gypsyjaney

^

^

Of course there are no perfect solutions but surely that doesn't mean that airlines should not constantly try to improve procedures. A second person in the cockpit means that at least there is someone else who at least has a chance at opening that door and or communicating. BA should have done it long ago.

exilencfc

Personally I think that a two people in the cockpit at all times rule probably would be an improvement on the current situation. Though you still have the risk of somebody attacking their colleague and then downing the aircraft.

However I do wonder if the locked, armoured cockpit doors are actually a good thing. So far as I can see there are more circumstances in which you want people to be able to access the cockpit (malicious action by pilots, medical emergency, fire in cockpit, cockpit window blown out) than there are circumstances in which you want people kept out of the cockpit (attempted hijack, person with serious mental health problems/drunks running about). And post 9/11 I think anyone who is thought to pose a serious threat is going to be jumped on by their fellow passengers/cabin crew before they can do any damage.

Jumbodriver

It doubles the amount of times the flight deck door will be opened.

It makes the timing of that opening utterly predictable to anyone watching the crew. All the US style theatre does is make it patently obvious what is going on.

It also presents a huge opportunity for people with ill intent to join an airline and know that 6 weeks later they will be alone on a locked flight deck with someone who cannot fight back if attacked.

Aviation safety has never improved as a result of knee jerk responses from a hysterical public. It improves because of lengthy consideration by people who know what they are talking about and realise that every change has hidden consequences.

paul4040

One of the recent "solutions" to cockpit access was to ensure that the cockpit door was both bulletproof and inaccessible if the occupant/s of the cockpit wanted to override the access code. That's what facilitated this tragedy, and the Helios 737 crash a few years back.

A further question would be - is it more important that people are safer (from
a mathematical point of view), or just feel safer?

I don't have any solutions and neither does anyone in this thread, nor do I suspect any airlines, to the (extremely rare) problem of genuinely suicidal pilots who want to take everyone down with them. A member of cabin crew sitting in the cockpit for five minutes while a pilot uses the toilet is not going to prevent this sort of appalling murder.

I think it is more important to remain philosophical and realistic than to demand knee jerk changes which are unlikely to prevent the next tragedy.

abfab

If they think something is wrong, all they have to do is open the door and call the other pilot ^

I think their main purpose would be to make sure there is a 2nd person in the cockpit who can open the door.

SaraJH

+1

710 77345

Let's hope the second person remembers that's their role, and doesn't attack the pilot with the axe whilst their back is turned.

Jagboi

You mean this one?: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helios_Airways_Flight_522

Cockpit access doesn't appear to have been a factor in that crash.

gypsyjaney

There has been a lot of talk about 'knee jerk reaction'. In fact I am just amazed and disappointed to learn that the 'two person' rule is not already the norm.

Jumbodriver

Yes, but, the people cautioning against a knee jerk response are often people in the industry who have been thinking out this and other scenarios like this for longer than the last 12 hrs.

I can see the argument, but, I strongly believe the risks introduced outweigh the rewards. As do the vast majority of my colleagues.

SaraJH

Risk management is very difficult. The only solution to mitigate all risk is to stop flying.

The powers that be need to carefully analyse all risk and take appropriate measures to mitigate against that risk.

I'm no risk analyst but IMO always having 2 responsible persons (defined by the primary roles that they are employed to undertake) seems sensible to me.

I apologise for overuse of the word risk

paul4040

Cockpit access isn't mentioned on the Wikipedia site. The cabin crew noticed oxygen masks dangling in the cabin but were unable to access the cockpit to warn the flight crew (who suffered from the effects of hypoxia). Reading the official accident report will shed more light.

Further incidents of cockpit access in this article: http://m.smh.com.au/world/germanwing...26-1m8o5b.html

SaraJH

What risks are these please Jumbodriver? As a non pilot I'd be interested in your views.

Jumbodriver

See my post a few up.

A pilot determined to do harm will do harm, cabin crew minder or no. They shouldn't be there in the first place. That's what needs to be changed.

Apart from what I've said above, the subconscious message to every pilot and every cabin crew member in every airline will be 'we don't trust our pilots'. That is going to be catastrophic for long term aviation safety.

I'd like to see all of us, pilots and cabin crew recieve some training on spotting signs of mental torment.

At some point, though, if you're ever going to leave home, you have to trust your doctor, the armed policeman, the train driver, and your pilot.

Globaliser

AIUI, the last person known to have been conscious on that flight was a cabin crew member, who had sustained his consciousness by using portable oxygen bottles. He eventually got onto the flight deck when the door unlocked, possibly when the engines started flaming out and there were power interruptions. It's reasonable to suppose that he'd been unsuccessfully trying to get in before, because he had undergone some flying training (although I can't immediately remember whether he was a qualified pilot). By the time he got in and got seated in one of the flight deck seats, it was too late for him to do anything useful.