No opinion, just bringing background. Info from publicly viewable web pages show, in general, TSOs must be able to pass a background investigation, an LTSO must be able to maintain eligibility for a security clearance, and an STSO must be able to obtain and maintain a Secret clearance. TSM, DAFSD-S and AFSD-S are usually Secret, while DFSD and FSD are usually Top Secret. All should also include a Compartmentalized designation. Some specific vacated positions might require a higher clearance then normal (for instance, a AFSD-S that requires Top Secret). This isn't to say that someone couldn't have a higher clearance then required (previous job, staging for a promotion, etc), yet that should be the bare minimum.

From what I've been reading, having Secret is a key to a door leading to huge job opportunities in the government sector. Top Secret is even better. And loosing it is being shown the door. So it might explain a lot, in that the implied/inferred threat might be if that someone with Secret shares SSI looses Secret. That's a really powerful tool to possess (as an employer).

Why is criminal history a tangible risk criteria? To be a valid criteria, a positive correlation must exist between criminal history and attempts to take WEI onboard aircraft (note: this is a frequentist's argument). I doubt such a correlation can be demonstrated. The reports I've read are almost all focused on simple forgetfullness by people without a criminal history. Moreover, the attempts by those with criminal histories must be to small for a correlation to be proven.

If no correlation is proven, then the risk-based screening is simply another name for profiling.

Correlation is but one of many issues with "risk based screening". Many of the others are grouped under the heading of uncorrected bias -- the same bias that gets someone added to secret lists.

And that brings up another issue -- to what extent is "risk based screening" driven by one or more secret lists?

After Oklahoma City and Fort Hood, you could make a statistical case that active and retired military are MORE likely to commit acts of terrorism than the population as a whole.

Since the number of people who would attempt to take WEI onboard aircraft is very small, you can't find any proven criteria. So you have to use common sense. If somebody has a criminal history of armed robbery, for example, you know that their morality is such that they're willing to harm others to obtain personal benefit. If you were a terrorist and wanted to pay somebody to bring WEI on an airplane, such a person would be an obvious choice. You don't need any studies to prove that.

And people who bring a weapon on a plane due to forgetfullness aren't a threat. I'm not saying that they should be allowed to bring it, but if they're given a lighter screening that doesn't detect it, no harm has been done. So we needn't try to find anything that correlates with such forgetfullness.

I think everybody here agrees that a path that searches just for objects isn't viable. And few here are in favor of any plan that exempts a group of people from security. It seems clear that the only workable approach is one that tries to assign a "risk" score to individuals and act accordingly. It sounds like that's being proposed. Whether the TSA can pull it off or not is a big question and I, like most here, and skeptical.

But I also think that any such plan depends on using many criteria, not just one or two. Some of those should be positive and some negative. The more known about a person and the more investigations that have been done the lower the risk. So security clearances, CCP permits, NEXUS status, flight rate, FF program status, and long credit histories seem to me to be legitimate positives. Criminal history is certainly a legitimate negative one, but I can't think of another at the moment.

What I think may well doom such a program is that most of the above can only be checked in opt-in situation. And that will likely produce a situation where the infrequent flyer always gets a "higher risk" score. That's going to cause both PR issues and logistical problems at the checkpoint. In my opinion, the challenge of such a program will be avoiding assigning such a score to those people.

There is more to it than that: the guy who was recently caught with a small amount of explosives in his luggage. And at SAT, we had 2 people bring a fake IED into a checkpoint, thinking it would be funny. And many more incidents of current and former military than that doing things at airports they shouldn't...

But as I have said, current military in uniform with proper ID are screened less intrusively.

There will be more to it than that, from what I understand. Was just giving that as one example. I am sure another factor will be to see if you have donated money to particular "special interest" (my guess). It will not be based upon one thing, I do know, but a series of factors.

But you call it what you wish.

While the things above don't actually change the real underlying risk (unless the person with the explosives actually was planning to use them), there's certainly no support for the idea that active duty military are _less_ of a risk of committing acts of terrorism than the average member of the US population. The numbers, of course, are vanishingly small in all cases (which speaks to how vastly we as a country overspend on attempting to reduce tiny risks), but, over the past decade:

Number of active duty military who committed acts of terrorism on US soil: 1
Active duty military: 2.3MM (including the reserves, to be comprehensive of anyone who might be traveling in uniform)

Number of non-active duty military who committed acts of terrorism on US soil: 19
US population ex-active duty military: 305MM.

The incidence of commission of terrorist acts among members of the military is about 7x the non-military incidence.

I'm certainly not saying "we gotta screen those military folks more closely, they're dangerous!" But there's zero reason to assume that they're LESS dangerous than the typical flyer, and hence should be screened LESS thoroughly.

If risk does not equal "common sense", the program is not risk-based. The question then becomes, does common sense equal profiling?

What evidence do you have that armed robbers are inclined to bring WEI on airplanes? None? Frequentists would put the risk at zero. Proabablists would want some evidence to form a probability estimate. Right now all you have is supposition, which doesn't inform risk.

Agree

If the "risk" score is not based on risk, what is it based on? Pre-formed opinions warped by numerios biases?

Many people that did great harm over the years were well-known to the government. Aldrich Ames is one. There are many others. They are all examples of why pre-formed opinions do not support risk estimates.

My sole point is the incongruence between the claim of "risk-based" and the reality.

Correct, but the fact is that in small ways they are screened less thoroughly, regardless of my or your opinion.

Re-read what I wrote. What I said is that somebody who's shown they value money over lives is more likely to agree to be paid to bring something on a plane than somebody who has not shown that. I don't think that's the least bit controvercial.

We're talking probabilities here. Obviously, there are people who have security clearances who've used them for espionage, but that doesn't mean that there's no purpose in doing investigations: they lower the probability that people given classified information will abuse it.

There is a tremendous difference in trying to determine those unlikely to commit acts based on past history than trying to determine those who are likely to commit acts based on history.

It seems that the trusted traveler programs are designed to find those of little risk and then apply normal screening to the rest. It is not to find those likely to commit nefarious acts and only apply screening to them.

I recall some discussion a few years ago about something like this risk-based discussion.

Some bright child decided that TSA could 'rate' pax by a point system. Unfortunately (or fortunately, depending on your point of view), some details got leaked. Don't know if that was why the rating system didn't happen, or maybe they are tracking pax and assigning points but just not using the data right now.

IIRC, a pax got assigned 'points' for things like day-of-flight ticket purchases, cash tickets, one-way tickets, certain destinations...and even for 'special meal' requests. (I believe someone speculated that requesting a 'halal' meal might be...cause for mild concern).

This sort of system is risky anyway, but even more so when put in the hands of an agency like TSA. Unlike a credit report, but like the watch list, there would be no way to verify what information TSA had - and no way to challenge or correct it. I am concerned that TSA's version of risk-based screening will lead to precisely this system.

It can become controversial when TSA treats someone who has committed robbery not as someone 'more likely' to accept cash to bring something on the plane but as someone who will bring something on the plane.

Further, we've already seen problems and abuses with this sort of system on the Canadian border. It is patently absurd to assume that someone who got nicked once 20 years ago is a serious threat worthy of resources, attention and harassment. We're just back to focusing on the drops in an otherwise empty water bottle or screening for 3.5 ounce LGAs instead of real threats and frisking 3-year-old kids or Senator's wives because they have a name 'similar' to a terrorist (maybe) name.

There's every incentive to try to automate a system like this. Capture huge unwieldy amounts of random data and try to draw conclusions from the data. No recourse for the pax, no appeals for someone who has been unjustly put on the list.

I don't have issues with risk-based security, I've worked with it and it can be a good thing.

But given the problems with the watch/no-fly lists (lack of judicial oversight or appeals process or transparency), I shudder to think what a TSA version of 'risk-based security' will look like.

He indicated in a post that he possesses a security clearance and naturally I followed up. I am familiar with the process :)

lol, I am not surprised. Anyway, thanks for your reply.

There is no reason that some animals should be more equal than others. TSA employees, airline employees, FFs, and the occasional flyer should all go through the same screening. X-ray of bags, walk through / hand held metal detector, Explosive Trace Detection / Explosive Trace Portal (as used in places such as nuclear facilities and the CN Tower).


Now come on, all TSA employees have gone through a background check, so why wouldn't your personal data be secure?

Wh:eek::rolleyes:ps!

Ex-TSA worker charged with high-tech sabotage



Now that is scary. :(