EPS

Flying the deadly skies
Whistle-blower thinks the state of U.S. aviation security invites another attack
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cg...NGIVJPJR91.DTL

LessO2

So many on-target sentences in that article.

This one probably summarizes it the best....

Wally Bird

And this...Not news to some of us.

Spiff

"You combine this atmosphere with absolutely no accountability and it is a very dangerous formula for a repeat of 9/11. "

entropy

I think we all know that its made it more miserable.

The most disturbing part is that they suppressed the failures of the security and fired (worthlessly demoted) the people who tried to do something about it.
sad sad sad

Scifience

I agree that the TSA is, for the most part, just for show.

However, I don't think another 9/11 will happen. Not because of the TSA or the government, but because the passengers wouldn't allow it. The reinforced cockpit doors are also a good security measure that can prevent a 9/11-style hijacking.

etch5895

With any luck Americans will come to their senses next election year and maybe this will all go away. Or at least get fixed.

entropy

the problem is not preventing another 9/11, passengers can do that. The problem is preventing other types of attacks. They aren't doing jack to prevent those.

Scifience

I realize that. I just hate how people keep comparing everything to 9/11, instead of just saying "security is not sufficient to prevent attacks." Instead, by making the reference to 9/11, the imply that the attacks we are not protected against would be of the same type.

Our friends in the Pointy Objects Confiscation and Barefoot Traveller Enforcement Squad (better known as the TSA) aren't looking at the big holes in security, like unscreneed cargo and are instead choosing to focus all their energies on the things that make air travel appear secure to the average American. "See, we make everybody walk through this metal detector and take off their shoes, and we take away lighters and nail clippers, so you're all safe now."

juanvaldez

Everytime I get a secondary screening, makes me wonder how good the initial one was...

Superguy

The fact that there's SSSS and secondaries for people who don't alarm is a tacit admission that TSA doesn't have confidence in the screening either.

jtkauai

Xlnt thread folks. There are some times when Flyertalk really rules, and this is one such case.

Does the general public have any clue, or ? And does anyone in the government at any level care?

bocastephen

I think the problem is, the general public doesn't care...at least not enough to exact change. The politicians know any attempt to change airport security that even appears to 'weaken' it, is a death sentence for their political careers. Political opponents only need to run attack ads with an ode to 9/11 and a byline that Sen./Rep. So-and-so is going to let that happen again, and it's game over.

My long detailed letter to the House Subcommittee on Aviation, which proposed solutions and fixes, still sits unanswered, even after being in direct contact with a Legislative Aide there. I think at this point, their only interest is preventing fiscal chaos at the TSA, while ensuring the security theater keeps the public in line.

We will continue to suffer while politicians put their fears and careers ahead of the national public interest.

exerda

That is unfortunately true.

These ads could be countered, but it would take some good PR work to do so in a way that would get the message across and be effective advertising at the same time. I'd want to accuse the challenger of wearing blinders to real security threats, wasting taxpayer money with little results to show for it, and of wanting to strip away civil rights. Still, the "safety moms" would be against me regardless of any logic or reason from the get-go in such a campaign.

Bart

As you know, I'm all about context and perspective. I respect Bogdan Dzakovic's background and expertise but have to couch his comments in terms of a jaded whistleblower who isn't going to look for any silver linings. This doesn't mean we have to dismiss what he says. It just means we have to account for his perspective. However, much of what I'm about to say is probably going to shock a lot of you, and some of you will say that I've "finally awakened" when that's not the case at all.

First things first, we have to agree that it makes no difference whether the current state of airport security applies to the TSA's way of doing things or the private contractor companies. Ultimately, the federal government decides the procedures. So slamming TSA screeners is just a waste of breath and effort. Criticizing TSA in the same context as its predecessor, the FAA, from a purely airport security screening policy and procedure perspective, however, is completely fair.

The biggest challenge to any security policy is balancing risk against threat. If you take it to one extreme in the form of risk avoidance, then you can certainly reduce the likelihood that something will be smuggled past security, but that will come at the cost of tremendous inconvenience and many false alarms. The airline industry simply couldn't survive.

The best choice is risk management that acknowledges that security is less than perfect but is willing to take that risk in terms of targeting the obvious threat as opposed to the theoretical one. The problem here is on agreeing what is reasonable and what isn't. And TSA hasn't reached that point yet. However, in all fairness, TSA has made some recent modifications to its prohibited items list: cigar cutters, scissors, small hand tools, corkscrews, cuticle scissors and can openers, each prohibited items immediately after 9/11, are now permitted. Then again, in some areas, TSA has taken a step backwards: the restriction on lighters is a clear example. Still, overall, it does appear that TSA is attempting to strive towards risk management as opposed to risk avoidance, even if it's at a snail's pace. Still, there's much more improvement needed: eliminating the SSSS policy, modifying the shoe criteria to a more reasonable and feasible level (yes, in the wake of the recent Houston incident, I still think the shoe screening criteria can be modified but never eliminated), and modifying the PI list for knives (I can see prohibiting a standard Swiss Army knife with its 3"-3 1/2" knife blade but not the small pocket knives with the 1" blade).

Here is the problem I have with Dzakovic's criticisms: ANY level of security CAN be penetrated. The vulnerabilty needs to be assessed and measured, but one will NEVER achieve perfect security. I agree with Dzakovic that TSA should be able to detect and prevent the most rudimentary of terrorist methodologies. And in this area, TSA needs improvement, but I would argue that it's much better than its private contractor predecessors. (For the record, there has NEVER been a direct comparison between the pre-9/11 private contractor security companies and TSA...that's an online myth that has duped many people...particularly in this forum. I'll gladly argue this point separately.)

One of my many responsibilities was to conduct Red Team attacks against very sensitive US Army facilities and units. While I'm unable to disclose the nature of these facilities or identity of these units, I'll say just this: let your imagination fly, and you'd probably get an idea of the type of units/facilities I'm talking about. One of the commanders of one of these units was highly skeptical at our capabilities; in fact, he said that he'd dispute any finding we had without solid proof to the contrary. Talk about a tough customer. So, I had him autograph the back of one of my calling cards. A week later, he called me. His operations officer found that exact same card inside one of his vehicles in a highly restricted area that was under 24 hour security ranging from closed circuit TV to human observation. We then discussed how to improve his countermeasures.

Point: there has to be a reasonable acceptance of flaws in security. Perfect security is impossible. This doesn't mean it's not worth the effort. It only means that sound security has to be dynamic and always in a state of change. Otherwise, you end up with a Maginot Line.