Originally Posted by
law dawg
I think it's a problem of execution rather than principle. I'd rather have security people, in principle, be looking for the weapon wielder rather than the weapon. Lots of things can be used as weapons, but all of them require a wielder. Security people in general should be looking for him/her.
Agree, with the caveat that in this context, good resource management demands recognition that the percentage in location of actual "wielders" is drastically lower than, for example, muggers in bad neighborhoods, or people bypassing border crossings in certain rural areas.
Originally Posted by
law dawg
Whether the TSA should be doing this is as is certainly cause for debate and discussion.
Okay,
law dawg, I'll take the bait.
Since 9/11™ many thousands of muggers and illegal border crossers have been correctly identified and prosecuted. Money spent training, employing and equipping city cops, or Border Patrol, produces measurable
and positive ROI. For air hijacking, millions spent have produced a number in the low single digits. Richard Reid, the most dangerous example, was ID'd and controlled by FAs and pax. FAMs, if present, would not have changed initial contact by much. ROI may not be zero, but when damage to the air travel industry, the businesses that use it, and public confidence in government agencies are factored in, it goes steeply negative.
Granted Richard Reid is a gimme example; other events might prove out differently. Except there haven't been any. The tactics used on 9/11 became obsolete that same day. Flight 93 had a tragic outcome but, by its perpetrators' standard, was a failure. Now, cockpit doors are reinforced. Passengers may yet be intimidated by coercion or force, but will nevertheless resist, not passively cooperate. The 2006 liquids plot was indeed a plan, just not a
feasible plan. The Glasgow attempt used better-educated actors to achieve a cruder result, and still failed.
Also, the shock value of the initial operation is used up. Why spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to get operatives and weapons onto an aircraft, when a suicide bomber with a device costing under a hundred could be sent into a slow, crowded checkpoint where everyone waits to have their laptops booted and swabbed?
TSA, as constituted, is the Maginot Line of transportation security. They spend an enormous amount of effort and treasure to defend against an event, and techniques, that will never occur again, while ignoring weaknesses that might be usefully addressed. The main difference is that the Maginot Line did not seriously compromise the rights of the citizens whose taxes paid for it.