I believe that the entire "checkpoint," as currently exercised, is not cost-benefit justified. Screening should be returned to pre 9/11 levels, with less sensitive settings on the magnetometers, less restrictions on potential weapons, allow 2 carry-ons. We have better security with: a) changes in attitudes of flight crew and passengers; b) hardeded cockpit doors; c) more random FAM's. (I don't love everything about how FAM's are done, but I believe they make sense.)

Please see page 85 of "The 9/11 Commission Report" which states:

"The final layer, security on board commercial aircraft, was not designed to counter suicide hijackings. The FAA-approved "Common Strategy" had been elaborated over decades of experience with scores of hijackings, beginning in the 1960's. It taught flight crews that the best way to deal with hijackers was to accommodate their demands, get the plane to land safely, and then let law enforcement or the military handle the situation. According to the FAA, the record had shown that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it was to end peacefully. The strategy operated on the fundamental assumption that hijackers issue negotiable demands (most often for asylum or the release of prisoners) and that, as one FAA official put it, "suicide wasn't in the game plan" of hijackers. FAA training material provided no guidance for flight crews should violence occur."

The next paragraph in the report then explains that *everything* being done today at the checkpoints, standing alone, is potentially irrelevant to preventing another 9/11. Note that the comment below, from the ALPA Security Committee Chairman was made BEFORE 9/11. (The real changes that matter, post 9/11, IMO, are: a) different attitudes of flight crews and passengers; b) presence of more FAM's on random fights.)

"This prevailing Common Strategy of cooperation and nonconfrontation meant that even a hardened cockpit door would have made little difference in a hijacking. As the chairman of the Security Committee of the Air Line Pilots Association observed when proposals were made in early 2001 to install reinforced cockpit doors in commerical aircraft, "Even if you make a vault out of the door, if they have a noose around my flight attendant's neck, I'm going to open the door."

The current checkpoints still allow people to bring items that could be fashioned into a noose including rope, luggage straps, belts, clothing, etc. So the pointy object search isn't the answer to preventing

Reverse economics is having a play here. IYO it is not cost effective but the downside is that if things are relaxed and people dont feel safe, they dont fly. What impact would that have on the economy at a time when records are being broken for the first post 9/11? The settings on the magnetometer are the same now as they were then. You couldnt carry bowling balls on the plane back then and you can now. There are a host of things that have been allowed and new things are prohibited, it was give and take. IT is not the TSA that sets the one bag, one personal item, quota on carry ons. IT is not the passengers job or position that they should be willingly or unwillingly depended upon as a line of defense. IT appears that you are contradicting yourself by saying that hard cockpit doors are a good thing and then you quote from this saying that they arent. Which is it? OR are you furthering your point that a noose is a deadly weapon? If it is the latter then you are countering yourself once again with the reaction of the passengers.

You are incorrect.

Norm Mineta ordered checkpoints to restrict pax to one carryon plus one personal item on October 8, 2001, and the when the TSA was formed, it adopted this restriction and to this day has continued this restriction on the number of carryon bags:

http://www.tsa.gov/public/interapp/e...orial_1052.xml

Mineta said at the time that the limit was devised in conjunction with some airline representatives (including Bob Baker at AA), but the fact remains that it is a government-imposed limitation.

Just the facts, please.

No, there is no contradiction in what I am saying.

BEFORE 9/11, the chief of Security for ALPA was saying that a hardened cockpit door didn't matter, because he would open the door voluntarily.

AFTER 9/11, I am saying that attitudes are different. A hardened cockpit door matters because now the crew *won't* open the door, even if you have knives and guns.

In other words, before 9/11 the crew attitude (consistent with official FAA policy as cited) was that a hijacker was welcome to come into the cockpit. You didn't need a pointy weapon - any threat (a noose) was sufficient.

Today it is different because the attitude of the crew has changed. If you did have a gun, and if you said "I will shoot people unless you let me into the cockpit [and allow me to fly this plane into the White House]" the crew will tell you "Sorry, you can't have the controls to my plane."

Since the *attitude* has changed (based on experience), it doesn't matter whether you have a noose (which we aren't taking any steps to prevent) or a metal knife to eat your steak in first class (which is currently banned). What has changed is not the ability to threaten to harm someone on the plane - it is the expected response which is different. [Note the word "expected" response - it is certainly possible that there is still a captain, somewhere, who would open the cockpit door if you said "Unless you open the door I will urinate on the carpet" - but no person would plan an attack which required 4 different flight crews, on 4 different planes, to react in that manner.]

The general population hasn't a clue about the realities of safety or security...they only conceptualize what they are told. If you announce that airports are returning to pre-9/11 screening procedures and these procedures have been determined by the government to be perfectly safe, then 9 out of 10 sheeple will believe that and fly. If the TSA employee base reacts to that change by picketing outside the terminals with signs that read "you're all going to be hijacked", then 9 out of 10 sheeple will believe that and not fly.

What I do know is this: if the TSA continues to make the screening process more and more inconvenient, invasive, lengthly and uncomfortable, more people will reduce their flying because they will decide the entire trip is not worth the aggravation - safety or security won't have anything to do with that decision. If you don't believe that, then I suggest chatting with some of the folks standing in line for 2 hours at FLL T2, or walking a mile to the end of the Pier D line at BWI. I doubt many of them will proclaim "isn't this great? we are finally safe!"

I am editing to echo SBrower - before 9/11 the pilot would do whatever the hijacker demanded because it was consistent with training policy and their directive to protect the aircraft and onboard passengers/crew. Now the game has changed - I doubt you would find any Captain who would open that flight deck door for any reason, no matter what horrible carnage is happening in the cabin. To further that notion, I believe that FAA and airline policy should hard-code that into training - meaning, it should be written that in the event of a cabin disturbance of any kind, the flight deck door shall NOT be opened under any circumstances without a verbal directive from an appropriate FAA ACDO or control tower senior manager, who would have that instruction pre-confirmed by the DOT and DHS. Nothing to think about, nothing to ponder, nothing to consider. It is the law, period.

The process, in my opinion, upon discovering a cabin disturbance of a serious nature which is not in the control or management of the cabin attendants, should be to dump cabin pressure to incapacitate anyone running about the cabin, declare an emergency and descend rapidly to land at the nearest airport as designated by ATC. There should be nothing vague for the crew to interpret or think about.

^^^

Unless this sort of policy is written, trained-on, and enforced, all the screening and confiscation in the world won't do a lick of good.

Prior to 9/11, a hijacker could probably have gained control of the cockpit by politely threatening the crew/passengers without ever brandishing a weapon or prohibited item. If the crew would surrender on demand, which I don't believe they would today, then the presence of prohibited items is irrelevant.

And IMO "dump the pressure and land the plane" with heavy emphasis on land the plane, which in my understanding could be accomplished in 10-15 minutes in most non-overwater situations (albiet at non-optimal airfields and with non-optimal effects on the passengers' stomachs), is the best protection we have against another 9/11 and much more realistic than gun/taser/axe/knife/fist battles in the sky.

Great point. The checkpoint charade is much worse than useless: it's an expensive government program that acts as a huge disincentive to flying. I've heard over and over again from many of my acquaintances that they're sick of the security hassles and that they're cancelling trips or opting to take a train or bus or private car. Joe Sharkey has documented in the New York Times a huge response from women who say they are changing their plans to avoid flying because of the unwelcome breast exams. Screening isn't just purposeless, it's purposeless and destructive to the travel sector.

"Finally someone with common sense."

Is reverse economics a TSA term of art like discombooberate?

I would like to have the WTC back to pre-911 conditions with about 30 friends there too but it just isn't going to happen.

I sympathize with TSA Manager and *most* human beings on this planet, who would prefer that 9/11 didn't occur. The point is, as stated in my original message, that the checkpoint security isn't rationally related to that event.

What if, consistent with the statement from the ALPA Security Chair, we knew that the 9/11 hijackers had, in fact, used nothing more than their t-shirts converted into nooses around the neck of the flight attendants. Would that mean that we would, or would not, have changed checkpoint security?

What is the relationship between 9/11 and searching checked baggage? Absolutely *none* (unless you assume that 9/11 was the first notice that terrorism existed in the world - but no literate person could make that claim.)

On the other hand, if the lesson of 9/11 is that terrorism can reach into the US, then what steps have we taken, proportionate to the increased cost of checkpoint and checked baggage security in relation to:

Trains (ours are no more secure than those in Spain)
Subways (ours are no mroe secure than those in Japan)
Nightclubs (ours are no more secure than those in Indonesia)
Restaurants (ours are no more secure than those in Israel - in fact, far less)
Parked cards (ours are no more secure than those in Ireland)
Schools (ours are no more secure than those in Russia)

So true. I think that if the 9/11 terrorists had used their bare hands, we would have at least gotten the idea that you can't prevent this sort of thing with security point checks. The most valuable thing that they've done since 9/11 is secure cockpit doors. Based on any rational assessment, that is ALL that they should have done above pre-9/11 security. The rest is an enormous, expensive circus, complete with clowns.

While I agree with your basic sentiment that hardening the doors (and hopefully training cockpit crews not to open them but to land the plane in the event of a disturbance) is the key relevant response to 9/11, 9/11 did spur a few other worthwhile endeavors.

The improved effort to screen checked bags for explosives was/is worthwhile. Not because of 9/11 but just because it was overdue anyway. The implementation, however, is questionable considering the locked luggage and theft issues. I also think the concept of screening carry-ons and/or people for explosives is worthwhile (ETD, puffer, etc.) though the implementation has generally been abysmal (shoe carnival, groping of people clearly not hiding explosives outside their body based on the contour of their clothes, extreme overreaction to false positives on the ETD, etc.) Of course, neither of these do anything to stop 9/11-style hijackings, but they do address actual holes in security.

The rest of it, however, is well-described by your analogy IMO!

The facts are that there was a restriction as to the number, size and weight of carry on luggage in FAA regulations PRIOR to 9/11. After 9/11 the government advised airlines to keep the regulation and uphold it. TSA doesnt enforce it and has nothing to do with it.

Nice post!