I know this is heresy to post here, but ... Bob has a point.

If TSA wasn't trying to test their own checkpoints, critics would yell at TSA for being asleep at the switch.

Instead, if TSA conducted testing, but only tested their own checkpoints with stuff the SOP was designed to find, critics would yell at TSA for not thinking "outside the box" about the next generation of threats.

So, TSA tests at EWR using a threat that the current SOP isn't designed to detect. Lo and behold, the contraband makes it through the checkpoint. And now everyone yells and screams that TSA failed to detect the item that TSA knew it wouldn't be able to detect.

Look, there are plenty of reasons to criticize TSA, and I do so frequently here. But I think we also ought to play fair.


[Hey, goalie, can you lend me your blocking pads? I think I'm gonna need them ...]

The underlying reason that its so easy to smuggle credible threats airside is because TSA wastes so much time and resources looking for non-credible threats and harassing passengers.

TSA's well-deserved lambasting should be sharply increased and the agency as a whole should be scheduled for termination.

Pick one.

http://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/fil...ity_layers.jpg

I think I understand your general point, but I'm not sure it applies here.

Current SOP requires accounting for anything that doesn't register as body or clothing (on the scan or to a TSOs probing fingertips) - regardless of what that might be (ostomy bag, piece of gum, hanky, breast expanders, bra underwires, adult diapers).

The pax got a grope. He had an item concealed on his person that was not questioned or detected. It doesn't matter what the item was, whether or not it was real or something the TSO had never encountered before, hence was not trained to detect - something was there that went unchallenged.

It's not like the TSO said "(pat, pat) Hey, do you have something in your pocket/underwear? What (pat, pat) is this?" and asked for an explanation.

I've just read something at another site that brings up a good point or two:

This incident happened at EWR's Terminal B, checkpoint 1. According to TSAStatus.net, that checkpoint is MMW all the time, with WTMD reserved for families with children.

How did the testor get to go through WTMD and how/why was he picked for a random pat down?

This seems to be totally out of the ordinary for that particular checkpoint and could make one believe that it was a set up the whole way. Some person or persons knew who he was and deliberately sent him through WTMD. He was not "randomly" chosen - unless he opted out of the MMW and was sent through WTM with the added bonus of a pat down.

I doubt they will. TSA's had a lot of reasons to can bad programs, like SPOT, when they were shown to be ineffective and a waste of time. TSA doubled down on the propaganda and justified the program based on the "bad guys" caught that aren't a threat to aviation.

The problem is that TSA is a jobs program and canning programs puts people out of work. TSA's not going to do that, regardless of sequestration or not, because the whole program is not about security. If BB lets something slip ... so what? It's not like TSA's effective anyway, and anyone that's read PV or FT knows that. So no damage is done, even with BB's "security slip up."

I agree. However, since this is a combination workfare/populace control organization, it won't be cut. The government's only interested in cutting organizations that actually do something, like the military and intelligence communities. :td:

If the process is such that the item is not detectable then why test? I have to believe that the item is detectable but in this particular case was not found.

If you have something that is believed to be undetectable and you then prove it is in fact not detectable hasn't the test been successful?

The only thing that would need to be changed is the capabilities of the screening method, either person, machine, or both. Unless there is really no reason to be able to detect this particular item in the first place.

TSA is getting flack for justifying itself when so many other things point out how flawed the whole organization is.

I think the latter (the opt-out) is the most plausible scenario.

Okay, I may have overstated the case slightly. TSA may have "strongly suspected" that the item was not detectable, but wouldn't "know" (for certain) until the test was performed in a live setting.

Absolutely. Of course, the dominant storyline in this narrative is "EWR TSA failed to detect a dangerous item", not "TSA successfully proved vulnerability in system". The latter is the narrative that Bob is promoting; it's not an unreasonable interpretation of the few facts we have.

And that's partially my point. I know there are folks who would love to just pile on the TSA given any opportunity; there are better opportunities for doing this.

I don't see anyone here 'piling on', and even the media and self-serving hacks like Mica are just re-hashing rhetoric.

No one, least of all here on FT, seriously expects TSA to change.

I think the 'vulnerability' is one that folks (here and elsewhere) have pointed out all along - the grope would have to be far more invasive than even the AFS American public is likely to be bullied or harassed into accepting.

The report is that it was an IED; even if the IED is the size of a piece of candy, a properly conducted grope should have caught it. If it didn't, either the grope was casually executed or the protocol is inadequate (in which case, why do I get hands between my legs and in my pants every time I fly).

It's also quite possible that this was a deliberate TSA 'leak' (sadly, many folks would understandably believe just about any lapse alleged to have taken place at EWR). Bob's very disclaimer would encourage some (Mica among them) to believe the leak, and he knows that.

TSA has brought the public relations nightmare on itself. I think they worked xtra hard for it. That's why people pile on at every opportunity.

I question just how dangerous something is that can be missed in a pat down. Perhaps in conjunction with other items they become a concern and the chances of missing everything is not likely. I honestly think TSA is over reacting and trying to justify a mission that is nowhere near as dire as TSA claims.

I wish Mica would criticize TSA for something more significant than the blog. Maybe he could criticize TSA about, say, backscatter radiation risks.

And I think that's an unfair assessment of TSA. TSA has shown some willingness to change its procedures, and even its attitude towards its procedures.

• It used to be the case that all liquids were banned in carry-ons. Then, liquids in containers greater than 3.0oz were banned. Eventually, TSA harmonized with international standards on a size limit of 100ml.
• It used to be the case that lighters were banned in carry-ons. Eventually, TSA decided to allow lighters in carry-ons.
• It used to be the case that all knives of any sort were banned in carry-ons. Effective next month, "small" folding knives will be permitted with a blade length of 6cm or less --- and TSA is starting by adopting the international size limit rather than adopting its own limit with imperial units and later converting to the international standard.
• Even the way in which it uses AIT is changing --- TSA appears to be standardizing on the equipment that doesn't emit radiation, and has gotten rid of the private nude-o-scope viewing stations.

That doesn't mean, of course, that everything TSA is doing is wonderful --- or even that these changes address the most significant issues TSA faces. I think we need to give TSA some credit when it does make the right sort of changes; it might encourage them to continue making even more of the right sort of changes.

To be sure, much of TSA's PR problem is self-inflicted. But when we pile on at every opportunity, we show ourselves to be no better than they. TSA can point to the unfairness of the tactics (as it is doing now, complaining about the anonymous complaint of a disgruntled employee) as a distraction from the real issues at hand.

Sorry, but enacting ridiculous unnecessary rules and then relaxing them is not behavior that should be rewarded; it should be condemned.

It's like the mafia getting you into trouble and then bailing you out so that you are beholden to them.

Organized crime at its finest. :(

I would agree to an extent, but(and here is the pink elephant), this is the TSA. The TSA is not an agency that likes to be held accountable and reviewable, at least not to the common public. That would likely reveal what a sham the agency is and be their undoing.

I view the restrictions, and easing of, that you mentioned more akin to a bully taking a smaller kids candy. Except the bully turns around and notices his parents(Congress) watching. So the bully turns back and says, with a wry smile, "Aw shucks, I was just kidding, take your candy. See, I'm a nice guy." Did the bully actually change his way? Or, more likely, is the attitude still there, but just under a thinly veiled cloak to be uncovered when the next opportunity arises?

I know my feeling regarding that question. I think a prime example to lead a conclusion would be regarding your point of the AIT standards changing. That change is not of their own volition, but of a court ruling that would seriously impact them on a much larger scale. Nothing they have done gives me any inclination to trust them, on any matter. Least likely the change to AIT.

All of this to me is like the story of the rabbi and the goat: