Actually, this one is simple. ID isn't a requirement to fly; one needs only submit to an additional secondary and Bob's your uncle.

BTW, conflating the conceptual notions of identification and identity will land you in serious fallacy trouble. Identification documents come with expiration dates; one's personal identity doesn't. Valid ID does not entail security.@:-)

Yes. Because after a certain amount of time lapses the state says I must pay more money for the privilege to drive. It is my Drivers license and does not bestow any flight privileges to me just as I don't need anything to be a passenger in a motor vehicle.

people boarding planes with expired employee credentials sounds like an HR problem to me.

Hassle?! We're not talking about planning an "Ocean's 11" heist! How much of a hassle would it be to grab a few ID blanks like these and print up something? Too much hassle for a crackhead petty thief? Okay, but too much hassle for a 'pro' laptop thief? Not at all.


How does a bit of laminated (if that) plastic make someone "legit"? Suppose I pull up an old online bp (I keep PDF copies for reporting purposes), modify the date to 10/2 and change the name to "James Kirk". Then I get one of those ID card blanks and put, say, a couple of logos from the US Dept of Interior and National Park Service along with my photo and the name "James Kirk" on the card....how then does that make me "legit"?

But the fake ID isn't even needed. Last year MrsJ and BabyJ were off on another adventure back east. Now they are fairly experienced travelers but without my sherpa services on the other side, it would have been a rather daunting undertaking for MrsJ to deal with the (then) car seat, stroller and carryons. The solution? Her sister would be the Eastern sherpa But dealing with the airline weenies to get SIL a gate pass was a royal PIA. The story kept changing from "not possible" to "possible for a $50 fee" Solution? SIL showed up to the checkpoint with a bp bearing her name. She sailed through security with narry a peep, met MrsJ and BabyJ at the gate (more nephew time )

"Legit"? Just because a person shows up at the checkpoint with a slip of paper and a bit of plastic with a photo and name that matches the name on said slip of paper doesn't mean that person is getting on a plane! Even if the bp presented is for a real pax on a real flight leaving that day, there's nothing that requires that person to board the flight...how many people have used this workaround to see a loved one off at the gate? Or to greet a loved one arriving from a long trip?

But you know, doing all that--which would take all of 15 minutes, 30 tops--is moot because...

Not too mention that some IDs (like a couple of my DOD ID cards) don't have an expiry date. I've heard that some folks have been hassled by similar IDs but I think it depends on the airport. With so many here traveling on such IDs nobody gives them a second thought.

It stands to reason though that there must be some form of regulation to the secured area. The ID and boarding pass is that regulation. The other option is that anyone can go out to the gate and that would be too much foot traffic to handle and the cases of theft would go out of site.

It doesn't stand to reason. I would proffer that the delays at the screening checkpoint might actually decrease since the TSO's can be moved back to doing actual screening, which would open up more lanes. I don't believe that there are an inordinate number of people that want to go airside but are not flying, especially when they weigh the time and hassle of having to go through security. The cases of theft wouldn't dramatically increase either IMHO. Is there a dramatic difference between theft airside and landside today? If it is such an issue, shouldn't we be checking claim tags in baggage claim. That is just not happening today.

I thought the notion of a secured area was to ensure that banned, dangerous substances can't easily be put on board aircraft. Checking ID is doing nothing to cut down on foot traffic. You want the gate areas limited to those flying? Then make BP's standard and have a scanner at security. If the BP is legit, the pax can come through. Who they are is of ZERO matter.

To the post above mentioning Osama (aka he-who-must-not-be-named), I couldn't care less if he boards my flight, as long as he's not smuggling anything dangerous on board in his newly-dyed beard.

It wasn't that long ago (in relative terms) that one did not need a boarding pass to go through security at most airports. Further, at least one airport (PIT?) was announced during the last year as a test bed for allowing non-travelers through security.

I'd love to see before-after data to back up your assertion.

Kippy seems to think that checking IDs confirms that an individual is not on the no-fly list. The airlines like checking IDs for revenue protection. Yet the system has more holes in it than the Mexican and Canadian border put together.

IF, and I repeat IF, the ID is cross-referenced at the point of entry to a permit/deny list, then it serves a purpose of restricting access. If the ID is recorded when one passes the point of entry (e.g. as is done with a corporate access card entering a secure building) - and perhaps recorded upon exit, then it serves a purpose of knowing who is inside the premises at a given time, which is useful for law-enforcement purposes.

If you truly want an ID system that is effective for some kind of security purposes, you will require that the TSA check and record the ID and boarding document upon entry to the checkpoint, you will have the TSA check the no-fly/SSSS list (and cross-reference back to the ID issuer to make sure it's a valid ID) at that time, and you will have the TSA record ID info when one leaves a checkpoint (and/or have them obtain the actual boarding scans from the airline). This does nothing, however, to ensure physical security, other than ensuring that a no-fly/SSSS passenger is treated in accordance with policy. (This, by the way, was supposedly one feature of CLEAR, which was to ensure that the passenger was who they say they are, thereby allowing less of a screening process). Oh, and it would allow TSA one more way to spread their desire to be 'law enforcement' because it would also permit crossing against 'wants and warrants' lists.

I don't think anyone would stand for the marginal additional benefits that such a detailed cross-referencing would provide. But I do note that this is potentially one thing that DHS is thinking by requiring that RealID issuers allow electronic access to their databases.

IOW, the current ID scheme is only for show, and serves no effective purpose other than to make work and add a hurdle for passengers.

Nonsense.

There was not an astronomical amount of theft pre-stupid BP/ID requirement. There is no reason to believe that would be the case now, other than a larger pool of people for the TSA to steal from.

According to current TSA policy - ID is NOT REQUIRED to fly. My B/P indicates my "legit purpose to enter the security area."

Well, good thing you're not a pilot. It would be incredibly easy to fly with an "inaccurate" manifest. What is to stop Osama, for example, from buying a ticket as "Muktar Galab," checking in online or at an airport kiosk, and flying under that name? Remember, he doesn't even technically have to have an ID (he may get additional screening)... but even if he had an ID, I would assume Osama could get a convincing fake or even legit but aliased ID matching the ticket.

So, in other words, names do NOTHING for security!


Names of passengers does not equal ID checks. The passenger names come from the airlines, via the PNRs for ticket purchases. Again, there is NOTHING there that equates to ID checks.

And Mr. Psycho books his ticket using his first initial and middle name (as is often recommended by airline check-in agents when frustrated pax complain about getting clobbered by the no-fly list). Or flies with an assumed identity / alias. But we've covered before just how ridiculous the notion of "ID = security" is, haven't we?


At what point do they have to show ID to an agent? One can fly without ID; bringing an OLCI BP to the airport is enough to get through security, with "additional screening." Maybe (or maybe not, given the results of many red-team tests!) this prevents prohibited items from getting through; it surely doesn't prevent your "psycho" from making it through, even if he were on the list (which he isn't).

And I'll repeat for the hard of hearing: IDs do not equal security, in any way, shape, or form.

When you have more people going through a cp with no legit reason to be there then the incidence of everything goes up; wait times, and theft are no exception.
As a previous poster noted, it was not too long ago that it was allowed and at that time, pick pockets ran the trains at DEN and made a lot of people miserable.
Another poster noted that an automated authentication system would benefit the process, this is a logistical nightmare. It would have to tie into all the airlines ticketing systems and they are not uniform with each other. Then there is the issue of down time and who is going to pay for it.
You can get into the secure area if you can prove to the carrier that you have a valid reason. That is where it needs to be. The whole issue of checking validity of id is paramount in security because if you have a fake identification then you should be looked at closer because those people that are carriers of good i.d. have nothing to hide and those that are faking it are faking it for a reason. It doesn't mean that you cant fly.

That is correct. But how does TSA know that you are the person that is on that BP that is entitled to enter the secured area? The process of validation of ID comes from the 9/11 commission reports if my memory serves me correctly.

It's been a while since I read the report, but IIRC, there's notions of biometric ID documents which would be much harder to forge (in principle, anyway; there's still the problem of getting valid, but otherwise false, ID documents through various avenues).

(And mind you, this is only for international travel, not for domestic travel.)

There is also a vague ID notion put forth:

The problem is that there aren't any good notions out there of how to have standards for birth certificates and IDs, which are absolutely necessary to make any sort of realistic ID system work. Nor for validating said IDs to ensure they are not only fake, but not legitimate but false documents--and the "Real ID" nonsense doesn't go anywhere near addressing that problem, nor do the measures put in place by various states (such as providing "two forms of ID + proof of residence," etc., as all are still incredibly susceptible to forgery and deception resulting in the issuance of a valid but false ID!)

And, too, there's the problem that the 9/11 Report's recommendations are just that, and are not to be taken as gospel or a cure-all. A lot of those recommendations have been largely ignored (improving air cargo security, for example), and some have even been invalidated in the years since the report's issuance.