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Originally Posted by PatrickHenry1775
(Post 9324471)
To concentrate on airliners while ignoring cropdusters is fighting the last war, while simultaneously wasting billions of dollars and eroding our civil liberties. Terrorists think outside the box. So should governmental agencies. If we have made civilian airliners more difficult to exploit - a large if, given the holes in TSA "security" - then terrorists will look elsewhere for likely places of attack. Think of a tube of toothpaste. Well, that may be a poor example, given the war on liquids, but all should understand the analogy. An inflated balloon is a better example. Push in on one side, the rest expands. Similar principle: if one link is apparently less vulnerable, then terrorists have shown patientce and wilingness to probe to exploit other links.
If I hit you in the face with a jab, you should be also looking for a hook to the floating ribs and an uppercut to the jaw. But you'd be foolish to ignore the jab to the face, otherwise I'll hit you with it again. That's my fighting strategy - attack you repeatedly with successful blows until you do something that makes me stop it and do something else. If I'm successful, why change? |
Originally Posted by law dawg
(Post 9324672)
Of course agencies should think outside the box, but they should also not ignore the last successful attack.
If I hit you in the face with a jab, you should be also looking for a hook to the floating ribs and an uppercut to the jaw. But you'd be foolish to ignore the jab to the face, otherwise I'll hit you with it again. That's my fighting strategy - attack you repeatedly with successful blows until you do something that makes me stop it and do something else. If I'm successful, why change? Depending on your perspective, the level of protection commercial aviation is afforded can be seen as anywhere from "almost decent" to "completely over-the-top". Whereas anyone would agree that non-aviation public transport is completely nonsecure, and private aviation security is very lax. |
Originally Posted by alanR
(Post 9324408)
He added it would cost around £250 for terrorists to improvise an unmanned aircraft to deliver explosives using a mobile phone with GPS technology and a model aeroplane.
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Originally Posted by graraps
(Post 9324715)
But it doesn't take a rocket (mmm rocket!) scientist to understand that it's a lot easier to attack through the nonsecure fronts...
Depending on your perspective, the level of protection commercial aviation is afforded can be seen as anywhere from "almost decent" to "completely over-the-top". Whereas anyone would agree that non-aviation public transport is completely nonsecure, and private aviation security is very lax. OTOH, where is the best "bang for your buck?" Where do the bad guys want to attack to best accomplish their goal? I'd say historically that civilian aviation ranks up there, whereas, to date, private aviation does not. |
And how do you determine when the threat is gone or reduced?
Or do you continue to throw money at it, "just because"? |
Originally Posted by birdstrike
(Post 9324838)
And how do you determine when the threat is gone or reduced?
Or do you continue to throw money at it, "just because"? That's waaaaay above both my pay grade and my experience. I'd guess the Intel people would make that call. Us front-liners will just continue to follow orders. |
Originally Posted by law dawg
(Post 9324890)
And that's the million dollar question, isn't it?
That's waaaaay above both my pay grade and my experience. I'd guess the Intel people would make that call. Us front-liners will just continue to follow orders. Operational people may have their shortcomings, but I (and I suspect many others on this forum) would argue that the problem isn't really on the operational side...The strategic risk assessment (right at the top) is the main thing that's completely flawed (assuming that terrorists will do exactly what they've done in the past, thinking that "more of the same" security is the way forward and doing sweet FA on eliminating the things that cause terrorism). |
Originally Posted by graraps
(Post 9325254)
But I don't think anyone here is attacking you as being a bad person or even bad employee.
Operational people may have their shortcomings, but I (and I suspect many others on this forum) would argue that the problem isn't really on the operational side...The strategic risk assessment (right at the top) is the main thing that's completely flawed (assuming that terrorists will do exactly what they've done in the past, thinking that "more of the same" security is the way forward and doing sweet FA on eliminating the things that cause terrorism). I don't agree with a lot of what goes on in DHS and have stated so, publicly and privately. As a FLEO I have sworn to uphold the Constitution and the law. I try and do my best. Also realize that sometimes here I take positions that I may not 100% agree with just to make a point or to put out another opinion. There aren't many opposing voices here, which lessens the dialogue, IMO. |
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