "commander in chief," and when they unanimously promise to strengthen military readiness, they together reinforce the dominant American myth - that an extravagant social investment of treasure and talent in armed power of the group offers members of the group escape from the existential dread that comes with life on a dangerous planet. That such investment only makes the planet more dangerous matters little, since the feeling of security, rather than actual security, is the goal of the entire project."

Yabut the DCA Access Program puts GA through TSA screening and requires an FAM aboard any plane flying into DCA. Further, when the Federales have tightened restrictions on the DC area GA airports, they've mandated that GA planes stop at a gateway airport for a search prior to being allowed in.

Here's an example from 2003:
As for the inspections, I am reminded of what the security idiots did at Meigs (before Daley closed it, but after 9/11, and pre-TSA).... in several cases, they took pens and pencils away from pilots that had to go through security clearance. Pretty tough to write down an IFR clearance when you have no pencil or pen (notwithstanding that these were the PILOTS.... what were they going to do? Stab themselves?)

Point taken, but I thought a good chunk of GA started avoiding the DC area after all this started anyway, and for this reason. I don't remember the last time a private GA aircraft flew to/from DCA because of the FAM requirement, and there are plenty of airports in suburban VA and MD which don't have these restrictions.

If the TSA tried to implement this as a system-wide program, you can bet there would be plenty of screaming.

I am surprised at the Meigs incident - perhaps it was close to 9/11 and pilots deferred more to the TSA, but why did they allow their stuff to be taken away from use on their own aircraft? Who established the TSA's authority to screen GA pilots/passengers at Meigs?

Exactly.
The basic law of system security is that a system can only be as secure as its weakest link. This applies to any system, from the infection-control in your car's air conditioning to a corporate intranet to the system of airspace control.
As governments seem hellbent on securing already reasonably good security procedures while keeping the weakest links every bit as weak as they've always been, the whole process will remain pointless at best and downright disingenuous at worst.

Ah Jeez. The dirty bomb myth and the little airplane specter. Trifecta anyone ? :rolleyes:

True, but what can they do? The Constitution is quite clear on the point. You must have some kind of line. And there is return on investment as well - which is the bigger threat? Where should you spend your money?

It's like the border - the Canadian border is bigger but has far fewer agents because the money is better spent at the southern because it's far busier.

Hence our description of TSA as Kabuki security.

The money should be spent at strengthening the weakest links! And that's only if (which is a BIG if) the security risk is high enough (which, as long as planes are not hijacked, I think that it isn't, though I'm prepared to listen to opinions to the contrary).
What is the benefit of the liquids ban if I can easily get a dozen kamikazis to simultaneously blow up in cropdusters over major cities across the western world and a leased Learjet or even E170 to penetrate government buildings (well probably not the white house, but a lot of others nevertheless)?

Not just the weakest links, but the more likely place of attack.

How many crop dusting terror attacks have occurred versus civilian airliners?

He added it would cost around £250 for terrorists to improvise an unmanned aircraft to deliver explosives using a mobile phone with GPS technology and a model aeroplane.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/mai...irobots127.xml

To concentrate on airliners while ignoring cropdusters is fighting the last war, while simultaneously wasting billions of dollars and eroding our civil liberties. Terrorists think outside the box. So should governmental agencies. If we have made civilian airliners more difficult to exploit - a large if, given the holes in TSA "security" - then terrorists will look elsewhere for likely places of attack. Think of a tube of toothpaste. Well, that may be a poor example, given the war on liquids, but all should understand the analogy. An inflated balloon is a better example. Push in on one side, the rest expands. Similar principle: if one link is apparently less vulnerable, then terrorists have shown patientce and wilingness to probe to exploit other links.