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Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet

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Old Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
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Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html

Cabin photos

Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html

Cabin Layout

Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html







- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.

Routes

The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:

YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
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Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet

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Old Mar 15, 2019, 10:14 am
  #2071  
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Originally Posted by pitz
A relaxed stability aircraft, when put into a roll, will not stabilize itself without an opposite input. A naturally stable aircraft, if you let go of the yoke, will naturally right itself coming out of a roll.

Next time you're on the A320, watch the ailerons sometime. When they come out of a roll, the ailerons on a given side deflect in an opposite direction to level the plane. A naturally stable plane doesn't require anything but a return to a neutral aileron position to level the airplane. They need at least a partial opposite deflection of the controls.
Except, as far as I can tell the 320 is not a "relaxed stability" airplane. It does have stability augmentation stuff active when not in direct mode.
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 10:20 am
  #2072  
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Originally Posted by Stranger
....Risks have dropped rapidly over the years, but to me the Max and the MCAS gimmick (perhaps not driven so much by cost-cutting as by marketing) look like they likely set us back by twenty years or so. So yes twenty years ago the Max would have been "safe," but today?
Assume you also read this from the pilot database, reported in the Dallas newspaper, on PPRuNe and elsewhere

“Ever since the Lion Air crash, 737 MAX 8 pilots have been expressing outrage that Boeing did not properly inform them of MCAS, particularly the possibility that the program could wrench control of an aircraft from human hands. “We had NO idea that this MCAS even existed,” one anonymous American Airlines pilot posted to an online forum “I’ve been flying the MAX-8 a couple times per month for almost a year now, and I’m sitting here thinking, what the hell else don’t I know about this thing?” An aircraft incident reporting database maintained by NASA is filled with multiple reports from MAX 8 pilots of the aircraft aggressively pitching forward soon after takeoff.”

“In another, a pilot called the MAX 8’s flight manual “almost criminally insufficient” and complained that Boeing had left pilots in the dark about the extent of the MAX 8’s automation. “The fact that this airplane requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag,” read the report.”

EDIT to add:
@Stranger

Additional links here

https://www.pprune.org/10419636-post1511.html

https://www.pprune.org/10419640-post1512.html

Last edited by 24left; Mar 15, 2019 at 10:27 am
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 10:24 am
  #2073  
 
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Originally Posted by Garbageman
To add to the list of other storage locations, there are two ferry flights currently heading from YYZ to YRQ (Trois Rivieres)
YRQ and YQG are both locations for AAR an MRO provider for AC. Any chance they actually could be doing wifi installations?

3 of the aircraft in YQG were scheduled to get wifi in March according to the wiki. There are also a few more flights scheduled to YRQ today.

Edit: FINs 518 and 521 are headed to YRQ, but they already have wifi installed.
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 10:28 am
  #2074  
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Originally Posted by 24left
Assume you also read this from the pilot database, reported in the Dallas newspaper, on PPRuNe and elsewhere

“Ever since the Lion Air crash, 737 MAX 8 pilots have been expressing outrage that Boeing did not properly inform them of MCAS, particularly the possibility that the program could wrench control of an aircraft from human hands. “We had NO idea that this MCAS even existed,” one anonymous American Airlines pilot posted to an online forum “I’ve been flying the MAX-8 a couple times per month for almost a year now, and I’m sitting here thinking, what the hell else don’t I know about this thing?” An aircraft incident reporting database maintained by NASA is filled with multiple reports from MAX 8 pilots of the aircraft aggressively pitching forward soon after takeoff.”

“In another, a pilot called the MAX 8’s flight manual “almost criminally insufficient” and complained that Boeing had left pilots in the dark about the extent of the MAX 8’s automation. “The fact that this airplane requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag,” read the report.”
While I had not read this, and I don't disagree, I am perhaps trying to go further. Apart from the editorial comment, the above can be read as mainly a complaint about the lack of information, not so much about the need for the MCAS. The borderline criminal lack of information would seem to have been driven by marketing, which advertised that transition from older 7373s to the Max was trivial. Of course, similarly, a redesigned horizontal stabilizer not only might have been more costly but would also potentially have affected the marketing pitch. But where were the engineers? (And yes I am one.)
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 10:52 am
  #2075  
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A fascinating read for those interested in this from the Air Line Pilots Association magazine

Taking the B-737 to the Max

ALPA Gets an Inside Look at the Newest Member of the Boeing Family


By F/O Bryan Lesko (United), ALPA Air Safety Organization Aircraft Design/Operations Group Chair

Magazine - ALPA
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 10:55 am
  #2076  
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delete

Last edited by skybluesea; Dec 24, 2020 at 12:38 pm
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 11:27 am
  #2077  
 
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Originally Posted by skybluesea
2. Might you agree then that the probability matrix changes over time with changes in information? So before ET, the “potential “ design flaw had only the JT reference tragedy, and despite multiple outspoken voices, regulators assessed the probability of a future event was determined to be sufficiently low that meant regulators did exactly the opposite of your most useful proof - and the French lab with the a/c recorders will tell us soon which probability was right.

No quarrel here. As I said above, probabilities are ultimately subjective, and, I would add, humans are terrible at assessing probabilities. However, an attitude of wait and see after a single accident but take a more cautious approach after a second one, even before the similarities are known, is not inconsistent or irrational.

Originally Posted by skybluesea
ps...do we need another data point to determine whether 77 should be grounded to given MH 370 mystery - might same mistake be made or was this loss just one off ?
I don't follow. While the wreckage was never found, there is substantial evidence pointing to a rogue pilot in the case of MH370 (flight simulator exactly replicating the abnormal flight path found on his personal computer, etc). In fact, there is plenty of evidence that the plane flew under perfectly safe conditions for many hours after comms were deactivated (satellite tracking data, wreckage washing up in East Africa, etc.) Why would you suspect the aircraft type is to blame? If anything, you may argue for a grounding of MH pilots, better screening, a review of training practices, etc. I am also pretty sure many people have made their own probability assessments and have decided not to fly MH as a result of flight 370.
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 12:02 pm
  #2078  
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Originally Posted by skybluesea


@Mauricio23
ps...do we need another data point to determine whether 77 should be grounded to given MH 370 mystery - might same mistake be made or was this loss just one off ?
You keep raising the 777 example but you conveniently ignore the fact that thousands of 777 has been flying safely for over 15 years prior to MH 370 unlike the 737 Max (No you cannot include 737 NG as history due to the significant modifications from prior models).
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 1:17 pm
  #2079  
 
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Originally Posted by ChrisA330
YRQ and YQG are both locations for AAR an MRO provider for AC. Any chance they actually could be doing wifi installations?

3 of the aircraft in YQG were scheduled to get wifi in March according to the wiki. There are also a few more flights scheduled to YRQ today.

Edit: FINs 518 and 521 are headed to YRQ, but they already have wifi installed.

C-GEHI (fin 519) also now on its way to YRQ (from YUL); not sure if it already has wifi.
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 2:28 pm
  #2080  
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Excellent column today in Leeham News

https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/15/bj...sh/#more-29660


QUOTES:

"The Seattle Times today wrote the horizontal stabilizer trim system, a jackscrew which pushes the horizontal stabilizer up or down, has been found at the crash site. Apparently, it was in the full nose down position. This should point to this being another MCAS accident, with the aircraft’s powerful pitch trim going to full nose down position."

......"There will be a lot of debate around the implementation of the MCAS function for the 737 MAX. With the fix, Boeing and FAA now show what was wrong with the implementation in the first place."
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 5:49 pm
  #2081  
 
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Originally Posted by 24left
Excellent column today in Leeham News

https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/15/bj...sh/#more-29660


QUOTES:

"The Seattle Times today wrote the horizontal stabilizer trim system, a jackscrew which pushes the horizontal stabilizer up or down, has been found at the crash site. Apparently, it was in the full nose down position. This should point to this being another MCAS accident, with the aircraft’s powerful pitch trim going to full nose down position."

......"There will be a lot of debate around the implementation of the MCAS function for the 737 MAX. With the fix, Boeing and FAA now show what was wrong with the implementation in the first place."
And be sure to read the comments that followed the article - some really interesting input from some seemingly qualified and knowledgeable folk....
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 6:19 pm
  #2082  
 
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Originally Posted by 24left
Excellent column today in Leeham News

https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/15/bj...sh/#more-29660
This statement from Boeing regarding the software update is quite shocking:

“For the past several months and in the aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already safe aircraft even safer. This includes updates to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law, pilot displays, operation manuals and crew training. The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority”

That none of those features was included in the original MCAS implementation is quite damning, especially if all it takes is a code rewrite. What on earth happened to redundancies and failure protections?
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 6:26 pm
  #2083  
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Originally Posted by Mauricio23

This statement from Boeing regarding the software update is quite shocking:

“For the past several months and in the aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already safe aircraft even safer. This includes updates to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law, pilot displays, operation manuals and crew training. The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority”

That none of those features was included in the original MCAS implementation is quite damning, especially if all it takes is a code rewrite. What on earth happened to redundancies and failure protections?
Might be too little too late however. This time around the FAA may feel the need to redeem itself, and some other certification authorities might not go along (as they are supposed to) if they are not satisfied. Boeing too at this point has a major credibility issue. So again potentially too little too late? Can Muilenberg survive this, who else can they offer as scapegoats? Trust is hard to win but easy to lose, how many scapegoats will they need to offer to the gods, plus putting up a good show as to what had been wrong with them and why it won't be the same again?
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 6:32 pm
  #2084  
 
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Originally Posted by Mauricio23
That none of those features was included in the original MCAS implementation is quite damning, especially if all it takes is a code rewrite. What on earth happened to redundancies and failure protections?
The fact that they're not putting a hardware solution on the table, ie: increased redundancy of the sensors, and are still stubbornly sticking to a "we can just fix this all in software, unintended consequences be damned" is equally problematic.

If this specific part of the 737Max implementation was obviously half-baked and botched, what else in the plane isn't up to snuff?
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Old Mar 15, 2019, 8:50 pm
  #2085  
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Originally Posted by Mauricio23
a) The MAX fleet was 17.5 larger than Concorde's - 350 units vs. 20. In order to obtain unbiased statistics with acceptable confidence intervals, that's more than enough, just like a poll of 1,000 people out of a population of several million is enough to make certain business decisions.
If you're using the same statistic used to measure a binary decision of a human population to determine the MTBF of a machine or compare the safety profile of two competing machines then you're doing it wrong.

tl;dr You're doing it wrong.
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