DHS Calls for Liquid Explosive Detector by September
#16
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As I mentioned in a previous post, not only is the technology already there, so are the machines! Faculty at my alma mater designed and built a machine to detect all types of chemicals and organic compounds instantly without any sample preparation. Their machine is small, cheap and could easily be integrated into the screening process.
However, until logic returns to the screening process itself, no matter of machines or technology will help. Remember - the TSA won't even let you carry on a sealed bottle of liquid you just purchased from an airside vendor.
How many bottles or jars containing liquids or gels does the average passenger carry with them? 5? 10? Will they need to sample every single container? How long will that process take?
Is the threat still realistic? What if the specific threat or process identified by the threat morphs and becomes undetectable by the new technology they just spend a billion dollars on?
I see more taxpayer waste and more tail chasing in our future
However, until logic returns to the screening process itself, no matter of machines or technology will help. Remember - the TSA won't even let you carry on a sealed bottle of liquid you just purchased from an airside vendor.
How many bottles or jars containing liquids or gels does the average passenger carry with them? 5? 10? Will they need to sample every single container? How long will that process take?
Is the threat still realistic? What if the specific threat or process identified by the threat morphs and becomes undetectable by the new technology they just spend a billion dollars on?
I see more taxpayer waste and more tail chasing in our future
#17




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Originally Posted by Wiirachay
The airport security teams in Israel are probably laughing at us. 

; the ones laughing loudest, I believe, are those who reside in caves in certain parts of the Middle East...
#18
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Originally Posted by Bart
Am I oversimplifying here.
...
I have to agree that this is just a PR stunt.
...
I have to agree that this is just a PR stunt.
Never mind that by the time any such technology was implemented the bad guys would have moved on to the next methodology. Or softer targets. It would be nice if we could be one step ahead of them, but I'd settle for being even. One (or two) steps behind just doesn't cut it.
#19
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Originally Posted by txrus
I think they're just shaking their heads &
; the ones laughing loudest, I believe, are those who reside in caves in certain parts of the Middle East...
; the ones laughing loudest, I believe, are those who reside in caves in certain parts of the Middle East...
#20
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Originally Posted by Bart
Am I oversimplifying here? I don't know. I do know that these same machines can be recalibrated to detect all sorts of drugs by changing the definitions algorithms. We do not use them as drug-detection machines, but they can certainly be used in that capacity. What these machines do is alert on whatever you define for them to alert on; hence, my confusion about why the call for "liquid explosive detectors" when it's just a simple matter of recalibrating the machine.
#21




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Originally Posted by jonesing
The argument that such measures would effectively kill business travel and probably commercial airlines in general? He doesn't see it..."people will just have to adjust how they do business then." 

Fortunately we still have elected officials.
#22




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... has anyone read the info on the bottle screening devices web site they have cooked up... yeea, they have a web site for the solicitation... well delving into that you gotta read all the hoops that procurement is doing with this... wonderful little pdf file available here
so there are 9 levels of technical readiness levels of assessment... from risk assessments to cost analysis... from what i see, and my experiences working with the government, i'd say this assesment will be about an 18-24 month process before they come to any real conclusion...
yup... no water for you!
so there are 9 levels of technical readiness levels of assessment... from risk assessments to cost analysis... from what i see, and my experiences working with the government, i'd say this assesment will be about an 18-24 month process before they come to any real conclusion...
yup... no water for you!
#23

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Not to mention the way DHS R&D procurements work:
1 - allocate an absurd fraction of the money and time it actually will take
2 - rush out a half-baked RFP
3 - modify and/or withdraw it repeatedly
4 - finally accept white papers
5 - deposit all white papers into a black hole
6 - give the funding to two or three of the politically connected usual suspects
7 - pull the plug, after finally realizing that once again nothing they've come up with will be workable
8 - repeat
And the whole exercise is pointless anyway because there's nothing resembling quality assurance in the explosives screening process. (See above 5-8 for what has been going on since pre-9/11 days with proposals for QA.)
1 - allocate an absurd fraction of the money and time it actually will take
2 - rush out a half-baked RFP
3 - modify and/or withdraw it repeatedly
4 - finally accept white papers
5 - deposit all white papers into a black hole
6 - give the funding to two or three of the politically connected usual suspects
7 - pull the plug, after finally realizing that once again nothing they've come up with will be workable
8 - repeat
And the whole exercise is pointless anyway because there's nothing resembling quality assurance in the explosives screening process. (See above 5-8 for what has been going on since pre-9/11 days with proposals for QA.)

