From today's NY Times:

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/05/na...rtner=homepage

And maybe I'm just tired, but is this quote backa**wards or is it representative of the DHS/TSA? I vote for the latter.

Where's VideoPaul - I'm waiting to hear about his experience at EWR earlier in the week. Do you suppose he's still on the golf course or did he mouth off to a screener and is being held captive in a stairwell at EWR?

TSA screeners are not law enforcement officers, so they should not be expected to be trained in retrieving handguns, such as the situtation described in this article, especially if a criminal is brandishing one. This article does make several excellent suggestions that would cost minimal extra taxpayer dollars to implement, especially the larger space for passengers to unload personal items before the WTMD. Of course, most of us frequent flyers know the routine, placing watches, cell phones, etc. into briefcases or other bags while waiting in line rather than using the filty bins. But this problem is simple to solve. Why didn't TSA think of this solution, simply longer tables? How much did consultants charge taxpayers for thinking of this solution?

I am glad to see the article at least mention the issue of air cargo on passenger planes. Perhaps if TSA paid 5% of the attention to this issue that it pays to shoes and pat downs, it would figure out a way to screen air cargo, a problem that has destroyed airliners in flight before (Lockerbie, ValuJet, Air India over Canada).

In a side bar to the article mentioned in my first post, the Times published a list of 10 of the 120 security breaches reported at airports in 2003.

The economic impact of just those 10 breaches and resulting evacuations: $18,613,000

TSA Screener: "Gee, that guy I sent to the penalty box for not taking off his shoes just walked off after getting tired of waiting around. Time to dump the terminal."

or

TSA Screener: "Gee, that bag that went through the x-ray 5 minutes ago had something inside that looked suspicious... Time to dump the terminal."

Solution to scenario 1: minimize secondary screenings to only when they are really needed and not as a penalty for noncompliance with the shoe rules.

Solution to scenario 2: grab suspicious bags immediately.

How is having more armed guards going to speed up the process?

There's a huge misperception here. Some of it comes, I believe, from how screeners handle pocketknives, scissors and other minor prohibited items and the assumption that major items such as firearms, grenades, IEDs, etc are handled the same way. There's another erroneous assumption that passengers are allowed possession of their items before a screener searches it.

Whenever the x-ray operator detects a prohibited item, the operator will generally notify another screener to search the bag to locate and remove the item. However, if it is an obvious threat such as a pistol, grenade, IED, etc., then the x-ray operator takes a different course of action, and no screener is placed in a situation where he or she has to handle a handgun as alleged in the article. Could be that there have been some incidents in certain airports where this may have occurred. If so, then those screeners weren't following correct procedures and the problem is not with TSA policy but with compliance of written policy. Big difference.

Taken to an extreme, there is one major vulnerability which, in its final analysis, is a moot point and not a reflection on TSA as it is on the whole concept of airport security as a whole. If a group of terrorists were to simply storm a terminal such as what was done in the 70's in Europe, then there is absolutely nothing that could be done to prevent that other than to respond once events begin to unfold. Arming TSA screeners with weapons is certainly not a viable option. Flooding airports with armed troops has been tried but wasn't very practical nor cost effective. This scenario is still a realistic one, but not one to the point where we need to station troops at each and every terminal in anticipation of an armed attack. Taking this scenario one step further, why stop at just an airport? This same horrifying scenario applies to a sports event, shopping mall or Fourth of July street parade. So where do we draw the line? The brutal reality is that we have very little choice but to artificially draw the line somewhere between what we can prepare to counter and what we hope may never happen. At airport security checkpoints, the assumption is that someone will try to smuggle a weapon through security rather than just storm the terminal and kill as many innocents as possible.

I'm curious how you regard the Richard Reid incident. Unlike other scenarios which are based on theory, this really happened. His shoes were really filled with explosives and, had he been successful, the explosion would really have brought the plane down. Nat Wheathole then pushed the point further with his little escapade during which he made it through the WTMD without having to remove his shoes which were filled with putty simulating an explosive compound.

I'm not a fan of the shoe policy myself. However, my military training tells me that this is still a good way to smuggle explosives if the only screening criteria were based solely on metal shanks alarming the WTMD.

So I'm curious what your solution is to this reality? As I've posted previously, perhaps TSA can relax the standard to a more random criteria, say one out of every five passengers gets the shoe treatment. But, this should be based on analysis of intelligence that supports mitigating this threat to a less stringent standard and not based on the policy's unpopularity with passengers.

Please share your solution, if you dare.

What if Reid had hidden the explosives in his underwear, or inside a bodily orifice? Where do we stop in our quest to be 100% safe? I think we have to face the fact that we're never going to be 100% safe and that we need to draw the line on invasion of privacy at some reasonable place. We're putting nearly all of our efforts into air passengers. As others have pointed out, there are plenty of other vulnerabilities in our society.

I agree with you. Arming guards (I assume this to mean TSA screeners and/or placing armed security guards at certain points inside secure areas) is not a good solution. First of all, a great majority of security breaches are, for lack of a better word, dumb mistakes as opposed to deliberate attempts to circumvent security for sinister purposes. As inconvenient dumping a terminal is, it's a lot better than some yahoo with a gun shooting a grandfather picking up his grandchildren who merely didn't understand that he needed to go through the security checkpoint rather than go the wrong way through the exit.

There's another aspect to this as well, the rules of engagement for the use of deadly force have to be meticulously detailed. Even when we had National Guard troops stationed at the airports, the reality was that if someone were to run through the checkpoint without being properly screened, there was absolutely nothing that soldier could do other than chase that person down and physically detain him rather than plant a 5.56 NATO round in the violator's cranium.

The other aspect is accountability. People lose stuff. And if an armed screener/guard were to misplace his/her weapon inside the sterile area while on duty, it would result in a massive terminal, perhaps even airport, dump until that weapon was retrieved. For those of us who were in the military, remember the drill whenever an M-16 was lost? Nobody went home, nobody entered the area, and nobody rested until that weapon was found.

Then there's the basic problem with too many people being armed. While it may enhance security to one degree, it will also have the chilling effect of intimidating law-abiding citizens. We already experience many such accusations just with the current TSA screening policies; this will truly elevate it to a more realistic complaint with armed guards roaming the jetways and concourses and give airport terminals a gulag effect.

Nope. We're not there yet, and I hope we never will be.

I flew into Europe during the crisis in Kuwait when everyone was on alert. I remember seeing the German Polizei patrolling the airport at Frankfort with their Uzi machine guns and patrol dogs. They were everywhere, and I remember thinking that you'd never see that in the US no matter how bad this terrorism thing got. Then, a little over 10 years later, I was working at the airport as a security screener with a team of Army National Guard troops armed with M-16s. I'm glad we stood them down, although I do appreciate their dedication and professionalism. Still, it placed these troops in a very unenviable position the same as KGB border guards, and that's not the direction airport security should take.

yeah, yeah, yeah. blah blah blah.

Stick to the topic. I referred to a documented incident. I'm talking about something that happened not what can theoretically happen. If this is the best you can do, then I am quite disappointed.

Easy. Apply a consistent standard nationwide. Drop the hypocrisy and end the charade. Don't say on the website "you do not have to remove your shoes" then have screeners say you must remove your shoes and if you don't you go to the penalty box. Be honest with the public; tell is -- on the website and bia the spokesman Mark Hatfield -- that it really IS mandatory. Then tell the public that cargo still isn't screened for explosives, but we are all still somehow safer.

OK. So you're not really opposed to the policy itself. You criticize the inconsistent manner it is applied across the board. Either it is a threat or it is not. If it is, then all airports should follow the policy. If it is not, then TSA should drop it. Do I read you on that? If so, then I agree with you 100%.

One of my coworkers had to travel recently due to a death in the family. He told me he hit what he considered a cross-section of airports from the small podunk municipal airport to the major ones (LAX and BWI). (He had to make a series of trips, so he got a good view of different airports.) What he told me was quite shocking and appalling; and it admittedly gave me a better appreciation for some of the criticisms I read in here. He shared with me not only the fact that many checkpoints simply ignore the shoe policy, but that many screeners apparently follow a different uniform policy and have quite an unprofessional appearance as well as some pretty rude attitudes. He said I'd pretty much have a field day straightening out a lot of screeners out there, and that he came to appreciate SAT that much more.

Yeah, we have our own internal problems. What workplace doesn't? However, after what he saw, he came to appreciate the professionalism, courtesy and thoroughness of our crew. He said he now understands why so many other airports are having problems with passing the annual certification tests or why the Red Team tests create such worries.

I'm sure there are other good airports. Being honest here: my friend didn't happen to come across any of them. However, like me, he views things with a critical eye. So I make this admission here today but also hope to give you some insights on what you can expect whenever you travel through SAT.

Hindsight is 20/20. Reid was tapped as a security problem when he first went to the airport. What have we learned from this incident other than to look at shoes? I'm looking at the big picture. Sure, you can completely search all shoes. Those intent on harm will simply choose another method of sneaking things in.

Regarding shoes, I'm sick of being lied to by TSA staff who seem to make up the rules as they go along. When we federalized screening we were supposed to have gotten a standardized process, not different rules in different airports. It would certainly make things a lot easier if there was some consistency.

On the issue of terrorists simply storming an airport...

You're right, we can't arm the TSA (which would require much more than simply handing out guns and even basic training in handling them in an armed conflict), nor can we bring in more LEOs or introduce armed soldiery to the airports to prevent such a remote-probability event anyway.

What we currently do is rely upon intel; we hope to catch at some stage the planning and assembly of people, weapons, etc. necessary for such a task. Is that surefire, foolproof, etc.? No, but it's what we've got.

Perhaps more "on our side" is that simply storming an airport, with whatever intent (mahem / killing pax, employees, etc.; trying to board a plane and hijack it; etc.) is probably not enough of a statement for most of the big-time terrorist groups. They'd much rather bring down iconic buildings, blow up sports events / other gatherings of plain Jane Americans enjoying themselves, cause a WMD event of some sort, etc. We need to focus our efforts there rather than worrying our collective rears off that Osama & Co. are going to try small-time antics like bringing down a plane or two (although coordinated take-downs of 10-15 planes, that's a different story)

Maybe it's possible we could see an Invasion USA style series of small attacks disrupting our lives, but I doubt the terrorists out there could pull something like that off.

Small point, but the assured destruction of that plane is just acquired conventional wisdom. It is not proven, nor has it been demonstrated as fact. Yeah, I saw the sneaker err.. disruption tape which was done in completely different conditons, thereby simply proving that an explosion in an open field makes a big bang and lots of smoke.

It is a very compelling justification for the shoe carnival, but that does not in and of itself make it true.