So much of the complaining about TSA, whether about search techniques, selections, or almost any other issue, rests on the fundamental conflict in approach between Israel/El Al and the US government (putting aside the resource issue, which is a very real one). Either you accept the need for profiling and some level of very personal questioning on every flight (and the possibility that you'll be kept off a flight for what seems to be an unjustified reason � and you can�t sue!), or you accept that everyone is a threat until shown otherwise, and must be treated as such. [And to have a reasonable discussion I think one must also accept that a personnel issue (overzealous screeners) does not necessarily tar the entire system - there will always be bad screeners who need to be weeded out, and I agree that the TSA needs to be more transparent about how it reacts to complaints.]

However, without some level of profiling or other threat assessment (i.e., CAPPS), every passenger is equally likely to be a threat until they clear security, either through their own actions or the actions of others. Because our higher passenger volume virtually eliminates searching everyone (checking in at the airport 3-4 hours ahead of time for every flight) random selections are really the only other option. People who are upset that they or someone they know was selected are asking for exemption from the randomness because of who they are (mother, grandmother, child) - reverse profiling, if you will. But there are many who oppose this sort of approach, and the US political environment virtually guarantees that the Israeli approach will never take hold here.

I think it really boils down to the question of which we will have � because I believe we must have one or the other. Recognize that El Al does it all, really � they profile like crazy, they use some pretty in-depth psychological techniques during multiple questionings, and they hand search virtually every bag, and magnetron or wand lots of people. Most of our complainers don't want anything of the sort - don't profile me, don't ask me what my business is, don't search my bags, don't search me.

So the question to the two sides is, what would you have us do?

If you are against profiling and intensive questioning at the airport like El Al, how much searching is appropriate? And who gets searched?

If you are against the sort of searches going on at US airports (again, admitting that an overzealous search is never proper), how much profiling and questioning are you willing to tolerate?

The challenge to the group is to come up with what you would do, not what TSA shouldn�t do.

Neither option is acceptable!

Screen everyone for guns and bombs via chemical and metal detectors. X-ray hand luggage, checked baggage.

No other searches of persons or belongings should take place! No profiling should be allowed! No lists should be kept or maintained.

Minimally/non-invasive searches for guns and explosives of all passengers should be done equally and that's it.

Isn't that a false dilemma ? Do you want to be beheaded or shot ?

I agree with you long-term - the best technology for each risk point would seem to be the best approach. But to say that neither is acceptable doesn't quite address the realities of today - as far as I know, the chemical detectors aren't ready yet, either techically (false positives/negatives) or in quantity needed.

And I'm not in the business so I'll throw a question out there for the techies - where are we on detecting ceramic weapons (guns, knives, etc.)? Is this technology reasonably close? Or is the answer the individual x-ray machines that made news when they were tested a few weeks ago in the UK? It seems to be good technology but it sure caused an uproar.

I don't think so, unless you take the position that anyone can fly anywhere and take anything on the plane with them for any reason. I'm pretty high on the libertarian scale but I don't go that far. If you accept that some level of screening in necessary/acceptable, then the dilemma is very real, at least to me.

Why not? The chemical detectors are in use at 6 airports and they will detect underwear and body cavity explosives that groping will not.


Ceramic weapons are not a credible threat. There are no guns that do not have metal components, except in the movies. Knives of any kind are not credible threats to aircraft.

Individual x-ray machines are not an acceptable solution, either. No level of radiation may be considered to be safe; it is therefore unacceptable to bombard people with radiation when other technology exists.

6 Airports sounds like a test - is there a timetable for manufacture and rollout?

The "test" has been going on for quite some time. The machines do work. GE has the capability to produce as many EntryScan3s as the TSA would care to order and pay for.

The TSA is just dragging its collective rear on this in order to justify harassing passengers with the Shoe Carnival and Cheap Feels.

Not true. Right now it is cost prohibitive and you know that.

Ending passenger harassment policies will free up any shortfall and you know that.

Not true. Order enough machines and it becomes cheaper. Restructure the TSA on the staffing side and it becomes so much more affordable.

What % of the TSA personnel are there for the "touchy-feely" aspects of the current process?

80% of them -- i.e., the "touchy-feely' ones -- could go with the proper technology applications.

You are correct a knife is not a credible threat to the aircraft but it is a threat when a nut is holding it to the throat of a crewmember or someones love one telling the pilot to do something with the aircraft or they will kill that person. Yes they may only kill that one person before a brave passenger takes them out but I don't think I would want to be put in that position of making that decision. Yes Ceramic weapons are a threat, if someone is going to sneak a weapon on a aircraft it will be in pieces. Yes there is metal in those weapons but if they are position through out the bag you can't detect them. Yes we need better equipment but that equipment cost money and America does not want to spend the money. Also airport are not set up for the type of security we need. At my airport we are just now getting an expansion of the current checkpoint. Our checkpoint now runs 3 lanes in a space of about 75 feet and we are consider a mid size airport putting a million + passenger thru a year. They need to rethink the prohibit list. We are so ingrossed at finding the little bulls*** thing we miss the big stuff. I think you should only be allowed to have ONE carry on item no larger than a normal size computer bag PERIOD. Just this one thing alone will cut the wait times in half or more at most airports.
The TSA does alot of knee-jerk reactions to thing, I see it all the time,the basic screener does not make the rules they just try to follow them as best as they can.Yes there are screeners with bad judgement out there but it take time to weed them out. This organization was thrown together so fast it has created alot of problems for itself. One problem is the people that make the rules have never worked in a airport on the checkpoint. Another is internal personnel problems. We don't even had Title 5 protection. They can pretty much do what they want with us. The courts even said that screeners are not protected under the whistle blower act because we fall under the exempted services. If you don't take care of your people they won't take care of you. I bet 80% of the screeners at my airport are looking for other jobs, just because of the crap we have to put with. But that is a different story.

I think you're setting up a false dichotomy. In fact, both of your proposed actions, profiling people for intensive search, and random selection of people for intensive search, leave the majority of passengers getting a search that TSA admits is ineffective. When did TSA admit that its non-SSSS search was ineffective? When it imposed additional searches for some people: they wouldn't waste resources doing extra searches unless the super-search turned up things the regular search missed.

The problem, as pointed out in the carnival booth paper from MIT, is that profiling people is a defeatable system. If you are choosing people for SSSS based on their identity or on their booking patterns, the group of bad guys will just send all potential evildoers on trial runs to determine whose identity and which booking patterns get the supersearch. Then when the real time comes for an attack, they are assured NOT to get the supersearch (just send clean people on clean itineraries).

Random selection is also easily defeatable, since the person is alerted before reaching the checkpoint that he or she is selected. Just try an attack, and if you get SSSS'ed, leave the airport and try again next week. If you are randomly selecting people, there will definitely come a day and a flight on which the bomber can avoid SSSS.

The actual TSA system for selecting SSSS seems to be a combination of the two, with somewhat more profiling than random selection.

The only not-defeatable search procedure is to search everyone. Whatever they need to do for an effective search needs to be applied to every single traveller. Selecting any subset of people for a supersearch is worse than useless - it's actually helping the terrorists get through without being super-searched!

What about the situation where a terrorist on the ground threatens someone's "loved ones" and tells said person they must do A or face "loved ones" being subject to B?

[This is not far fetched; it's happened.]

It's a no win situation on the ground or in the air