So you're comparing what TSO's do to the slaughter of Jews & Pols ?

Slaughtering Pols ? Best idea yet

No, you just brought that up. Not me.

I and others sometimes compare the TSA's "I'm just doing my job" line with SS guards because that is the most striking example that people understand. There are countless other examples, but that is the one that usually gets the thinking processes started. How else do you get sheep to think?

Sure it would. Politicians would talk about "necessary inconvenience" and "primary responsibility is to keep people safe," and it would sail through, because the opponents' argument would basically come down to "willing to accept a slightly higher risk to speed up the process," and that never works explicitly, only implicitly (i.e. speed limits).

And yes, I do believe the liquids ban does reduce risk by a miniscule amount - I still oppose it, but it does, much as requiring everyone to fly nude and shackled to the seat would reduce the risk of hijacking.

Profiling... requiring shoes to be removed is not unconstitutional because if I recall correctly courts have already ruled on the constitutionality of airport security and the issue of implied consent.

You are waaayy underestimating the opponents. All we'd have to do is demonstrate that the liquid ban is nonsense and the liquids that we carry on a plane cannot be used to create an explosive. There is ZERO explosive risk in toothpaste, nail polish, perfume, water, medicine, etc. no matter how large the bottle. If we were allowed to have a public debate on this, it would be obvious how silly it is.

Paradoxically, I believe that it increases the security risk. We are now asking TSO's to look for more prohibited items than ever. By doing so, they are more likely to miss certain ones, which may be the important ones. If I am asked to only look for three items, I will be much more likely to find those three items than if I am asked to look for fifty items of which those three are a part.

Well sure, but the reasoning is probably that to check everyone's liquids would take too long, therefore by limiting the amount per passanger they believe the threat to be reduced sufficiently... Not sure what metric was utilized to come to this conclusion, but it seems the logical explanation.

In December 1994, Yousef boarded a Philippine Airlines Flight 434 in Manila headed to Cebu; he pretended to be an Italian man named Armaldo Forlani. Midway through the flight "he disappeared into the toilet, took off his shoes to get the batteries and assembled his bomb which he tucked into the life vest under his seat, seat number 26K. The plane flew on to Cebu where Yousef got off before the final leg of the flight to Tokyo, Japan. Haruki Ikegami, a 24-year-old businessman, took Yousef's old seat. Two hours later, the device exploded, killing Ikegami. The blast blew a hole in the floor and severed the cables that controlled the plane's flaps. The jet's steering was crippled but the captain made an emergency landing in southern Japan, saving 272 passengers and 20 crew.

Yousef monitored the effects of his "test", then increased the amount of explosive in his devices and began preparing at least a dozen bombs.

But just before the Bojinka Plot was due to be launched a fire started in Yousef's Manila flat and police, led by Aida Farsical, uncovered his plot. They also discovered he had been planning to assassinate the Pope and President Bill Clinton.


Liquid explosives were used in this plot.

Please tell me that you do not think ONE incident in TWLEVE years constitutes a credible threat?

So what? The way you check the KHIAI baggies, you won't detect liquid (or any other) explosives in there. Until you start looking for explosives in those bags (and please don't, it's enough of a hassle at the airports as it is), you can save yourself a lot of typing by not relating to stories like the one you had above.

By no means. Just pointing out that if he can do it. the foiled plot in London was gonna try it.

BTW....good to see you again CG. It's been awhile. Still come thru RDU ? I do see some "flyertalk" tags come thru every once in awhile. I always try to ask what their forum handles are.

First, the foiled plot (which probably couldn't have even been pulled off) was not using nitro, but attempting to use other chemicals to be mixed.

Second, if the plot in '94 was so credible, then why didn't we start this liquid nonsense back then.

Third, an ETD would detect the nitro. So why didn't the TSA make this a higher priority in getting equipment out into the field if this was such a credible threat.

Fourth, the nitro that was used did not bring down the plane and nitro is very unstable. It would seem that a solid explosive is more stable and would be a more credible threat. Why isn't the TSA more focused on that?

A single 'liquid' explosive (nitroglycerin) stabilised with cotton, so not really liquid. And other components including the above-mentioned batteries, some wiring and a modified wrist watch; and a detonator ! The nitroglycerin used could easily be secreted in 1 or more <3oz bottles with innocuous labels, just as in the incident you cite (contact-lens solution).

Youssef did not mix two liquid explosives on board the plane.

The current checkpoint might pick up the metallic components, but a slack x-ray operator could easily miss them. A visual 'baggie' examination would probably not find the nitro.

1st : I see you used the word "probably"

2nd : Were not the chemicals in question also in liquid form ?