Exclusive: SFO near miss might have triggered ‘greatest aviation disaster in history’
#586
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There are some strong opinions expressed here by people with almost zero aviation knowledge.
As for those suggesting that Air Canada management were complicit in this "CVRgate" cover-up, explain how AC, back at head office, would even know about the occurrence. The FAA didn't figure out that the occurrence was something worthy of investigation until two days later, on Sunday, when it reported it to the NTSB.
#587
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CVR or not, the crew amnesia says it all. They will not get a free pass on this though I suspect. Captain exploring early retirement I am sure.
#588
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Air Canada operations knows about every go-around and the reason for it. There is no way that management wouldn't know about this near record-breaking catastrophe unless the pilots lied about what happened. If they did lie about what happened, then that's not any better.
#589
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If the CVR is fuse-protected then the fuse is almost certainly located within the CVR unit which is located in the tail section of the aircraft. There is, however, a breaker for the CVR in the cockpit. But there's absolutely no way the go-around procedure would call for pulling that breaker. So during the 20-30 minutes after the go-around, what procedure would those pilots be following for which a checklist item specifies "pull the CVR breaker"? I would bet with almost 100% certainty that there is none. During a busy and stressful phase of a flight with a potential low-fuel situation developing, the last thing pilots should be doing is further compromising the safety of the flight by hunting through a manual in a dark cockpit, with a flashlight, trying to figure out how to disable some non-critical system.
There are some strong opinions expressed here by people with almost zero aviation knowledge.
As for those suggesting that Air Canada management were complicit in this "CVRgate" cover-up, explain how AC, back at head office, would even know about the occurrence. The FAA didn't figure out that the occurrence was something worthy of investigation until two days later, on Sunday, when it reported it to the NTSB.
There are some strong opinions expressed here by people with almost zero aviation knowledge.
As for those suggesting that Air Canada management were complicit in this "CVRgate" cover-up, explain how AC, back at head office, would even know about the occurrence. The FAA didn't figure out that the occurrence was something worthy of investigation until two days later, on Sunday, when it reported it to the NTSB.
I will re-word and stand by my statement that that possibility (CVR being overwritten, pulling breakers, etc.) should be taken out of the pilots hands completely so that there is not even a hint of ambiguity. With everything else about this incident, it just looks bad.
The technology exists already as previously posted.
#590
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If the CVR is fuse-protected then the fuse is almost certainly located within the CVR unit which is located in the tail section of the aircraft. There is, however, a breaker for the CVR in the cockpit. But there's absolutely no way the go-around procedure would call for pulling that breaker. So during the 20-30 minutes after the go-around, what procedure would those pilots be following for which a checklist item specifies "pull the CVR breaker"? I would bet with almost 100% certainty that there is none. During a busy and stressful phase of a flight with a potential low-fuel situation developing, the last thing pilots should be doing is further compromising the safety of the flight by hunting through a manual in a dark cockpit, with a flashlight, trying to figure out how to disable some non-critical system.
There are some strong opinions expressed here by people with almost zero aviation knowledge.
As for those suggesting that Air Canada management were complicit in this "CVRgate" cover-up, explain how AC, back at head office, would even know about the occurrence. The FAA didn't figure out that the occurrence was something worthy of investigation until two days later, on Sunday, when it reported it to the NTSB.
There are some strong opinions expressed here by people with almost zero aviation knowledge.
As for those suggesting that Air Canada management were complicit in this "CVRgate" cover-up, explain how AC, back at head office, would even know about the occurrence. The FAA didn't figure out that the occurrence was something worthy of investigation until two days later, on Sunday, when it reported it to the NTSB.
The problem is that it only records 30 minutes. By far, the easiest solution to this, would be to make that 30 days or something else huge.
It's not inconceivable that a mistake at take-off could affect the flight 12 hours later, so there are many benefits to extending this. Just legislate that the CVR is government property and may only be pulled for a serious incident, and you avoid the airline listening to it.
Air Canada operations knows about every go-around and the reason for it. There is no way that management wouldn't know about this near record-breaking catastrophe unless the pilots lied about what happened. If they did lie about what happened, then that's not any better.
And I doubt they knew the go-around was worthy of preserving the CVR in that time.
I understand closing ranks (almost like dealing with cops) but it contrasts with your previous incredulousness at how an incident like this could even happen.
I will re-word and stand by my statement that that possibility (CVR being overwritten, pulling breakers, etc.) should be taken out of the pilots hands completely so that there is not even a hint of ambiguity. With everything else about this incident, it just looks bad.
The technology exists already as previously posted.
I will re-word and stand by my statement that that possibility (CVR being overwritten, pulling breakers, etc.) should be taken out of the pilots hands completely so that there is not even a hint of ambiguity. With everything else about this incident, it just looks bad.
The technology exists already as previously posted.
#591
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Air Canada operations knows about every go-around and the reason for it. There is no way that management wouldn't know about this near record-breaking catastrophe unless the pilots lied about what happened. If they did lie about what happened, then that's not any better.
#592
Join Date: Mar 2001
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That's rich.
Bolding mine. Can you please provide supporting evidence for this?
While I agree completely that the 30-min limit is terrible idea, I don't let AC off the hook here either. Even if we only got the last 5 minutes of the approach on tape, that would have still been very useful. Air Canada knowingly allowed the tapes to be overwritten, in violation of the law, and that should not be understated, in my opinion.
#593
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Another question is: what is the effect of pulling the breaker? I talked to an A320 pilot this morning who told me there is, in fact, a CVR breaker in the cockpit. I asked what effect pulling it would have. The answer I got was "Hmm, I don't know." Possibly pulling the breaker will cause all data to be lost (??)
Apparently the manual doesn't provide much information about the CVR.
But I'd be much less concerned about stupid CVR limitations than I would about airlines operating 1980s technology passenger airliners that allow a pilot to line up with and almost land on a taxiway.
#594
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I share your skepticism here. Air Canada operates quite a large fleet of aircraft and if all go-arounds had to be documented and reviewed by management, then Air Canada needs to hire many more managers.
#595
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However, the ones that challenge Tenerife for the worst aviation disaster in the history of the world. I suspect those ones get some attention
I agree. If the plane had a regularly scheduled immediate turn, I would be far more forgiving. In the heat of the moment and in the middle of the night, I can understand that the CVR might have been overlooked. But that's simply not the case. It sat for many hours and didn't fly until lunch time the next day (at AC HQ). That is plenty of time for someone in management to pick up the phone and say "let's play it safe, keep that aircraft on the ground or protect the CVR data"
#596
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#597
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#598
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Yes, I suppose they all do, one way or another. I meant completed the landing on taxiway C. My point is that, by initiating the GA, they did not challenge anything for the worst aviation disaster in the history of the world. They did, however, come very close to it.
#599
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Yer missin' my (tacit) point; if your aircraft doesn't descend "gently" onto level terrain and gradually come to an undamaged stop to a pre-set location, the word generally used is "crash"