having read the following article, some nightmares seem to be ahead. I am not so much concerned about my own security (I am used to take risks, some times I even look for them), but I am caring about the security when my familiy/my friends/you/everbody else flies.

I might this weekend write letters about my concern, and ask for more informations, to:
- the Swiss air-traffic-authorities
- "my" favorite airlines (LH, SR, UA)
- IAPA (International Assoc. of Airline Passengers)

Could some of you - please - write to your local air-traffic-authorities, or do you think it is exxagerated and out of proportion?

(from bizmiles.com The Chandler Report)

Vector Of Vulnerability

By Jerome Greer Chandler

October 16, 1998
Reading time: �4 minutes

For all the improvements in airport security of late, there remains an Achilles heel, one the FAA--and terrorists--are acutely aware of. It�s air cargo. "It is the one avenue into an aircraft which is not thoroughly inspected at this particular time," says Lee Grodzins, a world-respected authority on explosives detection and vice president of advanced development for Billerica, Massachusetts-based American Science and Engineering.

Yes, passenger planes, not just airfreighters, carry cargo. Most often, it�s right beneath your feet, on the lower deck. Yet while your carry-ons are x-rayed, sniffed, or hand-examined and--at least on international flights--your bags are subject to x-ray or CT-Scan, air cargo "screening" is predicated almost exclusively on paperwork. "It�s all based on the assumption," worries Grodzins, "that the terrorists do not in some way subvert that system."

In the wake of the recommendations by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, the FAA tightened the definition of "known shipper" to ensure a greater measure of security in the transportation of cargo on passenger aircraft. It also improved "profiling" techniques to cull out suspicious cargo, and developed a security training program for trucking companies who accept air cargo. Smaller parcels are also subject to x-ray inspection. While all of this helps, it still doesn�t get around the fact that the system is not set up, on a comprehensive basis, to physically inspect large cargo. It is nothing less, contends Grodzins, than a vector of vulnerability.

What he advocates to suture the wound is a three-tiered system which would 1) employ sophisticated "backscatter" and transmission x-ray technology to check for explosives near the surface of large cargo containers; 2) use a second tier CT-Scan to detect explosives which might be secreted in the interior of a container; and 3) employ a trace explosives sniffing device. This troika, while not 100% effective, would--he believes--produce a "formidable security system."

To be practicable, any system would have to be premised on the fact that cargo, like people, travel by air because they have to get someplace fast. "You�ve got to make inspections relatively quickly," concedes Grodzins. And it can take a long time to CT-Scan an LD-3 (Lower Deck 3 container in which luggage and cargo are carried). To speed the process, he advocates a form of triage in which sealed, certified cargo from companies like General Motors and General Electric pass through unimpeded. "Some things are so secure, you really don�t have to touch them," maintains the former MIT professor. Other cargo, from less well-known shippers, might be suspect. Those, he says, "you have to be prepared to inspect."

The first scan would be quick, targeted at the surface layers of the cargo container. Traditional "transmission" x-ray techniques would provide high resolution detail of things like bomb components--power packs, wires, timing devices and the like. "Z-Backscatter" x-ray, a patented AS&E technology, would ferret out organics, like explosives. To the operator, they glow bright white.

Containers that pass surface scan, depending on circumstances and origin, could then be subject to computer tomography. Slice by slice, their innards would be probed for the untoward. Those scans "could require as much as ten minutes of tomographic study before we�re satisfied," said Grodzinx. CT-Scan could be augmented by sniffers. All airlines would have to do is drill a few holes in their LD-3s.

To date, no such hybrid system exists. The FAA has taken the position that there�s only so much money to go around, that proven security gaps have to be closed before potential ones can be covered.

Awareness, however, does not necessarily mean action. And an air cargo security system premised on proper paperwork does not guarantee safety. It�s enough to give industry insiders like Lee Grodzins a chill. "There�s no question but that the terrorists know our weak spots," he says. "If you ask me if I have nightmares, you bet I do."

Rudi: I had the same concerns when I read that article too. I read somewhere about
bomb limiting cages being developed that limited the damage just in case all the screening didn't detect an explosive. It could be a second line of defense but like everything else: very expensive.

not much sesponse on flyertalk on this issue.

But Swissair today responded to my letter and invited me to tour Zurich-airport (I will, on friday). They will show me some (but for security reason not all) security procedures on/with cargo.

As the international marketing manager for a company based out of LA and Miami, I have coordinated many air exports for the company.

We still have to fill out a "Known Shipper's Certificate" for every shipment that goes out via air. I thought that was nice. I don't mind the extra paperwork as long as it helps.

Rudi - I worked as a consultant on a cargo project earlier this year, and security is usually very tight. Western airports are usually very strict about this sort of thing, and even in some places where you would expect to be able to bribe your way through most things (ie, the 'developing world') they are still very strict about access to cargo/airport areas. As long as you're flying with a reputable airline you should be okay.