Is United sacrificing safety to cut costs?
#33
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: SYD; Central Coast, NSW
Programs: UA, 1K 2MM
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The segment of the article I was able to read commented on the "rocky" operations and massive increase in customer complaints since the merger with reference to more recent and serious issues relating to flight emergencies. To me all symptomatic of the pervasive rot that has beset UNITED which started with the appointment of the CO CEO and the crippling impact of SHARES on operations.
#34
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: SFO South Bay
Programs: UA 2MM
Posts: 3,052
Safety Issue?: no...... increased delays?: Yes!
The real issue here is delays, not safety. I am in no way concerned about the safety of UA fleet. BUT I think the combination of delayed maintenance (shame on UA) and disgruntled UA workers (again, shame on UA - not the workers) will cause many more delays in the next few months.
We are in for 6 months of terrible on time performance!!!
We are in for 6 months of terrible on time performance!!!
#35
#36
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Location: LAX/BOS/HKG/AMS/SFO...hmm, I need a life.
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Totally agree. I do think that the "heat" from the press in general is a very good thing. The one thing that will help put CS to the top of the "to do" list it is a bunch of sustained really bad press.
#37
Join Date: Jun 2005
Posts: 4,645
I posted this same question here a few months ago.
If every observable aspect of this airline has been cut and trashed in a short-sighted attempt to save money and goose up near term profit numbers at the expense of long term viability, it is reasonable to ask if the same cuts are being made to safety and maintenance.
And, we know from posts in the interim that there has been a reported increase in deferred maintenance, which is considered to be the main reason for such a huge jump in MX cancels.
What does this tell us about the culture and priorities?
It is naive to suggest that we're all safe just because we trust the pilots. History is littered with graveyards of passengers, pilots, and crew who are now dead due to crashes that can be attributed to management incompetence that cut safety margins in the name of greed and resulted in otherwise avoidable fatalities.
Yes, we have the FAA, and we trust them, and I'm sure they're great, but they can't check everything and be everywhere.
And, yes, UA has great pilots, and those pilots surely won't fly a plane if they believe it's unsafe. But, not every unsafe condition can be observed by a pilot during pre-flight checks. The pilots also have to trust that the overall maintenance and safety systems are also functioning properly.
A perfect case study of all the above is AK 261. It happened then, it can happen again.
I truly hope we don't have to repeat that scenario. I know it's important for $mi$ek to get his bonus, but some costs are too high.
If every observable aspect of this airline has been cut and trashed in a short-sighted attempt to save money and goose up near term profit numbers at the expense of long term viability, it is reasonable to ask if the same cuts are being made to safety and maintenance.
And, we know from posts in the interim that there has been a reported increase in deferred maintenance, which is considered to be the main reason for such a huge jump in MX cancels.
What does this tell us about the culture and priorities?
It is naive to suggest that we're all safe just because we trust the pilots. History is littered with graveyards of passengers, pilots, and crew who are now dead due to crashes that can be attributed to management incompetence that cut safety margins in the name of greed and resulted in otherwise avoidable fatalities.
Yes, we have the FAA, and we trust them, and I'm sure they're great, but they can't check everything and be everywhere.
And, yes, UA has great pilots, and those pilots surely won't fly a plane if they believe it's unsafe. But, not every unsafe condition can be observed by a pilot during pre-flight checks. The pilots also have to trust that the overall maintenance and safety systems are also functioning properly.
A perfect case study of all the above is AK 261. It happened then, it can happen again.
I truly hope we don't have to repeat that scenario. I know it's important for $mi$ek to get his bonus, but some costs are too high.
Last edited by FlyWorld; Aug 21, 2012 at 8:54 am
#38
Join Date: Nov 2011
Posts: 133
And on the training side, the CO management team has been reducing the full-motion simulator time for the UA pilots and replacing that time with stationary sims.
While they've secured the necessary approvals for this, and all is officially legal, it just common sense that a full-motion sim is a more realistic training environment than a stationary one. They're the biggest airline in the world, why would they want to skimp on training to use a cheaper method?
While they've secured the necessary approvals for this, and all is officially legal, it just common sense that a full-motion sim is a more realistic training environment than a stationary one. They're the biggest airline in the world, why would they want to skimp on training to use a cheaper method?
#39
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Join Date: May 2001
Posts: 10,982
Here is the scary thing...if anything bad happens, UA will probably blame it on the contractor like CO blamed Colgan and washed their hands.
IF the statistical trend point to maintenance issues, then there is one. Does it?
All the miles and statuses are meaningless if we have to fly an unsafe airline to achieve/enjoy them.
IF the statistical trend point to maintenance issues, then there is one. Does it?
All the miles and statuses are meaningless if we have to fly an unsafe airline to achieve/enjoy them.
#40
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: Southern California, GVA, SIN, LHR, BRU, CDG
Programs: UA LT GS 4.12MM (4.08MM BIS), AA EXP 1.86MM ,DL DM 1.1MM, HH LT Diamond, SPG Platinum
Posts: 1,182
I dunno. I am personally concerned about UA's safety practices now more than ever.
Not only did we have the three (3) incidents this weekend, we had the overweight 737 a month ago with the incorrect numbers at take-off.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, if a GA has to punch in obscene strings of keystrokes to reissue a ticket, how bad are the other systems in use to track maintenance and other safety-related items and data? And do their difficulty or lack of usability contribute to a suboptimal environment for maintaining data?
And on the training side, the CO management team has been reducing the full-motion simulator time for the UA pilots and replacing that time with stationary sims.
While they've secured the necessary approvals for this, and all is officially legal, it just common sense that a full-motion sim is a more realistic training environment than a stationary one. They're the biggest airline in the world, why would they want to skimp on training to use a cheaper method?
Remember also that CO was the airline where the FAA was investigating them regarding fuel stops and raised a concern that CO was putting pressure on pilots to reduce fuel stops:
"In an October 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines stated that there continued to be an opportunity to reduce unwarranted crew-initiated fuel additions. This bulletin further stated that adding fuel indiscriminately without critical thinking ultimately reduces profit sharing and possibly pension funding.
We were concerned that these types of bulletins might put pressure on pilots to either not stop for fuel when needed or to carry insufficient amounts of fuel."
Full report: http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/fil...memo_FINAL.pdf
And they're also the airline that published a 50% higher crosswinds rating for their winglet 737-500 take-offs than the winglet manufacturer allowed: http://www.denverpost.com/travel/ci_12864130
Who knows if that was a contributor to the CO1404 fireball in DEN.
Combine the CO influence with what many of us have witnessed with CO's culture -- the perceived infallibility, the inability to admit a mistake, little tolerance for questioning, etc. -- and it's also a potential cultural landmine that is shockingly similar to what got Toyota into so much trouble.
So to the OP's question, I think there's certainly potential for this management team to undermine safety for money. Of course I hope it's not happening.
Not only did we have the three (3) incidents this weekend, we had the overweight 737 a month ago with the incorrect numbers at take-off.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, if a GA has to punch in obscene strings of keystrokes to reissue a ticket, how bad are the other systems in use to track maintenance and other safety-related items and data? And do their difficulty or lack of usability contribute to a suboptimal environment for maintaining data?
And on the training side, the CO management team has been reducing the full-motion simulator time for the UA pilots and replacing that time with stationary sims.
While they've secured the necessary approvals for this, and all is officially legal, it just common sense that a full-motion sim is a more realistic training environment than a stationary one. They're the biggest airline in the world, why would they want to skimp on training to use a cheaper method?
Remember also that CO was the airline where the FAA was investigating them regarding fuel stops and raised a concern that CO was putting pressure on pilots to reduce fuel stops:
"In an October 2007 bulletin, Continental Airlines stated that there continued to be an opportunity to reduce unwarranted crew-initiated fuel additions. This bulletin further stated that adding fuel indiscriminately without critical thinking ultimately reduces profit sharing and possibly pension funding.
We were concerned that these types of bulletins might put pressure on pilots to either not stop for fuel when needed or to carry insufficient amounts of fuel."
Full report: http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/fil...memo_FINAL.pdf
And they're also the airline that published a 50% higher crosswinds rating for their winglet 737-500 take-offs than the winglet manufacturer allowed: http://www.denverpost.com/travel/ci_12864130
Who knows if that was a contributor to the CO1404 fireball in DEN.
Combine the CO influence with what many of us have witnessed with CO's culture -- the perceived infallibility, the inability to admit a mistake, little tolerance for questioning, etc. -- and it's also a potential cultural landmine that is shockingly similar to what got Toyota into so much trouble.
So to the OP's question, I think there's certainly potential for this management team to undermine safety for money. Of course I hope it's not happening.
It is a shame that the "world's largest airline" has chosen not to be the safest
#41
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Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: DCA
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Posts: 1,653
For all the poster who believe that the airline isn't safe, or warn people they should feel uneasy flying United, or predict that aircraft may start falling out of the sky - Do you still fly United?
#42
Join Date: Nov 2009
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It's just math! If 1 in ever 100, or 1000, or 10,000...... flights has a problem or needs to return to the departure airport UA will be involved more often than any other airline.
#43
Join Date: May 2001
Location: Portland, OR, USA
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I don't think UA is unsafe and yes, at the moment I am still flying them. However, safety is a complex function of a lot of things which include sytems and culture. I am concerned that there is evidence that UA is not able to manage its systems reliably - that is troubling because if they can't manage the systems we can see there is at least some reason to believe that they may not be able to manage the systems we can't see any better. As to culture, it has been proven many times in many places over the years that one of the biggest issues for safety is a culture of open communications and listening to "outlier" opinions. Again, the only thing we have from outside looking in is what we can see and what we can see is a management that seems to have a tin ear on issues that they don't want to address. Does this tin ear extend to internal processes that could impact safety - no evidence but again troubling. I have absolute confidence in the pilots and staff at UA - that is in no question. Besides - pilots arrive at accidents before anyone else and so have ultimate motivation for safe operations. But in the larger context safety is the product of the entire operation and management and there are certainly indicators that this management team operates in other areas in ways that would not be safety enhancing if that was how they operated in the safety arena. We can only hope (and I do) that they really are bipolar here - operating customer visible things in a closed, non-communicative manner while continuing to run an open, safety encouraging culture where that is needed.
#44
Join Date: Jun 2005
Posts: 4,645
This is simply the law of averages, not a safety problem. The biggest airline in the world, during peak summer travel seasons, who flies the most planes per day is bound to experience more problems.
It's just math! If 1 in ever 100, or 1000, or 10,000...... flights has a problem or needs to return to the departure airport UA will be involved more often than any other airline.
It's just math! If 1 in ever 100, or 1000, or 10,000...... flights has a problem or needs to return to the departure airport UA will be involved more often than any other airline.
I don't think UA is unsafe and yes, at the moment I am still flying them. However, safety is a complex function of a lot of things which include sytems and culture. I am concerned that there is evidence that UA is not able to manage its systems reliably - that is troubling because if they can't manage the systems we can see there is at least some reason to believe that they may not be able to manage the systems we can't see any better. As to culture, it has been proven many times in many places over the years that one of the biggest issues for safety is a culture of open communications and listening to "outlier" opinions. Again, the only thing we have from outside looking in is what we can see and what we can see is a management that seems to have a tin ear on issues that they don't want to address. Does this tin ear extend to internal processes that could impact safety - no evidence but again troubling. I have absolute confidence in the pilots and staff at UA - that is in no question. Besides - pilots arrive at accidents before anyone else and so have ultimate motivation for safe operations. But in the larger context safety is the product of the entire operation and management and there are certainly indicators that this management team operates in other areas in ways that would not be safety enhancing if that was how they operated in the safety arena. We can only hope (and I do) that they really are bipolar here - operating customer visible things in a closed, non-communicative manner while continuing to run an open, safety encouraging culture where that is needed.
Taking this one step further, part of culture is how the culture views risk management. Some companies view risk management with disdain, and so they under-invest (or divest) in practices that protect from undesirable outcomes. When the odds fall against them, those protections don't exist, so a terrible outcome occurs. Other companies value risk management, invest in it, and therefore, have layers of protection that defend them against adverse outcomes when the odds are stacked against them, when a black swan event occurs.
I once had a conversation with a legacy UA risk management person, and I was extraordinarily impressed with the systems and practices that he discussed with me.
What's happening now under the CO regime? I haven't seen any evidence to make me feel that it's good.
Last edited by iluv2fly; Aug 21, 2012 at 11:56 am Reason: merge
#45
Suspended
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: SEA
Posts: 12,485
By any measure I can think of, by any measure that's been published and that I've read, UA ranks dead last measured by "rate" so they do seem to be worse, operationally, than any other airline in the country and many other airlines in the world, as a function of flights flown.
Both UA and CO had exemplary safety records. I have to wonder why you are attempting to portray one pre-merger carrier as safer than the other?