Boggie Dog

I remain concerned about insider threats and TSA’s apparent lack of attention to these potential threats. With easy access to the ramp and aircraft and no routine screening I think insiders present a serious threat to the public’s safety, an issue that TSA turns a blind eye to.

I’ve tried to build a bit a list of where insiders could have been a potential threat yet were given access to airport sterile areas and direct access to aircraft in some cases.

The most recent case is the AA mechanic who sabotaged an airplanes air data module to make airspeed, pitch, and other data to be reported incorrectly.

In 2015 TSA gave Pre Check to a convicted felon.

In 2014 a baggage handler was arrested after using his security badge to avoid checkpoints in order to smuggle guns on aircraft

In 2013 an insider was arrested after planting what he thought was a bomb on an aircraft in Kansas.

In 2010 TSA pressured airport officials to issue a SIDA security badge to a new TSA hire who had been convicted of a robbery.

I’d appreciate help in adding to this list with known security lapses by TSA.

Section 107

Okay, I'll bite.

No, the most recent case are the gang of 9 from your home airport of DFW who thought they were smuggling drugs and offered to smuggle anything, including explosives, on Spirit and Envoy. There are quite a few more public instances of airport workers and airline workers using their credentials to bypass normal screening and conduct nefarious plots - mostly drug and gun running. the interwebs are your friend in this list.

But As someone with inside information and subject to the "inattention," I can tell you that neither TSA, nor are airport security coordinators, airport managers, op's departments, airline security, airport law enforcement, and other federal law enforcement organizations turn a blind eye or are inattentive to the definite and significant risk of the insider threat, however apparent to you their inattention might seem. Had you the opportunity to spend some quality time with folks in the airport security environment you would quickly come to know that what is apparent to you now is far from the truth. (I have offered to arrange an opportunity specifically for you in the past - that offer still stands).

Everyone involved in aviation security knows and is concerned and employs active measures to address the threats posed by insiders. Which is in no way a suggestion that the risk is gone or minimized - far from it. Could more active measures be employed? Yes, without a doubt.

Reasonableness also has to prevail - there are other threads where we have had robust discussion of why Passenger Checkpoint Screening of 100% of airport workers is not practical which I wont rehash here. I know that notion assaults some folks' sensibilities (i.e., "but it's not fair that airport workers don't have to subjected to this security theater torture like the rest of us").

As with any system involving humans, there will inevitably be someone that is a bad guy. That bad guys do get into the system does not = blind eye or unconcerned.

Boggie Dog

Not fishing so biting isn't necessary. I appreciate the offer to visit DFW and see things from your side of things but explained that at the time (and now) can't avail myself of the opportunity.

I fully disagree that airport workers cannot be screened. Will it be hard? Yes! Will it take additional resources? Yes! Is it doable? Yes!

I didn't attempt to create an inclusive list of security breaches and appreciate what you've added.

I'd be curious what portion of TSA's budget is directed to insider security efforts? Not enough in my opinion.

mysterym

insider threat is a very real threat.