From an article ( http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060815/..._plot_security ) before it was sanitized. You'll find this article cached on Google http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:m...ient=firefox-a

Many experts have been concerned about liquid explosives for years. However, TSA, which has spent tens of billions of dollars over the last 3 years, did nothing about this threat until the British uncovered this latest plot. I almost wrote, "Incredible!", but nothing TSA does is beyond belief. Pathetic is more accurate to describe the lack of foresight and imagination on the part of TSA. Aviation consultant Michael Boyd hit the nail on the head in his latest update - read the article linked here http://www.aviationplanning.com/asrc1.htm

"TSA's Rule: No Shirt. No Shoes. Now You Can Fly
US Aviation Security: Stupidity As An Art Form

There's no doubt about it. The bad guys are planning to hit us again.

The foiled UK plot is just one example. Not particularly sophisticated, but still an indication of a deeply-organized threat. ...

There's also the clear indication that the US aviation system is a sitting duck.

We've spent what, $15 billion? $20 billion? on "security" and all we have to show for it is an enormous bureaucracy..."

Hmmm. Let's see, instead of manning security checkpoints at a few hundred airports in the U.S., we could put enough operatives into the field to try to figure out what hundreds of millions (if not billions) of other people around the world are thinking and doing, and thereby KNOW that we can stop them all before they try to do anything harmful.

And when our government tries to do things concentrating on human intelligence like study patterns of calls from questionable overseas numbers, and listen to sat/radio transmissions involving overseas calls involving risky areas [i.e., calls to U.S. from hotbeds of terrorist activities], the civil libertarians again get up in arms, contending that rights are being violated.

How do you suggest we effectively concentrate on human intelligence? Even on just the foreign visitors in the U.S.? In the year 2000, there were 50 million visitors to the U.S. How do we investigate them on the "human intelligence" side to determine their likelihood of causing harm? And that's just the visitors. Doesn't include aliens living here. And sure does not include any kind of human intelligence on foreigners in their own countries who might have terroristic intentions.

Maybe we get about 10 million FBI agents here in the US to investigate all the aliens and visitors, and then get about 20 million CIA agents around the world, to investigate all the potential terrorists in other countries. That ought to do it.

So, just how do we EFFECTIVELY concentrate on human intelligence, instead of security screening? And how is it possibly going to cost LESS than the current program of security screening at airports?

Inquiring minds want to know.

It's why we have the CIA.

If the calls are entirely overseas on both end, there's no issue.

If one of the terminating points is in the US and there's enough of a reason to monitor it, there's enough of a reason to get a FISA warrant.

You try to make it seem like you can only have one, but not both.

HUMINT and other intelligence resources are finite. Most of what's collected is garbage anyway. There are targeted entities and targeted people and you develop leads off of that. Beyond that, it's classified and I can't tell you more than that (and no, I'm not kidding, I did work in this field).

So 99.9% of the people entering the US aren't going to be a threat.

You concentrate on what are the biggest threats and go from there. Stuff gets prioritized due to limited resourses. Risk management, not risk avoidance is practiced. Intelligence agencies do it. I don't know why TSA can't. And especially with what's going on in Iraq, Afghanistan and other areas where troops are deployed and people really ARE dying, these agencies still practice risk management. While every life lost is tragic, they focus on the largest threats to the troops safety and go from there.

Well, the current bans on liquids/gels are a waste of resources because anyone with a plastic bag of some variety or anoter and more than half a brain can readily circumvent the current procedures at US airports that prohibit such items. In effect, the current ban only applies to those people which volunteer to surrender their liquids/gels, don't care about their liquids/gels or are too incompetent to squirrel them past security. Basically, the ban doesn't apply to any terrorists who are half-way "competent".

The US government politicians and bureaucrats (esp. DHS/TSA) really are making fools of themselves with this liquid/gel ban.

I'm currently reading Richard Clarke's "Against All Enemies" (audio version so I can't go back and cite exactly). He mentioned a plot back then regarding trans-Pacific flights to the USA featuring Islamic "inflight cocktail service" as with the London fellows. I mention this because the response was to (temporarily!) ban liquids/gels on those flights only. His brief description of the details sounded exactly like what we have now.

You're probably referring to Oplan Bojinka.

Yes, indeed. Thanks.

My point was that the authorities seem to have just re-activated that plan wholesale on the entire domestic network.

Even in the eyes of the Filipino Islamic-majority groups that usually are accused of being "affiliated with Al-Qaeda", that wasn't "Islamic 'inflight cocktail service'", but considered "unIslamic 'inflight cocktail service'". Sort of in the same way Hezbollah condemened the 9/11 attacks.

For "you" not being able to bring liquids etc. on board may "not" be the end of the world. For me it means not flying unless I absolutely have no choice. It means cancelling a planned trip to Hawaii, and perhaps one booked to Aruba. It means changing my entire lifestyle. Fortunately I fly very little for biz so I can drive as an alternative.
But there are many of us who are more than inconvenienced by these new regulations

Bojinka is absolutely nothing like the current situation, except in that it used liquid explosives. The explosives were pre-mixed before being brought on board, not mixed from noxious and highly concentrated chemicals in highly exothermic reactions that would more likely result in the inside of the lav (and the would-be terrorist) having acid and chemicals spewed upon him than result in any kind of explosive being made.

That's why I think this whole thing is ridiculous. Anyone with a basic knowledge of chemistry and a few hours to spend on Google can figure out exactly what one needs to construct such a bomb, and find out exactly why it's infeasible to construct it on board. The only one that has components undetectable by ETD is TATP, but without several pounds of ice in the lav with you, you're not going to have much luck making it. All the others have nitrates as a component.

Go after the guy with the rather large dark glass bottle full of something that looks to be water but has a strong smell and that he refuses to sip. (While you can drink low strength peroxide without killing yourself, since it's mostly water, drinking high concentration peroxide such as would be necessary to make TATP or other peroxide bombs, it'll cause immediate and significant badness)

The current security measures are worse than useless, as they give us a false sense of security. After all, a couple of determined terrorists could always inject their bladder with the components of many binary explosives, although TATP is not one of them, since the peroxide would immediately begin foaming and cause the person's bladder to burst before they managed to get to the airport (or out of the bathroom if they did it in the airport bathroom before security)

I don't quite understand why so many are completely unwilling to take the time to even begin to understand what a farce this whole thing is.

I will agree with one security related statement, though. We need more puffers and more ETD swabbing, not less. Putting shoes through X-Ray machines does absolutely nothing now that we have WTMDs that detect metal all the way down to the floor, and will therefore register a knife concealed in a shoe, which is the extent of the threat from an ETD swabbed shoe.

Without going into too much specifics, would it be possible to give us an idea of what the mixing scenario would look like?
What would the baddie need to bring into the lav (I'm assuming this cannot be done at one's seat)? It's rather cramped in there, with not much space to put things down easily whilst juggling vessels. The common impression seems to be that it's a matter of unscrewing one's Gatorade bottle filled with peroxide, scooping in some doctored mascara/shampoo/toothpaste, and shaking the result until it explodes?

I can't give you incredible specifics, but everything I've seen indicates that it's a matter of mixing the two slowly and carefully and letting them catalyze for awhile. If you cap the bottle you're using to mix it in, the fumes will cause the bottle to explode from the liberated gases before the reaction is complete. If you don't explode, you'll likely poison yourself in the relatively poorly ventilated lav. Most of them if you don't keep cool will decompose rapidly prior to completion of the reaction, spewing the mixture all over you.

Also, there aren't that many truly binary explosives, most of them require three components, although the acid is generally only a catalyst. And shaking would be a bad idea, unless you want premature detonation, which would again result in little more than a burst vessel and crap all over the inside of the lav, and a dead would-be terrorist.

Except that one that's actually sold, which consists of pouring nitroethane into a container full of tiny plastic beads and letting the nitroethane soak through.

Additionally, the components of most of these are volatile fluids that will decompose if exposed to light and will not be contained in plastic bottles, and due to that volatility need to be kept cool, and also produce lots of fumes.

Lastly, I'm pretty sure, but wouldn't be in a position to know like the head honchos at the TSA, but at least one of the components of all of the explosives one can (relatively, none of them are truly easy) easily mix are detectable by ETD machines, with the exception of TATP, which I believe is only detectable once mixed, but would be very difficult to clandestinely mix on an aircraft, given that one would require 90 or 100% hydrogen peroxide, which isn't very stable. It also takes several hours for the powder to precipitate out of the acetone and peroxide mix, and needs to be kept cool the entire time.

Thanks to Djlawman for spurring me to Google "liquid explosives" and learn about these things for myself.

If someone spends a rather long time in the lav and makes it smell of chemicals, you know something funny is going on. Of course, he's probably dead by then from the fumes..so look for guys going into lavs with two or more drink containers and a gas mask, and probably a glass bowl or flask, too.

Really the only one I'm worried about is the commercialy sold mine clearing explosive that consists of nitroethane and the aforementioned tiny plastic pellets as a sensitizer. (nitroethane is pretty darn stable without a sensitizer, most explosions without it have been caused by valve hammer effects causing a rapid rise in pressure in the container dispensing the fluid) Of course, that one needs a detonator, since it's quite stable even when mixed with the sensitizer, so if we stop making the TSA do stupid things like X-Ray shoes and look for harmless "weapons," maybe they'll be able to concentrate on finding important things like that.

IMO, good security consists of an xray of hand luggage, a WTMD, and an ETD swab of shoes and perhaps the confiscation of dark glass bottles that the owner is unwilling to drink from, if we're worried about people somehow smuggling an equal amount of acetone and a few pounds of ice onto the plane and letting them react for a few hours.

P.S. Sorry for the ramble, I'm no editor.

Setting aside beer and wine bottles, the only legitimate liquids I've needed to transport in large dark bottles were prescription mouthwashes (Peridex).