How would we define "an acceptable security system?"
#1
Original Poster
Join Date: Dec 2010
Posts: 855
How would we define "an acceptable security system?"
Originally Posted by fishferbrains
So instead of hating the system (and some those who work within it), how would we - the educated frequently-flying public - define "an acceptable security system" in a post-hate DHS/TSA world?
How would the passenger and/or baggage screening process change?
What defines an acceptable level of risk?
Who would best be responsible/accountable for administering it?
Who would be be in charge of oversight?
I've just been thinking how good it would be to offer a solution.
Thoughts?
So instead of hating the system (and some those who work within it), how would we - the educated frequently-flying public - define "an acceptable security system" in a post-hate DHS/TSA world?
How would the passenger and/or baggage screening process change?
What defines an acceptable level of risk?
Who would best be responsible/accountable for administering it?
Who would be be in charge of oversight?
I've just been thinking how good it would be to offer a solution.
Thoughts?
As to these:
Who would best be responsible/accountable for administering it?
Who would be be in charge of oversight?
Who would be be in charge of oversight?
I'm thinking that security must be handed back to the Airlines and the Airports, so that the Constitution and the free market can answer these questions:
How would the passenger and/or baggage screening process change?
What defines an acceptable level of risk?
What defines an acceptable level of risk?
Living in a free society means sacrificing the false security government control represents. The answers to these all-important questions are unknown to me, but that's OK. I don't have to know the answers from the beginning in order to go about arriving at the correct solution.
I've seen threads like this before, and previously had no answer. Now I know what I think, because I've had months to ponder the question.
Anyone else care to venture an opinion?
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Last edited by ElizabethConley; Mar 29, 2011 at 7:55 pm Reason: Clarity
#3
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What we had on 9/10/01 was adequate to the risk. I'd update the hardware that was used so they can better x-ray the stuff and get a better idea of what's there. I'd also fix the puffers and use those, as well as ETD swabbing and dogs.
I think it should be implemented by private companies with oversight by the gov't. The oversight should provide reasonable rules like we had pre-9/11 and have random red team testing. Real penalties should be assessed against the companies for failure to perform, up to and including the loss of contract if deficiencies are not corrected in a reasonable and specified time period.
CYA and fear should not dictate risk. Terrorism should be looked at objectively for what it really is, with the likelihood of success and the damage caused factored into mitigation measures. Mitigation should be proportionate to the risk. Theater should be eliminated. Whenever I see theater, it just tells me that they're doing what people think they want to see rather than what wants to be done. I'm more concerned about what's going on down below. Adequately screen pax and the pax will take care of the rest if something goes wrong in the cabin. However, pax are powerless to do something if something goes wrong down below.
We've wasted a ton of money on security and don't have anything to show for it. The GAO has shown what an abysmal failure TSA is. If we can get the same results with more or less pre-9/11 security, plus get it a lot cheaper, what do we really lose? Nothing. We have a lot to gain, though.
I think it should be implemented by private companies with oversight by the gov't. The oversight should provide reasonable rules like we had pre-9/11 and have random red team testing. Real penalties should be assessed against the companies for failure to perform, up to and including the loss of contract if deficiencies are not corrected in a reasonable and specified time period.
CYA and fear should not dictate risk. Terrorism should be looked at objectively for what it really is, with the likelihood of success and the damage caused factored into mitigation measures. Mitigation should be proportionate to the risk. Theater should be eliminated. Whenever I see theater, it just tells me that they're doing what people think they want to see rather than what wants to be done. I'm more concerned about what's going on down below. Adequately screen pax and the pax will take care of the rest if something goes wrong in the cabin. However, pax are powerless to do something if something goes wrong down below.
We've wasted a ton of money on security and don't have anything to show for it. The GAO has shown what an abysmal failure TSA is. If we can get the same results with more or less pre-9/11 security, plus get it a lot cheaper, what do we really lose? Nothing. We have a lot to gain, though.
#4




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What we had on 9/10/01 was adequate to the risk. I'd update the hardware that was used so they can better x-ray the stuff and get a better idea of what's there. I'd also fix the puffers and use those, as well as ETD swabbing and dogs.
I think it should be implemented by private companies with oversight by the gov't. The oversight should provide reasonable rules like we had pre-9/11 and have random red team testing. Real penalties should be assessed against the companies for failure to perform, up to and including the loss of contract if deficiencies are not corrected in a reasonable and specified time period.
CYA and fear should not dictate risk. Terrorism should be looked at objectively for what it really is, with the likelihood of success and the damage caused factored into mitigation measures. Mitigation should be proportionate to the risk. Theater should be eliminated. Whenever I see theater, it just tells me that they're doing what people think they want to see rather than what wants to be done. I'm more concerned about what's going on down below. Adequately screen pax and the pax will take care of the rest if something goes wrong in the cabin. However, pax are powerless to do something if something goes wrong down below.
We've wasted a ton of money on security and don't have anything to show for it. The GAO has shown what an abysmal failure TSA is. If we can get the same results with more or less pre-9/11 security, plus get it a lot cheaper, what do we really lose? Nothing. We have a lot to gain, though.
I think it should be implemented by private companies with oversight by the gov't. The oversight should provide reasonable rules like we had pre-9/11 and have random red team testing. Real penalties should be assessed against the companies for failure to perform, up to and including the loss of contract if deficiencies are not corrected in a reasonable and specified time period.
CYA and fear should not dictate risk. Terrorism should be looked at objectively for what it really is, with the likelihood of success and the damage caused factored into mitigation measures. Mitigation should be proportionate to the risk. Theater should be eliminated. Whenever I see theater, it just tells me that they're doing what people think they want to see rather than what wants to be done. I'm more concerned about what's going on down below. Adequately screen pax and the pax will take care of the rest if something goes wrong in the cabin. However, pax are powerless to do something if something goes wrong down below.
We've wasted a ton of money on security and don't have anything to show for it. The GAO has shown what an abysmal failure TSA is. If we can get the same results with more or less pre-9/11 security, plus get it a lot cheaper, what do we really lose? Nothing. We have a lot to gain, though.
I personally like the idea of the puffers - randomly applied. It'd be nice to avoid having to take off the shoes and avoid having to deal with the rest of the theater.
Since many of us don't see what's happening on the cargo side of the world, it seems like a place to transfer at least a portion of the funds to bolster screening there.
Imagine the Billions and Billions we could save.
#5
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I personally like the idea of the puffers - randomly applied. It'd be nice to avoid having to take off the shoes and avoid having to deal with the rest of the theater.
Since many of us don't see what's happening on the cargo side of the world, it seems like a place to transfer at least a portion of the funds to bolster screening there.
Imagine the Billions and Billions we could save.
Since many of us don't see what's happening on the cargo side of the world, it seems like a place to transfer at least a portion of the funds to bolster screening there.
Imagine the Billions and Billions we could save.
The CN Tower in Toronto had everyone going thru puffers. I agree that it's slow ... it took almost an hour just to get to the elevator after buying the ticket because of it. However, if there's one security measure that's effective and slow, I'm more willing to put up with it than the current stupidity we have that causes long lines.
A puffer as a random secondary isn't bad and I wouldn't object to it because it's noninvasive. Been thru one before and it's easy. And back in the day, TSA actually let you keep your shoes on if you went thru one.
#6
Join Date: Mar 2008
Posts: 3,004
When about 1 in 75,000 people (by TSA weekly report) are found with something that could be remotely considered a threat, why would anyone waste their time suspecting the other 74,999 passengers? The whole "treat everyone as a suspect" viewpoint is really the problem. It is the real cause of the resentment of the passengers, is really against anything that our country stands for (fairness, innocent until proven guilty, our Bill of Rights), and makes the TSOs sitting ducks for criticism. Sadly it doesn't make us safer, just more vitriolic.
#7
Join Date: Oct 2010
Posts: 438
When about 1 in 75,000 people (by TSA weekly report) are found with something that could be remotely considered a threat, why would anyone waste their time suspecting the other 74,999 passengers? The whole "treat everyone as a suspect" viewpoint is really the problem. It is the real cause of the resentment of the passengers, is really against anything that our country stands for (fairness, innocent until proven guilty, our Bill of Rights), and makes the TSOs sitting ducks for criticism. Sadly it doesn't make us safer, just more vitriolic.
And keep in mind that, of those 1 in 75,000 people who ARE found with something that could be remotely considered a threat, the number of them who were actually planning on USING the item to cause harm is probably close to, if not, zero. I know *I* wasn't planning on taking down the plane when they confiscated my eyelash curler!
I'm not qualified to offer suggestions that involve technology (puffers, scanners, or whatever). What I CAN say is that it is an impossible, and in fact ridiculous, goal to try to reduce the risk of travel by air to zero.
Airplanes are no longer an attractive target for terrorists - and that's without all the theatrics and civil rights violations that are going on at TSA checkpoints today. Reinforced cockpit cabins and raised passenger awareness have already completely neutralized any possibility of a terrorist taking over a plane with something as simple as a sharp object. And while explosives could still be a threat, the absurd physical assaults being perpetrated on the flying public would not stop a determined terrorist from bringing some aboard. The ways in which they could do so now are so numerous, I can't believe that the TSA is even bothering with their crazy antics. A terrorist could simply shove it up an orifice, or obtain a prescription for medicinal liquids and just carry it on disguised as a medical liquid...and those are only the two most obvious. Hell, the underwear bomber would still be able to walk right onto a plane TODAY!
There are so many more attractive domestic targets these days, that would be WAY easier for a terrorist to blow up than an aircraft. Heck, just walking up to a crowded checkpoint, getting in line, and then blowing himself up would be far more effective...and would pack an emotional wallop, reminding all Americans that we will never be secure! There is absolutely NOTHING preventing a terrorist from doing that...NOW!
And there are other forms of travel that make more attractive targets. Just look at Israel - how many buses have been blown up? Look at trains - a terrorist could easily blow up a train and cause numerous deaths. And why stop at forms of travel? Look at Bali - the bombings of night clubs still reverberates over there. Heck, a terrorist could just go stand in line at Disneyland and show us Americans who's the boss by blowing up hundreds of families. Why would a terrorist bother with a plane these days?
And yet, nobody is asking the DHS to start screening people on the streets, in lines at amusement parks, or at malls. Nobody is demanding that disabled grandmothers allow their hoohahs to be groped by strangers in order to go into a movie theater. So why are we doing it for airplanes?
I'm not suggesting that we should take away ALL security procedures for boarding an aircraft. But there needs to be a hard-and-fast litmus test: does it violate our civil rights? (And nobody with a brain can logically argue that what they are doing right now doesn't violate our rights - the only argument is that the end justifies the means.) Is it an effective method of actually stopping a real threat (as opposed to stopping me from curling my eyelashes). Does it MAKE SENSE?
I will leave it up to better minds than mine to find technologies that will help reduce risk without robbing us of our dignity and civil rights.
The random puffers sound promising (I don't know anything about them). Metal detectors should continue to be used - we don't want to make it easy to get a bomb on a plane. But stop confiscating boyscout's Swiss army knives, or technician's tools. Stop with the liquids ban - a determined terrorist could get past it so easily already, it's just plain silly. And for God's sake, STOP THE SEXUAL ASSAULTS!
#8
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And keep in mind that, of those 1 in 75,000 people who ARE found with something that could be remotely considered a threat, the number of them who were actually planning on USING the item to cause harm is probably close to, if not, zero. I know *I* wasn't planning on taking down the plane when they confiscated my eyelash curler!
I'm not qualified to offer suggestions that involve technology (puffers, scanners, or whatever). What I CAN say is that it is an impossible, and in fact ridiculous, goal to try to reduce the risk of travel by air to zero...
...a determined terrorist could get past it so easily already, it's just plain silly. And for God's sake, STOP THE SEXUAL ASSAULTS!
I'm not qualified to offer suggestions that involve technology (puffers, scanners, or whatever). What I CAN say is that it is an impossible, and in fact ridiculous, goal to try to reduce the risk of travel by air to zero...
...a determined terrorist could get past it so easily already, it's just plain silly. And for God's sake, STOP THE SEXUAL ASSAULTS!
Bolding mine. It is silly, and when it's not silly it's profane. Every bit of it tramples our Constitutional rights.
#9
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- The scope of the screening would be strictly restricted to to items that fall under the definition or weapons, explosives and incendiaries(WEI).
- Any intrusive searches, defined as searches requiring physical touching of the passenger or electronic methods that produce images of the passenger's body without clothing, would require a written disclosure of the need for the increased screening signed by the requester and a supervisor with a copy of the request to be provided to the passenger.
- Acceptable causes for the intrusive searches would include random selection by numeric electronic random generators, failure to clear the passenger-selected screening method, failure of an ETD scan of passenger carry on luggage, failure to pass a screening by trained detection animals, or when an acceptable government issued ID is not available. The intrusive search may also be initiated by TSA management above the supervisor level for any reason, but the reason must be documented, signed by the person initiating with a copy of the documentation given to the passenger.
- If available, a passenger may request the use of WBI in place of the WTMD for implanted medical devises. If the WBI is not available the passenger may request the physical inspection without the need for documentation.
- The passenger alone may choose whether to have screening done in a private or public area, that any screening may be witnessed by anyone of the passenger's choosing, and that the witness may photograph or video the process without restriction. It will be the responsibility of the TSA to provide a place of screening that does not have security sensitive items in the field of view of the camera and that all personal involved with the screening acknowledge their consent to the recording of the screening by their agreeing to the do the screening.
- Once the passenger has been cleared at the primary screening area, no additional screenings of the passenger may occur in the sterile area without written documentation as to why the additional screening is being done, signed by the person initiating the additional screening and a copy of the documentation being made available to each screened passenger that requests one. This additional sterile area screening includes any screening of items purchased or obtained in the sterile area, searches of the person, or their items to be carried on the plane. The sterile area screening can only be requested by someone at the supervisor level of above and the request must include the specific area or group for the screening. These screenings may include only the specific passengers of a single flight number or selected gate within a specific time frame.
I would find this fair and acceptable.
Last edited by InkUnderNails; Mar 29, 2011 at 9:15 pm
#10
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1) No ID checks - anyone can fly anywhere, any time.
2) Bags through an xray/explosives sniffer
3) Passengers through WTMD
4) No nudeoscopes, no secondaries, no liquids ban, no SPOT, no NFL, no random nonsense at the gate, no TSO's, no TSA, no DHS. In short, no bull .... - just common sense.
2) Bags through an xray/explosives sniffer
3) Passengers through WTMD
4) No nudeoscopes, no secondaries, no liquids ban, no SPOT, no NFL, no random nonsense at the gate, no TSO's, no TSA, no DHS. In short, no bull .... - just common sense.
#11
Join Date: Dec 2010
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No exceptions, no discretion (no screener's choice, no supervisor's choice, period. probable cause ONLY.
#12
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Disagree entirely on what should generate an invasive search. There should be NO intrusive searches, defined as searches requiring physical touching of the passenger or electronic methods that produce images of the passenger's body without clothing without an alert caused by a device or swabbing that yields a false positive only RARELY, and such screening ONLY if the cause cannot otherwise be identified. The frisk that ensues from this must be an LEO frisk ONLY. Not the sex grope that is currently performed.
No exceptions, no discretion (no screener's choice, no supervisor's choice, period. probable cause ONLY.
No exceptions, no discretion (no screener's choice, no supervisor's choice, period. probable cause ONLY.
A more perfect system, without the consideration of cost or time, would be the appointment of an administrative judge, assigned to the airport, to sign off on all intrusive searches after cause has been presented. It would likely delay the passenger, but it could be set up to be available as quickly as possible. With all of the security people that we pay for that do essentially nothing, one more doing something important would not be noticed. The passenger could also consent, but this would set up a potential for coercion. IMO, documenting the reason for the search and providing the passenger with the documentation would reduce the number of such searches.
In most cases, when people are asked to be held accountable for their actions, and those actions are documented, the result is a more thoughtful and reasonable decision. (However, I realize that I just used "thoughtful" and "reasonable" in a single sentence suggesting a possible course of action by the TSA, so I can understand why the skepticism would be high.)
#13
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Disagree entirely on what should generate an invasive search. There should be NO intrusive searches, defined as searches requiring physical touching of the passenger or electronic methods that produce images of the passenger's body without clothing without an alert caused by a device or swabbing that yields a false positive only RARELY, and such screening ONLY if the cause cannot otherwise be identified. The frisk that ensues from this must be an LEO frisk ONLY. Not the sex grope that is currently performed.
No exceptions, no discretion (no screener's choice, no supervisor's choice, period. probable cause ONLY.
No exceptions, no discretion (no screener's choice, no supervisor's choice, period. probable cause ONLY.
Agree. Poster suggests reasons for a frisk that are as unreasonable as what TSA is already doing.
#14
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They can do them because they are protected by the nature of the system that allows them. Change the nature of the system by inserting a reasonable change requiring accountability and they lose their protection.
Ideally, a judicial ruling that what they do is illegal and must be stopped immediately is at best years away, and even then can not be guaranteed if it does get judicial review. I do not trust the courts to stop this travesty. They are just as likely to make it judicially acceptable. And, then the game is over. They will continue because they will have the courts blessing.
#15
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I do not disagree. I am suggesting that if they are going to do the frisk, and for now without a court decision stopping them, they are, they should take personal responsibility for doing them by stating the reason for the decision and signing off on the decision. I also think, and this is just an opinion and subject to the high possibility of error that my opinions often generate, that the implementation of a valid and documented accountability system into the process will lead to its elimination. The actions can not withstand documented scrutiny. The current process lives and breathes on unaccountability and secrecy. Eliminate those and the system of illegal intrusive searches will eventually fail.
They can do them because they are protected by the nature of the system that allows them. Change the nature of the system by inserting a reasonable change requiring accountability and they lose their protection.
Ideally, a judicial ruling that what they do is illegal and must be stopped immediately is at best years away, and even then can not be guaranteed if it does get judicial review. I do not trust the courts to stop this travesty. They are just as likely to make it judicially acceptable. And, then the game is over. They will continue because they will have the courts blessing.
They can do them because they are protected by the nature of the system that allows them. Change the nature of the system by inserting a reasonable change requiring accountability and they lose their protection.
Ideally, a judicial ruling that what they do is illegal and must be stopped immediately is at best years away, and even then can not be guaranteed if it does get judicial review. I do not trust the courts to stop this travesty. They are just as likely to make it judicially acceptable. And, then the game is over. They will continue because they will have the courts blessing.
However alarming an ETD would in my opinion give cause for more in depth screening. Why is it so hard for TSA to knock off the BS and used devices that detect WEI?
Round file the WBI and deploy devices that detect chemicals of concern, or don't they really work?
Test for WEI and as you suggest document why any kind of frisk is ordered. That would at least hold TSA workers accountable for their actions.
Based on reports from off shore WBI machines have false positives of upwards of 75%. That is a story that TSA is working very hard to hide. No pat down should ever be conducted based solely on WBI screening.

