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Originally Posted by golfguy714
(Post 20391601)
A machine that "works but breaks often" does not work, period. And if it "breaks often", I suspect that the problem is a fundamental one that won't be solved by a "tweak".
I would disagree that they don't work. I work in the nuke power industry and I have seen them work up close and personal. I have seen the puffers detect shot gun shells in someone's coat pocket. I have also seen security testing the machines after some of my guys calibrated them and they did detect the contraband materials. Now on a large scale, there may be issues, but they do work with several thousand people a day going through them. You will not enter the protected area of any US nuke plant without going through a puffer of some kind. |
This episode once again demonstrates how Newark Airport is the Ground Zero of TSA failures,” a source said. |
Originally Posted by Ysitincoach
(Post 20391705)
The puffer's worked. TSA just chose not to pay to clean or service them. So, it's easier to have radiation emitting cancer boxes and not pay to service those either!
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Originally Posted by Ysitincoach
(Post 20391705)
The puffer's worked. TSA just chose not to pay to clean or service them.
Originally Posted by golfguy714
(Post 20391601)
I would disagree that they don't work. I work in the nuke power industry and I have seen them work up close and personal. ...
Apparently, there is a hidden requirement that TSA didn't state when it contracted for the puffers: that the machines work without "excessive" cleaning or servicing. In that sense, the puffers didn't "work", because they didn't satisfy the hidden requirement. Just because a tool is useful for a task in one context doesn't mean that it's useful for a similar task in a completely different context. Don't get me wrong: TSA is still at fault, for not realizing its own hidden requirement that led them to abandon the zillions of dollars they spent on this. But it's too easy to focus on a piece of technology and ignore the entire system into which that technology is used. |
So, since no one has yet seen fit to ask TSA to rein in costs, why wouldn't TSA consider re-visiting the puffer issue, keeping in mind that like much complicated and expensive technical equipment, it's not unwise to pony up for a maintenance contract.
If the puffers can handle the constant use at the CN tower, they would be adequate for TSA. Maintenance can be done during the off-shift or off-peak times. There are, after all, always back up procedures in place - even the NoS are taken out of service for maintenance, the ETDs fail and have to be serviced, etc. Or is it because L3 and/or Chertoff and company don't have financial interests in the right technology? After all, we kept the BSX going for months only because TSA had promised Congress that the gumby image was coming. Why was there no attempt to re-install the puffers and add maintenance? |
Originally Posted by tev9999
(Post 20383074)
Also possible the media does not know a WTMD from a NOS. Is this terminal at EWR typically WTMD only?
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Blogdad Bob Sets The record Straight About EWR
Of course, he expects us to believe him...
This is like Charlie Brown trying to kick the football that Lucy is holding. Why do I insist on trying to kick it, believing that she won't pull it away at the last second? Some tidbits, best read while completely drunk or on an empty stomach: You might be wondering why our testers run tests that our Officers are prone to fail? It’s because we want to see if our procedures, technology, and policies are or are not working. We also are constantly looking for ways to improve our performance. When a test is failed, we don’t simply check a tick mark in a box and move on. Nor do we take punitive measures as this testing is a learning experience. The results are shared with TSA leadership at the airport and HQ, as well as the officers who were part of the test, noting areas for improvement where warranted. The findings from these covert tests can result in changes to our policies and procedures, or even tweaks to our technology. Also, it’s important to note that this specific covert test was only testing one of the 20 layers of security. It was checking one aspect of the Checkpoint Transportation Security Officer SOP. These other layers include behavior detection officers, travel document checkers, intelligence gathering and analysis, checking passenger manifests against watch lists, random canine team searches, and more security measures both visible and invisible to the public. In a normal setting, all 20 layers would be working in concert; however, all layers cannot be tested in the same way. He also can't resist taking a shot at the ex-clerk with, of course, a personal attack: Since we’re on the topic of Newark, an article with comments from an alleged anonymous former Transportation Security Officer from EWR was posted over the weekend by the New York Post. It’s amazing how much credence a newspaper can give to someone who is not accountable for what he or she says. With that said, much of what this alleged former TSO had to say is just uninformed generalizations painted with a very wide brush. In the past, we have seen former employees who were terminated for wrongdoing quoted in stories like this one. As you might imagine, we think they have a credibility gap. |
we think they have a credibility gap |
He must be flooded with comments about the person who got through security at JFK with a stun gun in his carryon as he was fleeing after raping his former girlfriend. I wonder why those comments aren't showing up.
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Let me ask something.
These 20 layers of security (lol) are in place to check everyone passing through security to catch a plane. A secret test where someone hid an IED must have passed through security as everyone else, right? So he went through the document checker, had an ID and a boarding pass, went through the WTMD, NOS or whatever, got his carryon screened and was let airside to board a plane. How is this any different from any other regular traveler? How was it then not testing all the famous and highly secure layers?? |
Originally Posted by petaluma1
(Post 20417529)
He must be flooded with comments about the person who got through security at JFK with a stun gun in his carryon as he was fleeing after raping his former girlfriend. I wonder why those comments aren't showing up.
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Originally Posted by Alex.at
(Post 20417780)
Let me ask something.
These 20 layers of security (lol) are in place to check everyone passing through security to catch a plane. A secret test where someone hid an IED must have passed through security as everyone else, right? So he went through the document checker, had an ID and a boarding pass, went through the WTMD, NOS or whatever, got his carryon screened and was let airside to board a plane. How is this any different from any other regular traveler? How was it then not testing all the famous and highly secure layers?? |
Originally Posted by chollie
(Post 20418614)
He would have been caught by the random gate check. :rolleyes:
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Originally Posted by Blogdad Bob
It’s amazing how much credence a newspaper can give to someone who is not accountable for what he or she says.
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Originally Posted by petaluma1
(Post 20417529)
He must be flooded with comments about the person who got through security at JFK with a stun gun in his carryon as he was fleeing after raping his former girlfriend. I wonder why those comments aren't showing up.
Bob will just point out that the system worked, the 20th layer caught him as he was boarding. No harm, no foul. |
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