AA 300 (N114NN) hits sign on / about takeoff from JFK and returns (10 Apr 2019)
Jul 23, 2022, 4:54 pm
#77
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On Jun 14th 2022 the NTSB released their investigation docket, no updates on the preliminary report however. In the docket the operational factors/human performance group report states:
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The captain reported that at some point the FO stated that the flight should return to the JFK. Having not considered that at the time the captain determined after conducting a selfassessment that he may not be fit for duty following the experience and commanded the FO to get a vector back to JFK.
Once the flight received an initial heading back to JFK the captain transferred control of the airplane to the FO and then the captain coordinated with the company and informed the flight attendants of the return. One of the flight attendants informed the captain that a passenger informed them of what appeared to be a “dent” in the wing. The captain then made an announcement to the passengers that they were returning to the airport.
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The large left roll angle immediately after liftoff resulted in the left wingtip striking the ground and a runway distance marker, part of which remained imbedded in the wingtip. Airbus engineering simulations performed as part of this investigation demonstrated that the several seconds of near-maximum left rudder generated a rolling moment after the gear had left the ground to impart the left roll rate that the DFDR recorded. No airplane flight control abnormalities were noted, except for a left aileron deflection as the left wingtip scraped the ground. Thus, the left roll that occurred was in response to the captain’s left rudder pedal input during rotation of the airplane. Also, Airbus’ engineering simulations demonstrated that the airplane’s deviation to the left while on the ground was in response to the captain’s rudder pedal input; no abnormalities in the airplane’s response were noted.
In addition, American Airlines conducted a study of 13 months of takeoffs and found that the accident flight had a larger heading change, roll angle, maximum commanded rudder, and duration of maximum commanded rudder than the other takeoffs in the data set. Even though the crosswind that was occurring during the accident takeoff was about one-half of the company’s 35-knot crosswind limitation, the accident airplane had a greater maximum deflection and a greater duration of input compared with all the other flights in the data set, including several flights with takeoffs that occurred with a stronger crosswind than the crosswind during the accident flight. Thus, the accident captain’s left rudder pedal input was excessive and not necessary for the crosswind that was present during the takeoff.
***
The captain reported that at some point the FO stated that the flight should return to the JFK. Having not considered that at the time the captain determined after conducting a selfassessment that he may not be fit for duty following the experience and commanded the FO to get a vector back to JFK.
Once the flight received an initial heading back to JFK the captain transferred control of the airplane to the FO and then the captain coordinated with the company and informed the flight attendants of the return. One of the flight attendants informed the captain that a passenger informed them of what appeared to be a “dent” in the wing. The captain then made an announcement to the passengers that they were returning to the airport.
***
The large left roll angle immediately after liftoff resulted in the left wingtip striking the ground and a runway distance marker, part of which remained imbedded in the wingtip. Airbus engineering simulations performed as part of this investigation demonstrated that the several seconds of near-maximum left rudder generated a rolling moment after the gear had left the ground to impart the left roll rate that the DFDR recorded. No airplane flight control abnormalities were noted, except for a left aileron deflection as the left wingtip scraped the ground. Thus, the left roll that occurred was in response to the captain’s left rudder pedal input during rotation of the airplane. Also, Airbus’ engineering simulations demonstrated that the airplane’s deviation to the left while on the ground was in response to the captain’s rudder pedal input; no abnormalities in the airplane’s response were noted.
In addition, American Airlines conducted a study of 13 months of takeoffs and found that the accident flight had a larger heading change, roll angle, maximum commanded rudder, and duration of maximum commanded rudder than the other takeoffs in the data set. Even though the crosswind that was occurring during the accident takeoff was about one-half of the company’s 35-knot crosswind limitation, the accident airplane had a greater maximum deflection and a greater duration of input compared with all the other flights in the data set, including several flights with takeoffs that occurred with a stronger crosswind than the crosswind during the accident flight. Thus, the accident captain’s left rudder pedal input was excessive and not necessary for the crosswind that was present during the takeoff.
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Jul 26, 2022, 11:16 am
#78
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Cranky Flier has a good write-up of the NTSB report on this incident. It's a doozy; reads like some really poor airmanship by the captain. The wing dug into the runway for 300 feet because the captain applied so much rudder that he caused the wing to tilt.
Both pilots are still flying for AA.
Both pilots are still flying for AA.
Jul 26, 2022, 11:32 am
#79
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More coverage at https://onemileatatime.com/news/amer...crashed-plane/
Another amazing and terrifying aspect of this is how little the Captain understood his aircraft. He feared flying it in any crosswind, and used maximum control deflections often. If a pilot cannot fly their aircraft using the controls correctly, is not confident flying it in all circumstances within the performance envelope, and does not understand how to operate it they should not be flying.
Also what is it with AA crew and their tendency to flap the rudder around until it falls off or they crash the aircraft? Only by luck did this aircraft not crash killing all on board.
Another amazing and terrifying aspect of this is how little the Captain understood his aircraft. He feared flying it in any crosswind, and used maximum control deflections often. If a pilot cannot fly their aircraft using the controls correctly, is not confident flying it in all circumstances within the performance envelope, and does not understand how to operate it they should not be flying.
Also what is it with AA crew and their tendency to flap the rudder around until it falls off or they crash the aircraft? Only by luck did this aircraft not crash killing all on board.
