Should anybody care to read it.

http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/09/advanced...automated.html

How about some images of the same size and resolution as what a screener will see?

[/crickets]

There's no guarantee what Nude-O-Scopes will be using this, and the underlying problems still exist such as radiation exposure, not seeing into body cavities, etc. etc.

Even if a software upgrade was available would it be ported to both the MMW and Chertoff Special Backscatter machine?

The problem is using WBI as primary screening. More conventional screening methods should be used until the need to expand the screening of an individual based on undetermined threats.

WTMD, ETD Swab and visual screening of all people with Xray of all baggage and personal effects.

How long did it take to get the high resolution files of MMW & BackScatter scans? Oh, right.. We never got them.. Perhaps this given an indication of how long it will take for TSA to give us "more information at a later date"

Are you suggesting ETD on every bag and person that comes through?

The puffers work fine in the CN Tower in YYZ.

The puffers have been removed from the active inventory, with no plans to purchase more of them (not saying they WON'T make a comeback, but it would be about as likely as Ali getting in the ring one more time - what is more likely is a new tech that is more sturdy and checkpoint friendly will be developed and marketed at some point in the future). This makes the puffers a non-start issue, they are simply not a viable option right now. So the only viable (currently) way to check all passengers and bags for explosives would be ETD.

It's not an either/or. Just go back to pre-9/11 screening.

I'm suggesting an escalating range of options including WBI if threats cannot be resolved.

No need for that. Nine years on and the TSA has not been worth one single dime of the funding spent on them. It is one thing to look forward and ask "what if", it is another thing to look backward and ask what was accomplished. TSA has spent a huge amount of the public's dollars and accomplished zip. Spiff has been right since day one. TSA is workfare.

Puffers were removed through political infighting. There is no "checkpoint friendly" technology for screening. The boarding area is not the appropriate place to look for threats. TSA is useless as a security measure and should have never been funded. You have to rely on Jedi mind tricks to justify your existence. Come on man.

I'm more likely to die of prostate cancer than be benefited in any way by the existence of the TSA. Frankly, I'd rather die of prostate cancer than have to deal with the TSA on my next trip.

Sorry, bird, but you are beating your head against the wall.

No one from the TSA will ever admit that the organization they serve is a put up job. (After all, what exactly did Argenbright fail to do on 9/11?) In fact, they will go out of their way to plant the occasional seed of "we are the last line of safety before your flight leaves the gate."

How many times have our resident TSOs dropped into a thread and said, "The TSA is here to prevent another 9/11"? Then, one of us counters with the facts that nothing the TSA is doing today would have prevented 9/11 (for reasons very well known). They then retreat on the issue and wait for another opportunity to drop that blatant lie into the conversation to justify their existence as an agency.

It's completely disingenuous and completely based on motives of self-interest: they want to keep their jobs and the shiny tin badge that goes with it.

That idea has merit. However, the current thought process in DC (not just HQ mind you) seems to be moving towards the use of AIT (because it gives better ability to detect smaller things that may be missed by a metal detector), and there are some new tech advances they are working on in the ETD area (I have no specific info I can dig up online yet - but there are some promising xray advances as well that combine new stuff with the older imaging processes that are pretty cool). The problem we (collectively the public and TSA) have is we are at the mercy or the technology right now. There is no silver bullet tech that solves all of the security issues and the passenger relations issues. I personally like the ability to clear that AIT gives the agency, and with work beginning on the ATR software programs, I think that a lot of the issue about privacy can be resolved by a simple software upgrade. I understand there are other concerns about the AIT, but the most popular challenge right now is the privacy issue, and I am the kind of guy that would rather give the passenger some comfort if it is at all possible. I think the ATR could be a big boon for TSA if we can get it approved.


Political infighting or not, the puffers had maintenance issues, consistency problems and the problems seemed to be getting worse instead of better. My Jedi powers far exceed yours, so be careful how you tread in that arena.

TSA is not the last line of defense for much of anything except the checkpoint. We are a part of the security process (the largest, most visible part of the process). There are several other stopgaps and layers that are in play after you leave the TSA checkpoint. Anyone that loses sight of that is not very aware of the real world. There are several things that are in place now, that COULD (operative word here is could), have made a difference. We will never know, because we can't rewind time and redo the whole thing over with the new layers and processes in place - and anyone that claims otherwise is simply giving an opinion (much like I do in many threads here!). I think (and JK HUggins and I had some of this discussion the other day), that having the attitude of preventing ANY attack is a good thing as long as the person is doing their job the way it is supposed to be done. JK pointed out that some people use it for "mock heroism" and I agree in some cases. I think that most of the TSOs have the thought in the back of their mind that letting something through can mean that people may die, and if some of that thought process is tied to 9/11, then so be it. I personally don't want to let someone through because it could mean that someone else could get hurt, in the perfect case, it could mean a LOT of people could get hurt (or worse). I was lucky enough not to lose anyone on 9/11, but i had a friend that was in the Pentagon when it happened (he was pretty scared, but unharmed except for a bit of smoke inhalation). I understand the natural connection some folks that work here feel towards 9/11 - many lost family or friends. Some folks joined here simply to prevent another incident like it, some joined because they felt a call to try and protect the US in some fashion (many of the former military members feel that way), and some joined because it is a steady job. Whatever reason these folks joined, as long as they are doing the job the way it is supposed to be done, I really don't care what their motivation is.

The fact remains that puffers are effective in other venues, and pose no health or privacy risks. The only reason the Nude-O-Scopes are being rolled out is because of the Chertoff Group and other and other former TSA administrators that are now lobbyists. I don't see any credentials from Tom Blank that shows he is an expert on screening methods.

I didn't say "checkpoint." I said "before your flight leaves the gate." I am fully aware of the layers including the apparently short-lived but completely ridiculous checking of drinks purchased airside with chemical test strips.

Yes. "Could." That conditional phrase, however, doesn't change the fact that saying "we are here to prevent another 9/11" (or similar terminology) is pure puffery. I guess you could say it is just someone giving an opinion but you and I both know full well that there is a quantitative difference between some average person saying "The TSA is there to prevent another 9/11" and a TSO saying "We are here to prevent another 9/11."

What did Argenbright do wrong on 9/11?

Correct, I said checkpoint. In some cases where screening is conducted airside at the gates and in those areas, I guess a case could be made that we are the last line of security before you get on the plane, but that is not a completely true statement. Each individual person is their own last line of defense if you look at it literally (whether they choose to defend themselves or not). The point I was making is TSA is not the last line of security, it is the largest and most visible component of the security network.

The reason I say it is simply opinion is there are just way too many variables and it happened in the past - we have no way of determining what would have happened. TSA, TSAs opponents or 3rd party persons could conduct all kinds of theoretical testing and experiments and conjecturing and discussion - but it will always boil down to what seems to be the general consensus of each group... A majority opinion formed by that group. This is not a forensic situation where you have a clear set of steps or pathological checklists you can use to determine a definite outcome. Things could have gone better, things could have gone worse, things could have stayed exactly the same. We could drive ourselves crazy trying to prove things either way, and it would still come down to an opinion in the end.

Saying something like preventing another 9/11 is an exceptionally broad statement. I come to work everyday with the intention of doing my job, doing the best I can and learning something new everyday to prevent any kind of an attack from happening. Another 9/11 is not a likely occurence in the current climate of this country - a plane with 200+ people on it blowing up is a much more likely outcome. I think the majority of TSOs come to work with a similar thought process. Like I mentioned earlier - false bravado or (to quote JKH again) "mock heroism" just does not have a place, as it serves no real purpose. However, working for TSA because you have a deep seated belief that you want to prevent attacks from happening on airplanes because of 9/11 is not truly a bad thing, in my opinion.

Argenbright did everything they were supposed to (according to what I have read) on 9/11. It is also one of the reasons that so many of the rules for TSA keep changing, and HQ incorporates "intentional inconsistency" in the way they do things. The bad guys knew the rules, circumvented them, and exploited the situation in a spectacular fashion from their point of view. The inconsistencies are built into the system to help provide less of a chance for someone to know what they can get away with. I personally am not a huge fan of that system, but there is some merit in that thought process. It can disrupt many things that are planned out by simply foiling one aspect of the plan. On the downside, it makes it a logistical nightmare for passengers trying to figure out what they can and can't take with them, and it is a constant PR bash for TSA because of that.